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Since its enactment in 1990, the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) 1 has dominated discussions of disability law in the legal academy.
Literally volumes of work have been devoted to defending, criticizing, and
analyzing the statute, the cases interpreting it, and the effects it has had
in the real world.2 That scholarly focus is in many respects entirely
appropriate. The ADA was a historic achievement. It represented our
society's first comprehensive acknowledgment that people with disabilities
are truly equal citizens, fully entitled to participate in all areas of political,
economic, and civic life. And in large and small ways the statute has
improved the lives of countless individuals who have disabilities. The ADA
has made buildings more accessible and people with disabilities more
visible in the community, and it has accelerated the process of removing the
stigma from disability.
But while the ADA's achievements must be celebrated, the statute's
limitations have become increasingly apparent. In particular, the statute
appears to have had little, if any, positive effect on the overall employment
of people with disabilities, and a number of commentators assert that it has
had a negative effect. 3 That result has occurred, I contend, not because of
the narrowing interpretations the Supreme Court has placed on the ADA,4
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
2. A list of all of the ADA-focused articles that have appeared in the law reviews would go
on for pages. In addition to countless individual articles, the ADA has also been the principal
subject of at least eight law review symposia. See Symposium, The Americans with Disabilities
Act: Directions for Reform, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1 (2001-2002); The Americans with
Disabilities Act Symposium: A View from the Inside, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 371 (1991); Symposium,
Backlash Against the ADA, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2000); Symposium, Defining the
Parameters of Coverage Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: Who Is "an Individual with a
Disability?," 42 VILL. L. REv. 327 (1997); Symposium, Disability and Identity, 44 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 907 (2003); Symposium, Facing the Challenges of the ADA: The First Ten Years and
Beyond, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (2001); Garrett, Disability Policy, and Federalism: A Symposium on
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1075 (2002);
Symposium, Individual Rights and Reasonable Accommodations Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 46 DEPAL L. REV. 871 (1997). Among legal scholars alone, the ADA has been
the subject of at least three full-fledged books and two edited volumes. See BACKLASH AGAINST
THE ADA: REINTERPRETING DISABILITY RIGHTS (Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2003);
EMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY, AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: ISSUES IN LAW,
PUBLIC POLICY, AND RESEARCH (Peter David Blanck ed., 2000) [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT,
DISABILITY]; DAVID M. ENGEL & FRANK W. MUNGER, RIGHTS OF INCLUSION: LAW AND
IDENTITY IN THE LIFE STORIES OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES (2003); SUSAN STEFAN,
HOLLOW PROMISES: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE WITH MENTAL
DISABILITIES (2002); SUSAN STEFAN, UNEQUAL RIGHTS: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE
WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (2001). A number of
legal scholars also contributed to the edited volume AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING
IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS (Leslie Pickering Francis &
Anita Silvers eds., 2000), which likewise focused on the ADA.
3. See infra Section I.B.
4. Much of the legal academic commentary on the ADA criticizes various decisions of the
Supreme Court and other courts that have narrowed the scope of the ADA. See Samuel R.
Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV.
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but because of the inability of antidiscrimination laws to eliminate the deep
structural barriers to employment that people with disabilities face. The
ADA's antidiscrimination requirement can prevent an employer from
refusing to hire a qualified person simply because the person has a
disability, and the ADA's accommodation requirement can force the
employer to make some changes in facilities or job tasks to enable
individuals with disabilities to perform particular jobs. But those mandates
do not require the employer to provide in-home personal-assistance services
or transportation to enable an individual with a disability to get to work, nor
do they require the employer to provide the individual with health insurance
coverage that is as adequate as he or she can receive through Medicaid. 5
The solutions to these problems require more than simply mandating that
individual employers cease discriminating and provide accommodations;
they require more direct and sustained government interventions such as the
public funding and provision of benefits.
In short, the future of disability law lies as much in social welfare law
as in antidiscrimination law. Although this point may not be obvious from a
scan of legal scholarship, 6 activists "on the ground" have increasingly
921, 930-52 (2003) (collecting examples of that commentary). Examples of the Supreme Court's
narrowing decisions include the restrictive readings of the statute's definition of "disability" in
cases like Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999), and Toyota Motor Manufacturing,
Kentucky v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002); the expansive reading of employers' defenses in
Albertson 's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999), and Chevron U.S.A. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S.
73 (2002); and the invalidation of the abrogation of state sovereign immunity under the ADA's
employment title in Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
5. See infra Part II.
6. There are remarkably few exceptions to the ADA-centrism of post-1990 academic
discussions of disability law. Some scholars have argued that the ADA cannot achieve its goals
unless societal attitudes toward disability also change, but those scholars have not pointed to any
policy intervention-aside from the ADA itself-that would cause such a change in attitudes. See,
e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, Socio-Legal Backlash, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 476 (2000);
Michael Ashley Stein, Employing People with Disabilities: Some Cautionary Thoughts for a
Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, in EMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY, supra note 2, at 51, 52-53.
Professors Matthew Diller and Mark Weber have provided the most notable exceptions to ADA-
centrism in the law reviews. Professor Diller has written two significant articles that have focused
on the role of disability in social welfare law--one of which explored the "dissonance" between
the ADA's response to disability and the social welfare system's response to disability. See
Matthew Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies: The Tensions Between the Americans with
Disabilities Act and Federal Disability Benefit Programs, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1003 (1998)
[hereinafter Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies]; Matthew Diller, Entitlement and Exclusion:
The Role of Disability in the Social Welfare System, 44 UCLA L. REV. 361 (1996) [hereinafter
Diller, Entitlement and Exclusion]. Professor Weber has written about the limitations of the ADA
as a tool for improving the employment rate for people with disabilities and has urged expanded
welfare protections and a system of job set-asides for disabled individuals. See Mark C. Weber,
Beyond the Americans with Disabilities Act: A National Employment Policy for People with
Disabilities, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 123 (1998) [hereinafter Weber, Beyond the ADA]; Mark C. Weber,
Disability and the Law of Welfare: A Post-Integrationist Examination, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 889
[hereinafter Weber, Disability and the Law of Welfare]. Professor Jerry Mashaw has also been
centrally involved in work (outside of the law reviews) that focuses on the treatment of disability
in the social welfare system. See DISABILITY: CHALLENGES FOR SOCIAL INSURANCE, HEALTH
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understood the importance of the social welfare system to achieving the
goals of the disability rights movement.7 Litigation to enforce the Medicaid
statute is a growth industry for disability rights lawyers. And the legislative
priorities of disability rights advocates have turned in recent times to social
welfare legislation: the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement
Act (TWWIIA) of 1999,8 which removes some of the work disincentives in
the social-security-disability programs; the proposed Medicaid Community-
Based Attendant Services and Supports Act (MiCASSA), 9 which would
eliminate the "institutional bias" in the Medicaid program and require states
to provide in-home personal-assistance services for people with disabilities;
and other initiatives I discuss below. A major purpose of this Article is to
bring these developments to the attention of the legal academic community
and to make a case for treating them as central to future discussions of
disability law.
But I hope to contribute to the discussion as well as start one. The turn
to social welfare law is one about which disability rights advocates might
understandably feel uneasy. Much of the thinking of the disability rights
movement in this country developed as a reaction to the perceived
paternalism and oppression that attended a welfare-based response to
disability. l Although the disability rights critique of disability welfare
programs had its roots in the broader welfare rights movement of the late
1960s and early 1970s, disability rights advocates ultimately grew a great
deal more ambivalent about the very idea of welfare than did welfare rights
advocates more generally. By the 1970s, many disability rights advocates
were presenting antidiscrimination laws as an alternative to social welfare
provision for people with disabilities-a tool that would obviate welfare
programs by giving people with disabilities opportunities to make a living
on their own. If it is to be true to the disability rights movement, any turn
CARE FINANCING AND LABOR MARKET POLICY (Virginia P. Reno, Jerry L. Mashaw & Bill
Gradison eds., 1997) [hereinafter DISABILITY: CHALLENGES]; DISABILITY POLICY PANEL, NAT'L
ACAD. OF SOC. INS., THE ENVIRONMENT OF DISABILITY INCOME POLICY: PROGRAMS, PEOPLE,
HISTORY, AND CONTEXT (Jerry L. Mashaw & Virginia P. Reno eds., 1996); DISABILITY, WORK
AND CASH BENEFITS (Jerry L. Mashaw et al. eds., 1996); see also MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & JERRY
L. MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY: RETHINKING AMERICAN SOCIAL INSURANCE 210-26 (1999)
(discussing disability benefits policy in the context of a broader discussion of social welfare
policy). In a very significant sense, this paper stands on the shoulders of the important work of
Professors Diller, Mashaw, and Weber. I go beyond their work in a number of respects, however,
by highlighting the tension between disability rights goals and a social welfare approach to
disability, by analyzing the doctrinal means by which the ADA's accommodation requirement has
been stripped of power to eliminate deep-rooted structural barriers to the employment of people
with disabilities, and by focusing far more heavily on access to adequate health insurance as the
major barrier to employment for many people with disabilities.
7. See infra Part III.
8. Pub. L. No. 106-170, 113 Stat. 1860 (codified in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
9. H.R. 2032, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 971, 108th Cong. (2003).
10. See infra Section I.A.
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(back) to social welfare law must seek to solve the problems of paternalism
and oppression that advocates identified in an earlier generation of
disability welfare programs. I hope to show some of the ways that current
social welfare initiatives pursued by disability rights advocates do and do
not take account of these problems, and to highlight the dilemmas
advocates face in relying on the social welfare system.
My argument proceeds as follows. In Part I, I provide an overview of
the causes and consequences of the shift from a social welfare to an
antidiscrimination approach to disability law. I begin in Section A with the
arguments of disability rights activists in the 1970s and 1980s. I discuss the
ways in which activists criticized welfare programs for people with
disabilities and describe how their critiques evolved into an embrace of
antidiscrimination as an alternative to the social welfare paradigm of
disability law. The disability rights movement's argument that
antidiscrimination law would move significant numbers of people with
disabilities off the benefits rolls and into the workforce strongly influenced
both the drafting and the passage of the ADA. As I show in Section B,
however, events have not worked out as disability rights advocates hoped.
The antidiscrimination paradigm, as embodied in the ADA, has failed to
achieve significant improvements in employment for people with
disabilities. Although commentators are hotly debating the question
whether the ADA has caused a decline in disability employment, it should
be clear that any positive effect of the statute has occurred at the margins.
For literally millions of working-age people with disabilities-the
overwhelming majority-the ADA has been entirely irrelevant to their
ability to get jobs.
In Part II, I offer a reason why this is so: Antidiscrimination laws are
not suited to eliminating deep-rooted structural barriers to employment.
One might think that the ADA's requirement of accommodation provides a
tool to attack those structural barriers. But a number of features of ADA
doctrine-features that are not nearly as controversial as one might
expect--operate to assimilate the accommodation requirement very closely
to a nondiscrimination rule. Those features of the doctrine have made the
ADA a poor mechanism for eliminating structural employment barriers. I
give particular attention to the statute's (lack of) effect on access to
adequate health insurance because that is, by many accounts, the most
significant obstacle to entering the workforce that people with disabilities
collectively face."l
11. The unavailability of adequate health insurance is obviously not the most significant
employment barrier for each and every individual with a disability who is not working. For some,
such as those with mental retardation, employer prejudice and the need for workplace
accommodations may be the most significant barriers. But access to health insurance is plainly a
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In Part III, I point to some of the ways in which disability rights
advocates have begun to (re)embrace a social welfare approach to disability
law. I also try to identify some respects in which these recent developments
threaten to ignore the important critiques of welfare programs offered by
the disability rights movement in the 1970s, and I suggest some ways in
which a renewed embrace of social welfare law might be crafted to take
account of those critiques.
Before proceeding, a word about the nature of my project is in order. I
make no effort in this Article to offer any deep normative justification for
or critique of disability law. My basic goal is more instrumental-to assess
which policy tools are most likely to achieve the objectives that the
disability rights movement has itself articulated.
To describe my project in this way introduces a complication. Social
movements are not unitary actors. They are collections of people who feel
various affiliations and who have a variety of motivations. The goals,
strategies, and ideas of a social movement are always evolving and are
always contested within the movement. 12 The disability rights movement is
no exception. It embraces people with a range of different disabilities,
different life experiences, different material needs, and different ideological
perspectives.' 3 Thus, it is an oversimplification to write of the "goals of the
disability rights movement" as if the term referred to some stable and
uncontroversially identified category.14
Nonetheless, there seems to be broad agreement among diverse
disability rights activists on a number of goals. 15 One overarching goal is a
negative one: freedom from the control of paternalistic parents,
professionals, institutions, and welfare bureaucracies. 16  Another
major obstacle to employment for a broad swath of nonworking people with disabilities, for the
reasons I discuss in Part II.
12. See, e.g., William A. Gamson & David S. Meyer, Framing Political Opportunity, in
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES, MOBILIZING
STRUCTURES, AND CULTURAL FRAMINGS 275, 283-85 (Doug McAdam et al. eds., 1996).
13. See SHARON BARNARTT & RICHARD SCOTCH, DISABILITY PROTESTS: CONTENTIOUS
POLITICS 1970-1999 (2001) (discussing variety of views among disability rights activists
regarding proper goals and means); JAMES I. CHARLTON, NOTHING ABOUT US WITHOUT US:
DISABILITY OPPRESSION AND EMPOWERMENT 121-22 (1998) (describing ideological diversity
among disability rights activists); Bagenstos, supra note 4, at 1008-13 (discussing diversity
among people with disabilities); Andrew I. Batavia, Ideology and Independent Living: Will
Conservatism Harm People with Disabilities?, 549 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 10, 11
(1997) (describing ideological diversity among disability rights activists).
14. I have, alas, done so myself. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and
"Disability, " 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 426 (2000).
15. This is what I meant when I referred to the "goals of the disability rights movement" in
Subordination, Stigma, and "'Disability." See id. (describing views of "most disability rights
advocates").
16. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 4, at 1010-12; Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Supreme Court,
the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Rational Discrimination, 55 ALA. L. REV. 923, 932 n.70
(2004).
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overarching goal may be framed more positively: the full integration of
people with disabilities into all areas of public, civic, and community life.' 7
As a subsidiary matter, disability rights activists generally seem to agree
that the movement should seek expanded opportunities for people with
disabilities to obtain gainful employment and that it should seek additional
public support for community, rather than institutional, placement options
for those people with disabilities who need services and care. 18 These goals
do not exhaust the objectives of disability rights activists, and they may not
be entirely compatible in principle or in practice. Community placement
policies, for example, may serve a population for whom employment is
hardly the immediate goal (though such policies may also facilitate
employment in the long run), and they may compete for resources with
policies such as subsidies that more directly reward work. But the goals of
antipaternalism, community integration, and employment do provide a good
general statement of the major policy objectives articulated by most
disability rights activists.
In this Article, I largely take those goals as a given. My argument is
that the antidiscrimination strategy has only limited potential to achieve
them. In this respect, my argument is quite distinct from the two major
challenges to disability discrimination law that currently compete in the
legal academic literature. One challenge holds that the nondiscrimination
and accommodation requirements for people with disabilities are
themselves misguided because they impose unjustified burdens on private
market actors and state and local governments.' 9 The other challenge holds
that the ADA's nondiscrimination and accommodation requirements should
be far-reaching, but that courts have participated in a backlash against the
statute by reading its terms unduly narrowly.2° In contrast to the first
challenge, I contend that the problem is not that the ADA goes too far; to
the contrary, it does not go far enough. In contrast to the second challenge, I
contend that the limitations on the ADA's effectiveness are not simply the
result of a judicial backlash against the statute. Rather, they are, to a
significant extent, built into the antidiscrimination model itself.
17. See, e.g., CHARLTON, supra note 13, at 124-27; Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with
Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 393, 397 (1991); Ann Hubbard, The
Major Life Activity of Belonging, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 217, 254-64 (2004); Jacobus
tenBroek, The Right To Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54 CAL. L. REV. 841,
843 (1966).
18. On employment, see, for example, Bagenstos, supra note 4, at 964-65. On community
placement, see, for example, Cook, supra note 17.
19. The prime example in the legal academic literature is RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN
GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 480-94 (1992).
20. The articles collected in BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA, supra note 2, provide the best
examples of this legal literature.
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The argument in this Article should be of interest to those who think
about antidiscrimination and social welfare law more broadly as well. A
number of scholars who write about antidiscrimination law (myself among
them) have recently challenged the otherwise near-consensus view that
accommodation mandates are fundamentally different from and broader
than antidiscrimination requirements. These challenges have typically
emphasized the breadth of the antidiscrimination principle: They have
sought to show that even the supposedly limited antidiscrimination
requirement imposes the same sorts of costs-for the same sorts of
reasons-as are usually attributed to accommodation requirements. 21 This
Article may be regarded as approaching the same issue from the opposite
perspective-by emphasizing the narrowness of accommodation
requirements. As I show, especially in Part II, the ADA's requirement of
reasonable accommodation has been consistently interpreted in a way that
brings it very close to an antidiscrimination requirement in operation as
well as effect. Because even the ADA's strongest supporters have an
ideological interest in narrowly reading the scope of the accommodation
requirement, there is little reason to believe that this will ever change. This
is a point that has not previously been appreciated in the literature.
Moreover, there are strong parallels between the structural barriers to
employment for people with disabilities and the structural barriers to
employment faced by poor people more generally. 22 Indeed, disability and
poverty are closely intertwined: Disability is a frequent cause of poverty,
and living in poverty often causes or exacerbates disabling conditions.23
Because people with disabilities are often perceived as the "deserving
poor," it may be politically easier to obtain enactment of programs to
eliminate the structural barriers they face than it is to obtain the enactment
of broad antipoverty programs. As I discuss in Part III, however, the goals
of community integration and employment for people with disabilities may
21. I tried to do this in Samuel R. Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination, " Accommodation,
and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825 (2003). Other examples include
Mary A. Crossley, Reasonable Accommodation as Part and Parcel of the Antidiscrimination
Project, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 861 (2004); Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation,
115 HARV. L. REV. 642 (2001); and Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference:
ADA Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2004).
22. There is, for example, a strong parallel between the obstacles to employment for people
with disabilities who need but cannot obtain personal-assistance services and the obstacles to
employment for poor people who need but cannot obtain adequate childcare. See GRAETZ &
MASHAW, supra note 6, at 239-44; JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, WE THE POOR
PEOPLE: WORK, POVERTY, AND WELFARE 117-27 (1997).
23. See, e.g., COMM. ON A NAT'L AGENDA FOR THE PREVENTION OF DISABILITIES, INST. OF
MED., DISABILITY IN AMERICA: TOWARD A NATIONAL AGENDA FOR PREVENTION 47 (Andrew
M. Pope & Alvin R. Tarlov eds., 1991) [hereinafter INST. OF MED.] (noting the difficulty of
determining how frequently poverty causes disability versus how frequently disability causes
poverty).
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be best served in the long run by broader antipoverty measures. The
political and policy dilemmas that people with disabilities face in devising
and advocating favored policies may have lessons for other subgroups of
poor people.
I. DISABILITY LAW'S SHIFT FROM WELFARE TO RIGHTS
In this Part, I discuss the shift in the orientation of American disability
policy that took place in the 1970s and 1980s-a shift that culminated in
the 1990 enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Prior to the
1970s, disability law was effectively nothing more than a subcategory of
social welfare law. Disability laws were laws that guaranteed rehabilitation
services, cash benefits, and medical care to people with disabilities. As I
explain in Section A, many disability rights activists sought to change the
social welfare orientation of disability law. Those activists argued that
welfare is oppressive and stifling and that antidiscrimination and
accommodation requirements would enable people with disabilities to leave
the benefits rolls and enter the workforce. Their critique of social welfare
responses to disability strongly influenced the passage of the ADA.
Yet, as I explain in Section B, the ADA has not achieved the
employment results disability rights activists anticipated. Depending on the
measure of "disability" used, employment for people with disabilities has
declined or remained stagnant since the statute's enactment. Although a
great deal of controversy surrounds the question whether the ADA has
actually harmed the employment prospects of people with disabilities, it
seems undeniable that the statute has not significantly improved those
prospects. As I argue below in Part II, the ADA's failure to increase
employment among people with disabilities reflects the inherent limitations
of an antidiscrimination approach.
A. Disability Rights Activists Embrace the Antidiscrimination Paradigm
Since at least the end of the Civil War, welfare benefits (often provided
in conjunction with publicly supported rehabilitation services) have been
one of the major building blocks of disability policy in America.24 With the
24. For discussions of Civil War pensions, see THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS
AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 102-51
(1992); Peter Blanck, Civil War Pensions and Disability, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 109 (2001); and Peter
Blanck & Chen Song, "Never Forget What They Did Here": Civil War Pensions for Gettysburg
Union Army Veterans and Disability in Nineteenth-Century America, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1109 (2003). For discussions of World War I-era disability benefits programs, see DEBORAH A.
STONE, THE DISABLED STATE 75 (1984); and K. Walter Hickel, Medicine, Bureaucracy, and
Social Welfare: The Politics of Disability Compensation for American Veterans of World War I,
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creation of the Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled (APTD)
program in 1950 and the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI)
program in 1956-both of which extended cash benefits to people
determined to be unable to work because of a disability 25-welfare benefits
became the central component of federal disability policy.
The disability benefits system remains extensive today, with the
overwhelming preponderance of disability welfare spending going to four
26programs. Two are cash benefits programs, SSDI and Supplemental
Security Income (SSI); two are health care programs, Medicare and
Medicaid. SSDI and Medicare are contributory social-insurance programs,
which benefit only those individuals who have worked for a sufficient
period of time to become eligible for Social Security. When an eligible
individual acquires a "disability" under the Social Security Act's
definition-"inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for
a continuous period of not less than 12 months"27 --SSDI pays a monthly
cash benefit that effectively serves as early retirement pay.28 Medicare is
the health insurance companion to Social Security; after two years on SSDI,
an individual with a disability becomes eligible for Medicare's standard
package of coverage.2 9 SSI and Medicaid are, broadly speaking, means-
in THE NEW DISABILITY HISTORY: AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 236 (Paul K. Longmore & Lauri
Umansky eds., 2001). For good overviews of the history and administration of the major current
disability benefits programs, see EDWARD D. BERKOWITZ, DISABLED POLICY: AMERICA'S
PROGRAMS FOR THE HANDICAPPED 41-151 (1987); and Richard K. Scotch, American Disability
Policy in the Twentieth Century, in THE NEW DISABILITY HISTORY, supra, at 375.
25. Under the APTD program, the federal government gave grants to states to provide
welfare benefits to those who, under state-established criteria, could show that they were
"permanently and totally disabled." Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 141(a), 76 Stat. 172, 197 (1962),
repealed by Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 301, 86 Stat. 1329, 1465 (1972). The APTD program was
eliminated in 1972 and replaced with the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program-a
uniform federal program that provides a cash benefit to poor people with disabilities. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383d (2000). SSDI is a contributory federal social-insurance program that
essentially treats disability as a grounds for early retirement under the Social Security system. See
id. § 423. For good general descriptions of the disability benefits system, see Diller, Entitlement
and Exclusion, supra note 6; and Weber, Disability and the Law of Welfare, supra note 6, at 923-
30.
26. Richard Scotch reports that, in fiscal year 1995, "[o]f the nearly $184 billion spent on all
[federal] disability programs, over 90 percent went for health care (S91 billion) and income
maintenance (S78 billion)." Scotch, supra note 24, at 386; see also BERKOWITZ, supra note 24, at
4 ("Simply put, this nation spends most of the money allocated to disability on programs that
provide the handicapped with tickets out of the labor force.").
27. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
28. See, e.g., GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 6, at 88.
29. Medicare was established in the 1965 amendments to the Social Security Act, Pub. L. No.
89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). It is an entirely federal
program that applies uniformly across the nation. It covers inpatient hospitalization (under
Medicare Part A) and, at the recipient's option, outpatient treatment (under Medicare Part B), for
individuals who receive Social Security Old Age, Survivors, or Disability Insurance. For a
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tested welfare programs. Any individual-regardless of work history-who
satisfies the Social Security Act's "disability" definition is entitled to a
monthly SSI benefit (currently $552) if his or her income and assets fall
below a federal means test.30 In most states, Medicaid coverage is automatic
for those who receive SSI.3'
The disability welfare state remains extensive, but disability rights
advocates have sought to change that state of affairs in a number of
respects. Although its precursors can be traced back at least to the 1930s,32
the U.S. disability rights movement began to coalesce in earnest in the
1970s.33 Reacting to society's then-dominant model, which viewed
disability as a medical condition to be cured if possible and viewed people
with disabilities as unfortunates who deserved charitable largesse, activists
developed distinctive ideas of the nature of disability and the proper social
response to it. 34 They urged that disability is not an essentially medical
condition that inheres in the disabled person; it is a social condition caused
by the interaction between a person's physical or mental traits and social
institutions that are structured in a way that makes them inaccessible to
people with those traits.35 The proper response to disability, so viewed, is
not medical treatment, nor is it charity or welfare. Instead, the proper
response is civil rights legislation that prohibits discrimination against and
requires accommodation of people with disabilities.36 Disability rights
activists in the 1970s were thus explicit in their critique of welfare as the
primary response to disability. In terms that in many respects echoed the
arguments of the welfare rights movement of the late 1960s and early
discussion of the enactment of the Medicare program, see THEODORE R. MARMOR, THE POLITICS
OF MEDICARE 45-61 (2d ed. 2000).
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 134-136. Like Medicare, Medicaid was enacted as part
of the 1965 amendments to the Social Security Act. It is a state-federal cooperative program that
provides medical benefits of various kinds to needy populations. Participation in Medicaid is
entirely a matter of state choice (though all states have chosen to participate), and states have a
great deal of flexibility in deciding the populations they will cover and the benefits they will
provide. But for so long as a state chooses to participate in Medicaid, the statute sets forth certain
populations it must cover and certain services it must provide. For an overview of the enactment
of the Medicaid program, see ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN
AMERICA: A CASE STUDY OF MEDICAID 49-61 (Transaction 2003) (1974).
32. See Paul K. Longmore & David Goldberger, The League of the Physically Handicapped
and the Great Depression: A Case Study in the New Disability History, 87 J. AM. HIST. 888
(2000).
33. Probably the best introduction to the disability rights movement is Joseph Shapiro's
journalistic history, JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1993). A good source from an American disability rights activist that
puts the United States disability rights movement in global perspective is CHARLTON, supra note
13.
34. For a discussion of these ideas, see Bagenstos, supra note 14, at 426-32.
35. See id. at 426-30.
36. See id. at 430-32.
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1970s, those activists leveled a number of challenges at the disability
benefits system.37
First, those activists developed a critique of the paternalism of the
"helping professions." 38 In the context of disability benefits programs, this
critique took the form of a challenge to the paternalistic, arbitrary, and
oppressive aspects of welfare administration. Receipt of benefits depended
on compliance with the dictates of rehabilitation counselors and welfare
caseworkers. Influenced by an ideology that led them to believe that they,
rather than their clients, knew what was best for the clients themselves,39
caseworkers' dictates extended to core life decisions. As the great blind
scholar-activist Jacobus tenBroek 40 put it in a classic article he wrote with
Floyd Matson,
It is the agency of welfare, not the recipient, who decides what
life goals are to be followed, what ambitions may be entertained,
what services are appropriate, what wants are to be recognized,
what needs may be budgeted, and what funds allocated to each.
In short, the recipient is told what he wants as well as how much
he is wanting.4'
37. My discussion in this Section draws on, but extends significantly, my earlier discussion in
Bagenstos, supra note 4, at 987-1000. In particular, my discussion here draws out the complex
relationship between the disability rights and welfare rights movements in a way that I did not
attempt to do in the Welfare Reform article.
38. See, e.g., BERKOWITZ, supra note 24, at 187-88; Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans
with Disabilities Act as Risk Regulation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1479, 1486-87 (2001); Billy
Golfus, The Do-Gooder, reprinted in THE RAGGED EDGE: THE DISABILITY EXPERIENCE FROM
THE PAGES OF THE FIRST FIFTEEN YEARS OF THE DISABILITY RAG 165 (Barrett Shaw ed., 1994).
For an excellent expression of this critique by an important participant-theorist of the disability
rights movement, see Irving Kenneth Zola, Healthism and Disabling Medicalization, in IVAN
ILLICH ET AL., DISABLING PROFESSIONS 41 (1977).
39. See BERKOWITZ, supra note 24, at 187-88. For a highly critical discussion of the ideology
of rehabilitation professionals, see RUTH O'BRIEN, CRIPPLED JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF MODERN
DISABILITY POLICY IN THE WORKPLACE 27-87 (2001).
40. Many legal scholars are probably familiar with Professor tenBroek's important
contributions to Fourteenth Amendment scholarship. See JACOBUS TENBROEK, THE
ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1951); Joseph Tussman & Jacobus
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341 (1949). But Professor tenBroek
was also exceptionally important as a disability rights activist. He founded and served for twenty-
one years as president of the National Federation of the Blind-an organization he accurately
described as "an aggressive, militant, activist organization of the blind themselves" that even by
the mid-1960s had "achieved a great deal, legislatively and otherwise, and ha[d] always been in
the thick of the fight." tenBroek, supra note 17, at 841 n.t; see also Sharon Groch, Free Spaces:
Creating Oppositional Consciousness in the Disability Rights Movement, in OPPOSITIONAL
CONSCIOUSNESS: THE SUBJECTIVE ROOTS OF SOCIAL PROTEST 65, 76-77 (Jane Mansbridge &
Aldon Morris eds., 2001) (describing aggressive, militant character of the National Federation of
the Blind). For a history of the National Federation of the Blind, see generally FLOYD MATSON,
WALKING ALONE AND MARCHING TOGETHER: A HISTORY OF THE ORGANIZED BLIND
MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940-1990 (1990).
41. Jacobus tenBroek & Floyd W. Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54 CAL. L.
REV. 809, 831 (1966).
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To Professors tenBroek and Matson, the alternatives for people with
disabilities who receive welfare were stark: "obedience or starvation.
'A 2
Other disability rights activists echoed this attack on the administration of
disability welfare benefits.43
In that respect, the claims of the disability rights movement were
entirely consistent with those of the broader welfare rights movement. That
broader movement also highlighted the paternalistic, arbitrary, and
oppressive behavior of caseworkers. 4 Its adherents urged expansive,
categorical entitlements to welfare that would eliminate the discretion that
empowered caseworkers to engage in such conduct.45 Indeed, Professors
tenBroek and Matson frequently cast their argument in terms that supported
a more general program of welfare rights,46 and tenBroek himself was an
important legal strategist for the welfare rights movement.47
But several aspects of disability rights activists' thought pushed in
exactly the opposite direction. Disability rights activists, unlike welfare
rights activists, often framed their critiques of the existing welfare system in
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., PAUL K. LONGMORE, WHY I BURNED MY BOOK AND OTHER ESSAYS ON
DISABILITY 112-14, 234-46 (2003).
44. See FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE
FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 157-59 (1971) (discussing arbitrary terminations); id. at 166
("A central feature of the recipient's degradation is that she must surrender commonly accepted
rights in exchange for aid. AFDC mothers, for example, are often forced to answer questions
about their sexual behavior ('When did you last menstruate?'), open their closets to inspection
('Whose pants are those?'), and permit their children to be interrogated ('Do any men visit your
mother?')."); id. at 170-71 (discussing "degradation" inherent in submission to welfare agencies'
efforts at vocational rehabilitation); id. at 176-77 (discussing paternalistic aspects of social welfare
programs). See generally Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules,
Discretion, and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1137-38 (2000)
(discussing welfare rights activists' attack on discretion of welfare caseworkers).
45. See PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 44, at 348 ("In the absence of fundamental economic
reforms, therefore, we take the position that the explosion of the rolls is the true relief reform, that
it should be defended, and expanded."); see also id. at 314 (writing that welfare rights litigation
"contributed to the collapse of restrictions, partly by overturning major exclusionary statutes, but
perhaps more importantly by instituting procedural safeguards that hampered the arbitrary
exercise of discretion by relief officials"). For powerful critiques of welfare rights lawyers' attack
on the discretion of caseworkers and their accompanying turn toward rule-oriented proceduralism,
see William H. Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MD. L. REV. 1
(1985); and William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE
L.J. 1198 (1983).
46. See, e.g., tenBroek & Matson, supra note 41, at 837, 836-37 (favorably discussing the
idea of "a guaranteed income [for] all Americans" that would provide "a common floor of
protection for the needy").
47. See PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 44, at 306 n.17 ("The legal arguments which
underpinned litigation against relief agencies were developed in substantial part by Jacobus ten
Broek, a blind professor of political science at the University of California in Berkeley, who spent
the better part of his career writing about what he called America's dual system of justice-one
for the affluent, another for the poor."); see also MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS
AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960-1973, at 20-21 (1993). For Professor tenBroek's
most important contributions to poverty law scholarship generally, see FAMILY LAW AND THE
POOR: ESSAYS BY JACOBUS TENBROEK (Joel F. Handler ed., 1971).
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terms that attacked the legitimacy of any welfare benefits system (or at least
any disability-specific welfare benefits system). These fundamental
challenges to disability benefits were of three essential sorts, one of which
resonated strongly with the rhetoric of the political left, one of which
resonated strongly with that of the political right, and one of which was
politically ambiguous.
From the left, many disability rights activists contended that disability
welfare programs promoted political quiescence among people with
disabilities. They argued that disability welfare programs are essentially
symbolic government acts that, in the words of one activist, merely "buy
off' a potentially troublesome group.48 Instead of making fundamental
changes to social relations or the built environment that would allow people
with disabilities to achieve actual integration and equality in society, the
nondisabled majority uses relatively small cash benefits as a means of
dulling any urge among people with disabilities to protest existing power
arrangements.49
From the right, many disability rights activists argued that welfare
programs promoted a culture of dependence among people with disabilities.
Professors tenBroek and Matson themselves had argued that the existing
scheme of administering disability benefits "perpetuate[d] dependency and
discourage[d] initiative." 50 But, like welfare rights activists generally, they
remained sanguine that a welfare scheme could be structured in a way that
avoided these problems.5' Other disability rights activists did not appear so
confident, however. To the contrary, they spoke in terms that resonated
48. Cheryl Rogers, The Employment Dilemma for Disabled Persons, in IMAGES OF THE
DISABLED, DISABLING IMAGES 117, 120-21 (Alan Garmer & Tom Joe eds., 1987).
49. See Harlan Hahn, Civil Rights for Disabled Americans: The Foundations of a Political
Agenda, in IMAGES OF THE DISABLED, DISABLING IMAGES, supra note 48, at 181, 197; Rogers,
supra note 48. Even here, one can hear in disability rights activists' claims the echoes of
arguments of welfare rights activists like Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, who contended
that public welfare generally serves to blunt lower-class unrest at times of high unemployment
and to enforce a regime of low-wage work during more prosperous times. See THEODORE R.
MARMOR ET AL., AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE: PERSISTENT MYTHS, ENDURING
REALITIES 13-14 (1990) (discussing left-wing criticism of the welfare state by, inter alia, Piven and
Cloward); PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 44, passim; see also id. at 286 ("The political
circumstances of the 1960's made it crucial, however, that blacks get something in order to solidify
their allegiance to the national Democratic Party, and in order to quiet them. As it turned out,
welfare was the system that was made to do most of the giving-partly, perhaps, because black
constituents needed money; more importantly, because it was easier to give welfare than to press
for concessions that would challenge the interests of other groups in the cities."). But cf JOEL F.
HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, THE MORAL CONSTRUCTION OF POVERTY: WELFARE
REFORM IN AMERICA 4-5 (1991) (critiquing the Piven and Cloward critique). Piven and Cloward,
however, urged broad welfare entitlements. See PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 44, at 348.
Disability rights activists, by contrast, were much more hostile to the idea of disability welfare.
50. tenBroek & Matson, supra note 41, at 831.
51. See id. at 836-40 (discussing what seemed to be the emerging possibility of a
reconstructed welfare system).
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quite strongly with critiques of the welfare system that would be articulated
by such conservative commentators as Charles Murray.52 Ed Roberts, one
of the most important founding figures in the 1970s disability rights
movement,53 urged that people with disabilities should move away from a
dependent "welfare mentality." 54 And a group of activists that included
Justin Dart, who played the central role in lobbying for the passage of the
ADA,55 wrote that disability welfare programs "support[ed] large segments
of the population in relatively idle dependency., 56 They criticized the
position they characterized as the "'give me' socialist" view "that 'society'
should and can provide certain benefits to each human with no
corresponding obligation on the part of the individuals.,
57
Both of these fundamental challenges to disability welfare were broadly
compatible with another critique asserted by disability rights activists, one
that rested on the notion of the double-edged nature of categorical welfare
programs in a market society. Many nondisabled people believe that
disability benefits programs make disability a favored status in society by
exempting people with disabilities from the ordinary obligation to work for
a living. In that common view, disability welfare is an act of beneficence,
one that demonstrates society's intense concern for people with disabilities.
They are the paradigm case of the "deserving" rather than the
"undeserving" poor. 58
But activists sought to challenge the notion that society's "beneficence"
toward people with disabilities was really beneficial. Disability rights
advocates have long contended that "superficial indications of sympathy,
and even pity, for the plight of disabled persons frequently conceal a deeper
sense of discomfort and resistance that has perpetuated the segregation and
inequality" of people with disabilities.59 Those advocates believed that the
52. See CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980
(1984).
53. See SHAPIRO, supra note 33, at 41-58.
54. Edward V. Roberts, A History of the Independent Living Movement: A Founder's
Perspective, in PSYCHOSOCIAL INTERVENTIONS WITH PHYSICALLY DISABLED PERSONS 231, 239
(Bruce W. Heller et al. eds., 1989).
55. For discussions of Dart's role, see NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, EQUALITY OF
OPPORTUNITY: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 49-59, 72-79 (1997);
and SHAPIRO, supra note 33, at 108-11.
56. PEG NOSEK ET AL., A PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION FOR THE INDEPENDENT LIVING AND
DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENTS 11 (1982).
57. Id. at 44.
58. See STONE, supra note 24, at 29-51 (describing evolution of the disability category in the
English Poor Laws); Diller, Entitlement and Exclusion, supra note 6 (discussing the role of the
disability category in the American social welfare system).
59. Harlan Hahn, Antidiscrimination Laws and Social Research on Disability: The Minority
Group Perspective, 14 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 41, 43 (1996); see also MARY JOHNSON, MAKE THEM
Go AWAY: CLINT EASTWOOD, CHRISTOPHER REEVE, AND THE CASE AGAINST DISABILITY
RIGHTS (2003). In developing these arguments, the disability rights movement plainly drew on the
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welfare system, which treats disability as an excuse for not working, was a
prime example of that phenomenon. To be excused from the social
obligations of citizenship, they contended, is also to be excused from the
social rights of citizenship. 60 When persons cannot make their own way-
even for fully understandable reasons-then a society that undertakes to
care for them will necessarily also undertake to make their decisions for
them.6' Many of the more theoretically inclined disability rights thinkers
characterized the role of disability welfare recipients as an extended version
of the "sick role" described by the sociologist Talcott Parsons.62 The sick
person is excused from ordinary social responsibilities for the duration of
the illness, but only so long as the sick person submits to the control and
direction of professionals who "treat" the condition.63 For people with
disabilities, who often cannot expect to be "cured," the submission to the
control of others-and attendant denial of full citizenship--is lifelong.
64
These interconnected (if not entirely consistent) critiques of disability
welfare programs led disability rights activists to urge a fundamental shift
in the orientation of disability policy-a shift, captured in the title of
Richard Scotch's important book, "from good will to civil rights. 65
Disability rights activists urged that disability policy should promote
integration and inclusion in all arenas of political, civic, and social life.66 In
the realm of employment specifically, they argued that most people with
disabilities are willing and able to work, and that hostile attitudes and
contingent environmental barriers were the primary reasons for their
feminist movement's argument that paternalistic policies placed women on a "pedestal" that was
in fact a "cage," Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion). See
Samuel R. Bagenstos, Justice Ginsburg and the Judicial Role in Expanding "We the People ": The
Disability Rights Cases, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 49, 50-51, 56 (2004).
60. See, e.g., Gerben DeJong, Defining and Implementing the Independent Living Concept, in
INDEPENDENT LIVING FOR PHYSICALLY DISABLED PEOPLE 4, 18 (Nancy M. Crewe & Irving
Kenneth Zola eds., 1983). The British sociologist T.H. Marshall made the same point about the
English Poor Law of 1834. See T.H. MARSHALL, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS 15 (Pluto Press
1992) (1950) ("The Poor Law treated the claims of the poor, not as an integral part of the rights of
the citizen, but as an alternative to them-as claims which could be met only if the claimants
ceased to be citizens in any true sense of the word."). Marshall contrasted that effective denial of
citizenship with the reaffirmation of citizenship that is implicit in universal social insurance
systems. See id. at 33.
61. Thus tenBroek and Matson's observation that "[w]elfare clients, including the blind and
the disabled, have been categorically judged incompetent to manage their lives and affairs."
tenBroek & Matson, supra note 41, at 83 1.
62. See TALCOTT PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM 428-79 (1951).
63. See id.
64. See JoN GLIEDMAN & WILLIAM ROTH, THE UNEXPECTED MINORITY: HANDICAPPED
CHILDREN IN AMERICA 35-42 (1980); DeJong, supra note 60, at 16-18; Hahn, supra note 59, at
45.
65. RICHARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVIL RIGHTS: TRANSFORMING FEDERAL
DISABILITY POLICY (2d ed. 2001).
66. See CHARLTON, supra note 13, at 124-27; Cook, supra note 17; tenBroek, supra note 17,
at 843.
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exclusion from the workforce.67 Accordingly, they advocated the adoption
of civil rights laws that would prohibit discrimination against and require
the provision of accommodations to individuals with disabilities in the
workplace.68
Some British disability rights activists in the 1970s turned the same
sorts of critiques of disability welfare into a thoroughgoing attack on cash
benefits programs. 69 American disability rights activists did not go so far.
Many recognized that welfare programs would remain important for a large
number of people with disabilities, if only to provide the health insurance
benefits they needed to participate in the world.70 And grass-roots disability
protests preponderantly focused on demands for benefits rather than civil
rights.71 But a number of important grass-roots disability protests did focus
on civil rights.72 And activists (particularly, although not exclusively, elite
activists) did urge a fundamental reorientation of disability policy toward a
civil-rights-focused approach. As I have shown in other work, in the
campaign to enact the ADA, disability rights activists frequently posed a
stark choice between welfare and civil rights approaches. Throughout the
legislative process, those activists highlighted the public costs of existing
disability welfare programs and argued that dependence on such programs
(and the attendant fiscal burden) would be reduced substantially if only
civil rights laws existed to open up opportunities for gainful employment.73
67. See, e.g., Hahn, supra note 49, at 182.
68. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 14, at 430 (discussing goals of the disability rights
movement).
69. See MICHAEL OLIVER, UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 24-
25 (1996) (reprinting an edited version of the Union of the Physically Impaired Against
Segregation's 1976 statement of "fundamental principles of disability") ("'Benefits' which are not
carefully related to the struggle for integrated employment and active social participation will
constantly be used to justify our dependence and exclusion from the mainstream of life-the very
opposite of what is intended. This is why the ... appeal to the state for legislation to implement a
comprehensive, national disability incomes scheme is in reality nothing so much as a programme
to obtain and maintain in perpetuity the historical dependence of physically impaired people on
charity.") (omission in original); id. at 26 ("Experts begging for state charity on our behalf can do
nothing but lower our status, by reinforcing out-of-date attitudes.").
70. See, e.g., LONGMORE, supra note 43, at 236; DeJong, supra note 60, at 12. To some
extent, there may be less of a difference between the positions of British and American disability
rights activists on this point than meets the eye. British activists, after all, were operating in a
country with universal health care, so the opposition to cash benefits did not entail opposition to
all social welfare programs. It is significant, however, that the British National Health Service is a
universal, rather than disability-specific, social welfare system. See infra Part III.
71. See BARNARTT & SCOTCH, supra note 13, at 78, 177.
72. See SHAPIRO, supra note 33, at 130-41.
73. See Bagenstos, supra note 4, at 957-75.
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B. The Results of the Antidiscrimination Approach
The enactment of the ADA in 1990 was a major triumph for disability
rights advocates, and it seemed to herald the fundamental reorientation of
federal disability policy they had long urged. To be sure, the statute made
no changes to the existing disability welfare programs; to that extent,
disability policy remained "dissonant. 74 But the ADA did nonetheless send
the strong message that people with disabilities should be expected to work
rather than to sit on the welfare rolls. And the statute's enactment led a
number of technocratic analysts to urge that the revamping of disability
benefits programs along much more restrictive lines would be the logical
75next policy step.
But if the ADA's enactment raised expectations that large numbers of
people with disabilities would leave the benefits rolls and enter the
workforce, subsequent experience has been a major disappointment.
Numerous studies have found that the employment rate for people with
disabilities declined or remained stagnant throughout the 1990s-a period
that overlapped with both the implementation of the ADA and a booming
economy. The variety of possible definitions of "disability" makes it hard to
compare numbers across studies, 76 but the trend is clear. When "disability"
is defined as an impairment that imposes limitations on any life activity, the
employment rate for working-age people with disabilities declined from
49% in 1990 to 46.6% in 1996, according to the federal government's
National Health Information Survey (NHIS).77 When "disability" is defined
more broadly-as a diagnosed impairment simpliciter-the employment
rate for working-age men with disabilities fell from 84.7% in 1990 to
77.3% in 1996, while the employment rate for working-age women with
disabilities stayed relatively stagnant at just over 63% during that period,
according to the NHIS.78 And when "disability" is defined more narrowly,
as an impairment that specifically limits the life activity of working, the
74. See generally Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies, supra note 6 (discussing tensions
between the ADA and disability welfare programs).
75. See Edward D. Berkowitz, Implications for Income Maintenance Policy, in
IMPLEMENTING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 193, 218-23 (Jane West ed., 1996)
[hereinafter IMPLEMENTING THE ADA]; Richard V. Burkhauser, Post-ADA: Are People with
Disabilities Expected To Work?, 549 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 71, 82 (1997); Bonnie
O'Day & Monroe Berkowitz, Disability Benefit Programs: Can We Improve the Return-to-Work
Record?, in HANDBOOK OF DISABILITY STUDIES 633, 639-40 (Gary L. Albrecht et al. eds., 2001).
76. See Richard V. Burkhauser et al., A User's Guide to Current Statistics on the Employment
of People with Disabilities, in THE DECLINE IN EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES: A
POLICY PUZZLE 23, 29-30 tbl.2.1, 72-73 tbl.2A.3 (David C. Stapleton & Richard V. Burkhauser
eds., 2003) [hereinafter DECLINE IN EMPLOYMENT].
77. See H. STEPHEN KAYE, IMPROVED EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEOPLE WITH
DISABILITIES 9 & fig. 1 (Disability Statistics Ctr., Disability Statistics Report 17, 2003).
78. See Burkhauser et al., supra note 76, at 72-73 tbl.2A.3.
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employment rate for working-age men with disabilities fell from 42.1% in
1990 to 33.1% in 2000, according to the federal government's Current
Population Survey, which provides data that can be compared across the
entire decade; the employment rate for working-age women with
disabilities fell from 34.9% to 32.6% over that period, according to the
same measure.
79
More important than any absolute drop in the employment rate,
however, is the relative decline in the employment rate for people with
disabilities vis-A-vis the nondisabled. Although the employment rates for
men and women without disabilities increased with the economic boom of
the 1990s, the employment rates for those with disabilities did not. As a
result, "in the 1990s the relative employment rates of both men and women
with disabilities also declined dramatically." 80 A 2000 Harris survey of
working-age people with disabilities revealed that only 32% reported being
employed, as compared with 81% of the comparable population without
disabilities.
81
A number of commentators argue that the stubbornly high
nonemployment rate for people with disabilities shows that the ADA has
not just failed in its effort to improve disability employment; they contend
that the statute in fact caused the drop in disability employment in the
1990s. The theory is straightforward: Because accommodations are costly,
the ADA gave employers an incentive to refuse to hire people with
disabilities; because it is difficult to enforce the statute effectively at the
82 ohiring stage, employers were likely to act on that incentive. A number of
empirical studies that attempt to control for other explanations of the
employment drop appear to confirm this theory.83
79. Id.
80. Id. at 41; see also KAYE, supra note 77, at 10 (finding "statistically significant upward
trends in the employment gap" between those with and without disabilities throughout the 1990s);
Nanette Goodman & Timothy Waidmann, Social Security Disability Insurance and the Recent
Decline in the Employment Rate of People with Disabilities, in DECLINE IN EMPLOYMENT, supra
note 76, at 339, 341 ("[F]or both men and women, the employment rate of people with disabilities
was falling relative to that of people without disabilities during the economic expansion of the mid
and late 1990s.").
81. NAT'L ORG. ON DISABILITY, 2000 N.O.D./HARRIS SURVEY OF AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES 27 (2000).
82. See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of Employment
Protection? The Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 109 J. POL. ECON. 915, 924 (2001);
Thomas DeLeire, The Wage and Employment Effects of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 J.
HUM. RESOURCES 693, 694 (2000); Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV.
223, 273-76 (2000).
83. See Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 82, at 929-32; DeLeire, supra note 82, at 700-08;
see also Christine Jolls & J.J. Prescott, The Effects of "Reasonable Accommodations"
Requirements and Firing Costs on the Employment of Individuals with Disabilities 18-19, 28
(July 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (finding disemployment effect in initial
years of implementation of the ADA but no statute-specific disemployment effect after 1994).
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But the claim that the ADA has harmed the employment prospects of
people with disabilities remains controversial. ADA defenders note that the
empirical studies finding negative employment effects have used a
definition of disability that does not precisely map onto the coverage of the
statute. The ADA defines "disability" in relevant part as "a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of [an] individual. 84 But the studies define "disability" as an
impairment that limits the kind or amount of work an individual can do.85
That definition fails to embrace some individuals the ADA treats as having
"disabilities"-those who experience substantial limitations in a major life
activity other than working.86 ADA defenders argue that when we focus on
classes of people with disabilities who, in their view, are likely to be
protected by the ADA-people who have impairments that do not limit
their ability to work-we find that employment rates have improved since
the enactment of the statute. 87 Defenders also contend that the ADA's
passage may have destigmatized disability and thus encouraged significant
numbers of people who were already out of the workforce to newly identify
themselves as disabled; if so, the employment decline for people with
disabilities may be merely an artifact of measurement.88 Finally, ADA
84. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000).
85. See Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 82, at 925; DeLeire, supra note 82, at 695; Jolls &
Prescott, supra note 83, at 6.
86. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 199-203 (2002) (major life
activity of performing manual tasks); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638-39 (1998) (major life
activity of reproduction).
87. See KAY'E, supra note 77, at 15; Peter Blanck et al., Calibrating the Impact of the ADA 's
Employment Provisions, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 267, 275 (2003) [hereinafter Blanck et al.,
Calibrating the Impact]; see also Peter Blanck et al., Is It Time To Declare the ADA a Failed
Law?, in DECLINE IN EMPLOYMENT, supra note 76, at 301, 315-18 [hereinafter Blanck et al., Is It
Time]; Douglas Kruse & Lisa Schur, Does the Definition Affect the Outcome? Employment Trends
Under Alternative Measures of Disability, in DECLINE IN EMPLOYMENT, supra note 76, at 279,
282-86, 292-96; Susan Schwochau & Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, Part III: Does the ADA Disable the Disabled?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
271, 298-301 (2000); Tom Tolin & Martin Patwell, A Critique of Economic Analysis of the ADA,
23 DISABILITY STUD. Q. 130, 133-34 (2003). Cf Blanck et al., Is It Time, supra, at 326 ("In light
of the flaws identified, we submit that existing empirical research provides little basis on which
policymakers can make informed decisions regarding whether the ADA is the cause of
employment declines and should thus be amended, repealed, or left untouched.").
88. See Blanck et al., Calibrating the Impact, supra note 87, at 278; see also Kruse & Schur,
supra note 87, at 285 ("Perceptions of increased social acceptability and rights may have
encouraged more people to identify themselves as having a disability following the ADA. It is
plausible that this effect was greatest among those who were suffering the greatest stigma owing
to a lack of employment, and thus increased reports of work limitation would lower the associated
employment rate."); Douglas Kruse & Lisa Schur, Employment of People with Disabilities
Following the ADA, 42 INDUS. REL. 31, 36 (2003) ("Passage of the ADA may have led more to be
willing to identify themselves as having a disability either because it became more socially
acceptable to have a disability in general or because the general emphasis on employment of
people with disabilities led people with serious impairments to be more likely to say that [they]
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defenders argue that the empirical studies do not fully negate an alternative
explanation for the employment decline-that the loosening of eligibility
standards for SSDI benefits throughout the 1980s made leaving the
workforce particularly attractive for people with disabilities when the 1990-
1991 recession occurred. 89
The dispute over whether the ADA has been a negative force in the
effort to promote employment among people with disabilities is far from
resolved in the literature. 90 But that dispute-which has preoccupied a
number of important legal and economic scholars-is largely beside the
point. Even on the view of the data presented by the statute's most
optimistic supporters, the employment provisions of the ADA have done
absolutely nothing to give jobs to the overwhelming majority of people
with disabilities. Unless massive numbers of people with disabilities both
became employed and stopped identifying themselves as disabled in the
few years following enactment of the ADA, the evidence makes clear that
the statute has not significantly improved the employment position of
people with disabilities, if it has improved that position at all.
In 1994, 10.7 million people with disabilities (defined here as
impairments that limit any life activity) reported that they had jobs, an
increase of just over 800,000 from 1990. By contrast, 11.7 million working-
age people with disabilities reported that they did not have jobs in 1994, an
increase of just over two million from 1990.91 Assume that we can attribute
the entire increase in reported employment to the ADA and that we can
are limited in the kind or amount of work they can do (whereas prior to the ADA they may not
have considered employment as an option).").
89. See David H. Autor & Mark G. Duggan, The Rise in the Disability Rolls and the Decline
in Unemployment, 118 Q.J. ECON. 157, 162-64, 169-74 (2003); John Bound & Timothy
Waidmann, Accounting for Recent Declines in Employment Rates Among Working-Aged Men and
Women with Disabilities, 37 J. HUM. RESOURCES 231, 240 (2002).
90. I offer my own view of the evidence in Samuel R. Bagenstos, Has the Americans with
Disabilities Act Reduced Employment for People with Disabilities?, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. (forthcoming Nov. 2004), from which some of the discussion in this Section is derived. In
brief, I find it hard to disagree with the claim that the ADA imposed at least some negative
pressure on disability employment, at least in its early implementation. I find unpersuasive the
argument that the extant empirical studies are irrelevant because they employ the "wrong"
definition of disability. Although the studies that attempt to disaggregate the ADA's effects across
different classes of people with disabilities show that the statute has improved employment for
those people with disabilities least likely to need accommodations-those whose conditions do
not limit the kind or amount of work they can do-the overall picture for people with disabilities
is one of stagnation at best. I also think it unlikely that the measured decline in employment
reflects nothing more than compositional changes in the population that self-reports disability.
The SSDI-recession explanation for the employment decline, by contrast, is quite plausible,
though it is difficult to disentangle from the effects of the ADA. It seems likely that any negative
employment effects of the ADA will be a temporary phenomenon, however, as accommodation
costs fall over time. The empirical evidence-particularly the findings of Professors Jolls and
Prescott, see Jolls & Prescott, supra note 83-seems consistent with that prediction.
91. Figures are derived from KAYE, supra note 77, at 9, 21.
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attribute the entire increase in reported nonemployment to an increase in
reports of disability by people who were already out of the workforce. Even
in such a rosy scenario, the most that could be said is that the statute created
jobs for 800,000 people with disabilities while doing nothing for the ability
of more than nine million other people with disabilities to get jobs.92 The
ADA plainly has not lived up to disability rights activists' hopes that it
would move significant numbers of people from the disability benefits rolls
into the workforce.
II. THE LIMITS OF THE ANTIDISCRIMINATION PARADIGM:
STRUCTURAL BARRIERS TO EMPLOYMENT
Why, even on the most ADA-friendly reading of the data, has the
statute failed to make a significant dent in the nonemployment of people
with disabilities? The problem, I suggest, stems from the inherently limited
nature of antidiscrimination requirements. Antidiscrimination requirements
can prohibit employers from discriminating against qualified people with
disabilities who apply for jobs, but they cannot put people with disabilities
in a position to apply and be qualified for jobs in the first place. For a large
number of people with disabilities, it is not the discriminatory acts of
particular employers but instead deep-rooted structural barriers-such as
the lack of personal-assistance services, assistive technology, and accessible
transportation and, above all, the current setup of our health insurance
system-that keep them out of the workforce. Antidiscrimination laws like
the ADA are a singularly ineffective means of eliminating such structural
barriers.
93
One might think that the ADA's requirement of reasonable
accommodation could be used to remove these barriers. That requirement,
after all, is thought to be the ADA's great innovation, a tool that goes
beyond a mere nondiscrimination rule to demand the alteration of societal
structures that, however unintentionally, stand in the way of opportunities
92. It is theoretically possible that the statute created jobs for more than 800,000 people with
disabilities, if some newly employed individuals stopped reporting themselves as having
disabilities. But it seems unlikely that this number is very large, especially given the remarkable
increase in the number of people reporting disabilities during the post-ADA period.
93. The argument in this Part elaborates on the suggestion I made in Bagenstos, supra note 4,
at 1019-22, that the ADA cannot be counted on to increase the employment of people with
disabilities significantly. For others who have argued that the ADA cannot carry the weight of
disability employment policy, see Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies, supra note 6, at 1066-75;
and Weber, Beyond the ADA, supra note 6, at 135-38. My argument here goes beyond these
accounts by focusing on the doctrinal tools courts have employed to limit the statute's
effectiveness in eliminating structural barriers to the employment of people with disabilities.
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for people with disabilities.94 But although it would certainly be possible as
a formal matter to interpret the ADA's accommodation requirement as
imposing on individual defendants the obligation to make "reasonable"
contributions to undoing broad structural employment barriers, at least two
widely accepted doctrines relieve individual defendants of that burden.
Through these doctrines-the "job-related" requirement and the
access/content distinction-courts and the EEOC have removed entire
classes of possible accommodations from the requirement's scope. And
they have done so even if the requested accommodations could be provided
at "reasonable" cost.
These limitations on the scope of the accommodation requirement are
not obvious from the text of the ADA, and their application to particular
cases is indeterminate in substantial respects. But their agenda seems clear.
They confine the accommodation requirement so that, like a classic
antidiscrimination requirement, it simply demands that defendants provide
redress for their own wrongful conduct that uniquely disadvantages a
protected class. To a large extent, the application of these doctrines is a
symptom of a broader reticence-among both skeptics and supporters of
the ADA-to read the statute as mandating social welfare benefits. And
even if disability rights activists can overcome their more general resistance
to a social welfare approach and urge a broad interpretation that would
eliminate those structural barriers, it seems very unlikely that courts will
read the ADA's broadly phrased accommodation requirement in a way that
would force individual employers to bear the burden of bringing people
with disabilities into the workforce.
My argument in this Part proceeds as follows. In Section A, I discuss
some important deep-rooted structural barriers to employment for people
with disabilities. In Section B, I describe the "job-related" and
access/content doctrines and show how they deprive the accommodation
requirement of significant power to eliminate those barriers. In Section C, I
try to show that the "job-related" and access/content doctrines reflect a
common agenda of assimilating the accommodation requirement very
closely to the classic antidiscrimination model. As part of my argument in
that Section, I attempt to show that the doctrines the courts have employed
to narrow the accommodation requirement are formally indeterminate. That
is, they cannot, as an analytic matter, actually resolve any hard case. To that
94. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and
Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 38. 41 (1996) (noting that the ADA's
accommodation requirement "present[s] an opportunity to rethink employment discrimination law
more generally," and describing it as a "profound" innovation); Miranda Oshige McGowan,
Reconsidering the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 GA. L. REV. 27, 35 (2000) ("[T]he ADA
appears to make a revolutionary break with the old ways of thinking about discrimination while
charting a new course of affirmative obligations to ensure real equality.").
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extent, my argument is a critique of the existing case law. 95 But my
principal project here is more positive than normative. I hope to show that
courts have more or less consistently applied the accommodation
requirement in a way that deprives it of any significant power to eliminate
the significant structural barriers that keep people with disabilities out of
the workforce. To attack those barriers effectively, disability rights activists
must challenge the resistance to social welfare intervention that animates
the limiting doctrines applied by courts. Because it is unlikely that courts
will be persuaded to read the accommodation requirement more broadly,
activists must look past the ADA if they are to attack structural employment
barriers effectively.
A. Structural Barriers to Employment for People with Disabilities
1. Structural Barriers Generally
Although discrimination is plainly a major problem for people with
disabilities, 96 many individuals with disabilities face significant barriers to
employment that operate well before they are ever in a position to be
discriminated against by an employer.97 Many people with disabilities need
personal-assistance services-attendants who assist with personal hygiene
and other activities of daily living-to help them get out of bed and get to
work. 98 Many others need assistive technology to perform work-related
95. One could give further content to the critique by noting that the doctrines I discuss seem
quite strongly to adopt the "perpetrator perspective" toward discrimination, for they give
determinative weight in many cases to the question whether it seems intuitively appropriate to
hold the employer morally responsible for the barriers faced by individuals with disabilities rather
than the question whether the employer is in a position to overcome those barriers. Cf Alan D.
Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review
of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1052-57 (1978),
96. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 14, at 422-25.
97. One should not underestimate the extent to which discrimination itself also operates as a
barrier well before an individual with a disability ever puts himself or herself in a position to be
discriminated against. A person with a disability, knowing that he or she is likely to experience
discrimination in the workplace, may be discouraged from investing in education, training, or
other forms of human capital-and may indeed be discouraged from attempting to enter the
workforce at all. See, e.g., id. at 464. But even if enforcement of the ADA can eliminate that
structural barrier to employment, it leaves many significant structural barriers untouched, as I
explain in the text.
98. Stephen Kaye observes that thirty-two percent of people with disabilities who report that
they are unable to work also report that they need personal-assistance services. See KAYE, supra
note 77, at 32-33. Although Kaye's study does not identify how many of these respondents cannot
work without personal-assistance services, there is good reason to believe that it is a very large
fraction. The services provided by personal assistants are so basic to any participation in society
that an individual who needs those services for any purpose likely needs them to work. For
discussions of the importance of personal-assistance services to people with disabilities, see SIMI
LITVAK ET AL., ATFENDING TO AMERICA: PERSONAL ASSISTANCE FOR INDEPENDENT LIVING: A
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF ATTENDANT SERVICES PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED
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(and other) tasks, as well as structural modifications to their homes to
enable them to leave for work in the morning.99 And the lack of accessible
transportation remains a crucial issue for people with disabilities.'
00
2. The Important Role of Health Insurance
But far and away the most significant barrier to employment for people
with disabilities is the current structure of our health insurance system.'
0 1
For two major reasons, health insurance is a matter of especial importance
for those who have disabilities. First, because our society's response to
disability has historically been so heavily medicalized, many of the services
people with disabilities need for independence and labor force
participation-personal assistance and assistive technology being the most
obvious-are typically regarded as "medical" services for which the health
insurance system is responsible. Second, even without considering those
services (which might more appropriately be provided in a nonmedical
STATES 1-17 (1987); Andrew I. Batavia et al., Toward a National Personal Assistance Program:
The Independent Living Model of Long-Term Care for Persons with Disabilities, 16 J. HEALTH
POL. POL'Y & L. 523 (1991); Gerben DeJong & Teg Wenker, Attendant Care, in INDEPENDENT
LIVING FOR PHYSICALLY DISABLED PEOPLE, supra note 60, at 157, 157-62; and Margaret A.
Nosek & Carol A. Howland, Personal Assistance Services: The Hub of the Policy Wheel for
Community Integration of People with Severe Physical Disabilities, 21 POL'Y STUD. J. 789, 789-
90 (1993).
99. On the importance of assistive technology to the employment prospects of people with
disabilities, see Andrew I. Batavia, Health Care, Personal Assistance and Assistive Technology:
Are In-Kind Benefits Key to Independence or Dependence for People with Disabilities?, in
DISABILITY, WORK AND CASH BENEFITS, supra note 6, at 389, 402-05; John C. DeWitt, The Role
of Technology in Removing Barriers, in THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: FROM POLICY
TO PRACTICE 313 (Jane West ed., 1991) [hereinafter FROM POLICY TO PRACTICE]; and Katherine
D. Seelman, Assistive Technology Policy: A Road to Independence for Individuals with
Disabilities, 49 J. SOC. ISSUES 115 (1993).
100. On the lack of accessible transportation as a barrier to employment, see Robert A.
Katzmann, Transportation Policy, in FROM POLICY TO PRACTICE, supra note 99, at 214, 216.
101. See NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, REMOVING BARRIERS TO WORK: ACTION
PROPOSALS FOR THE 105TH CONGRESS AND BEYOND, at "Barrier: Many People Would Be Worse
Off Financially if They Worked and Earned to Their Potential Than if They Did Not Work"
(1997) [hereinafter NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, REMOVING BARRIERS TO WORK], available
at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/1997/barriers.htm (stating, as the first barrier to
work for people with disabilities, that "[p]eople fear, most of all, losing the medical benefits that
can literally spell the difference between life and death"); NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY,
SHARING THE RISK AND ENSURING INDEPENDENCE: A DISABILITY PERSPECTIVE ON ACCESS TO
HEALTH INSURANCE AND HEALTH-RELATED SERVICES, at "Findings on Barriers to Health
Insurance and Health-Related Services" No. 3 (1993) [hereinafter NAT'L COUNCIL ON
DISABILITY, SHARING THE RISK], available at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/
1993/sharing.htm ("Without adequate insurance coverage, persons with disabilities are likely to
forego employment."); see also Jerry L. Mashaw & Virginia P. Reno, Overview, in DISABILITY,
WORK AND CASH BENEFITS, supra note 6, at 18.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
The Future of Disability Law
context), it is nonetheless true that people with disabilities, on average, have
greater health needs than do those without disabilities. 1
02
In its current form, our health insurance system affirmatively disserves
the interest of people with disabilities in moving into the workforce. The
problem is not that people with disabilities are disproportionately
uninsured; they are not.10 3 The problem is that private insurance-on which
most nondisabled people rely for their health needs-fails to cover the
services people with disabilities most need for independence and health.
10 4
And public insurance is saddled with requirements that lock people with
disabilities out of the workforce.
a. Limitations of Private Insurance
Largely in response to perceived problems of adverse selection,
10 5
private health insurance often places severe limitations on coverage for
102. See Gerben DeJong & Ian Basnett, Disability and Health Policy: The Role of Markets in
the Delivery of Health Services, in HANDBOOK OF DISABILITY STUDIES, supra note 75, at 610,
612-13; Gerben DeJong et al., America's Neglected Health Minority: Working-Age Persons with
Disabilities, 67 MILBANK Q. 311, 320-22 (1989); Robert B. Friedland & Alison Evans, People
with Disabilities: Access to Health Care and Related Benefits, in DISABILITY, WORK AND CASH
BENEFITS, supra note 6, at 357, 358; Kristina W. Hanson et al., Uncovering the Health
Challenges Facing People with Disabilities: The Role of Health Insurance, HEALTH AFF., Nov.
19, 2003, at W3-552, W3-555, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w3.552v 1 .pdf.
103. A recent GAO report based on government data from 1997 and 1998 found that only 9%
of individuals with disabilities reported being uninsured, compared with 15% of individuals in the
rest of the working-age population. See GAO, MEDICAID AND TICKET TO WORK: STATES' EARLY
EFFORTS To COVER WORKING INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES 14-15 (2003); see also INST. OF
MED., supra note 23, at 253 (reporting 1984 statistics that showed that 10.8% of individuals with a
major activity limitation were uninsured, compared with 13.4% of individuals without such a
limitation). A nationwide Harris survey conducted for the National Organization on Disability
(NOD) in 2000 reported that 90% of respondents with disabilities had health insurance, a number
essentially identical to the 89% of respondents without disabilities who had health insurance. See
NAT'L ORG. ON DISABILITY, supra note 81, at 54.
104. See INST. OF MED., supra note 23, at 252; NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, SHARING
THE RISK, supra note 101, at "Findings on Barriers to Health Insurance and Health-Related
Services" No. 1; Andrew I. Batavia, Health Care Reform and People with Disabilities, HEALTH
AFF., Spring 1993, at 40, 43. The 2000 NOD survey found that, although people with disabilities
are insured in roughly similar percentages as people without disabilities, those with disabilities
were four times more likely "to have special needs that are not covered by their health insurance."
NAT'L ORG. ON DISABILITY, supra note 81, at 52.
105. See Andrew I. Batavia & Gerben DeJong, Disability, Chronic Illness, and Risk
Selection, 82 ARCHIVES PHYSICAL MED. & REHABILITATION 546, 546 (2001). For a general
discussion of the economic forces that operate on such insurance classification decisions, see
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY
64-100 (1986). For a strong theoretical and empirical claim that the likelihood of adverse selection
in insurance markets is overstated, see Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets:
An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223 (2004). For a claim that health insurance ought not
to exclude "bad risks," see Deborah A. Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 287 (1993).
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disabling conditions. 10 6 Insurers frequently offer policies that are subject to
"exclusion waivers," which bar reimbursement for any treatment for
particular named conditions. 10 7 When they do not exclude coverage
altogether, insurers often impose annual or lifetime caps on the permitted
reimbursement for specific conditions or classes of conditions. These caps
frequently are set far below the amount that would be necessary to pay for
even minimally sufficient care for the targeted conditions.
10 8
The limitations many insurers place on coverage for mental health
conditions-limitations that are often substantially more restrictive than
those placed on coverage for physical illness-have also been a major
subject of public debate and litigation. 109 The Mental Health Parity Act of
106. In the past, a common technique for imposing such a limitation was the preexisting
condition exclusion. See, e.g., NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, MAKING HEALTH CARE REFORM
WORK FOR AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: SUMMARY INFORMATION ON FIVE "TOWN
MEETINGS" ON HEALTH CARE REFORM 8-9 (1994); NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, SHARING
THE RISK, supra note 101, at "Findings on Barriers to Health Insurance and Health-Related
Services" No. 1; Batavia, supra note 104, at 43. But the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered
sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.), has made preexisting condition exclusions relatively less
important than are the condition- and treatment-specific exclusions discussed in text.
107. See, e.g., Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 675 (8th Cir. 1996)
(infertility treatment); Templet v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of La., No. 99-1400, 2000 WL 1568219,
at * 1 (E.D. La. Oct. 20, 2000) (obesity); Morgenthal ex rel. Morgenthal v. AT&T, No. 97 C1V.
6443 DAB, 1999 WL 187055, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1999) (developmental disorders); Conner
v. Colony Lake Lure, No. 4:97CV01, 1997 WL 816511, at *34 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 4, 1997)
(Treacher Collins Syndrome, a disorder marked by significant deformities of the head and face);
see also GAO, PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE: MILLIONS RELYING ON INDIVIDUAL MARKET
FACE COST AND COVERAGE TRADE-OFFS 43 (1996) (listing, inter alia, asthma, cleft palate, and
glaucoma as conditions for which insurers often exclude coverage); INST. OF MED., supra note 23,
at 255 (listing, inter alia, cataracts, pelvic inflammatory disease, and spine/back disorders as
conditions for which insurers often exclude coverage).
108. There are dozens of examples in the case law and the secondary literature. See, e.g.,
NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 106, at 9 ("The insurance company at my husband's
new employer . . . would only cover my lupus to a lifetime limit of $10,000. When you're
spending over $300 per month on drugs and hundreds more each year on physician care and
laboratory work, that amount wouldn't last very long. One-even one very brief-hospital stay
would use it all."); Bonnie Poitras Tucker, Access to Health Care for Individuals with Hearing
Impairments, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 1101, 1153 n.365 (2000) (noting that the EEOC settled litigation
against an employer whose insurance coverage imposed an annual cap of $150 on treatment for
hearing loss). Extremely low caps placed on reimbursement for treatment of HIV- or AIDS-
related illnesses have been a frequent target of litigation. See, e.g., McNeil v. Time Ins. Co., 205
F.3d 179, 182 (5th Cir. 2000) ($10,000 limit on coverage for AIDS or AIDS-related complex
during first two years of the policy); Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 558 (7th Cir.
1999) (two policies, one with a lifetime limit of $25,000 for AIDS or AIDS-related conditions, the
other with a lifetime limit of $100,000 for those conditions, both with $1 million lifetime limit for
coverage for all conditions); McGann v. H&H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 403 (5th Cir. 1991)
($5000 lifetime limit for AIDS-related conditions). Recent estimates of the average lifetime health
care costs for AIDS-related illnesses in the United States exceed $155,000 for each individual
with the condition. See Nancy R. Mansfield, Evolving Limitations on Coverage for AIDS:
Implications for Health Insurers and Employers Under the ADA and ERISA, 35 TORT & INS. L.J.
117, 117 (1999).
109. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 107-61 (2001) (reporting the proposed Mental Health Equitable
Treatment Act of 2001 to address this problem); Brian D. Shannon, Paving the Path to Parity in
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1996-which was recently extended through December 20041 I--prohibits
insurers from imposing annual or lifetime dollar limits on mental health
coverage that are less than those imposed on physical illness coverage."'
But the statute has a number of loopholes.1 12 As a result, "because of [the
statute's] narrow scope and reductions in mental health benefits that the
employers have made to offset the required enhancements, compliance may
have little effect on employees' access to mental health services."'1 13 Many
state mental-health-parity laws aim to close some of these loopholes, 1 4 but
those laws typically do not apply to insurance offered on the individual
market,' 15 nor do they apply to insurance offered by employers through
self-funded plans.' 16
Although the exclusion and capping of coverage for particular
conditions is a major problem for individuals with disabilities, it may not be
the most important way in which private health insurance policies fail to
meet their needs. For even when private health insurance contains no
limitations on the conditions for which individuals may be treated, it
Health Insurance Coverage .for Mental Illness: New Law or Merely Good Intentions?, 68 U.
COLO. L. REV. 63 (1997); Beth Mellen Harrison, Note, Mental Health Parity, 39 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 255 (2002) (discussing recent legislative developments relating to the issue) Richard G.
Frank et al., The Politics and Economics of Mental Health 'Parity' Laws, HEALTH AFF., July/Aug.
1997, at 108. For case law, see Modderno v. King, 82 F.3d 1059, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ($75,000
lifetime cap on mental health care benefits, in a policy with no cap for physical illnesses); Kunin
v. Benefit Trust Life Insurance Co., 910 F.2d 534, 535 (9th Cir. 1990) ($10,000 annual limit for
"mental illness or nervous disorders," which the insurer applied to limit coverage for autism); and
Fermin v. Conseco Direct Life Insurance Co., No. SA-98-CA-0943 NN, 2001 WL 685903, at *7
(W.D. Tex. May 1, 2001) (190.-day lifetime cap on coverage for hospitalization to treat "mental,
psychoneurotic or personality disorders," in a policy with no similar cap for hospitalization to
treat physical illnesses).
110. See Pub. L. No. 108-197, 117 Stat. 2998 (2003).
111. See 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5 (2000).
112. It applies only to group health plans, not health plans offered directly by insurers to
individual policyholders. See 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(a)(1)-(2); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5(a)(l)-(2). Even
then, it applies only to group health plans offered by employers with more than fifty employees.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(c); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5(c). And it applies only to (annual or lifetime)
dollar limitations placed on mental health coverage; the statute specifically permits covered
insurers to impose "cost sharing, limits on numbers of visits or days of coverage, and
requirements relating to medical necessity," on mental health coverage--even if it does not
impose such restrictions on physical illness coverage. 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(b)(2); 42 U.S.C. §
300gg-5(b)(2). Indeed, the statute even permits insurers to decline to offer any mental health
coverage at all. See § 29 U.S.C. 1185a(b)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5(b)(1).
113. GAO, MENTAL HEALTH PARITY ACT: DESPITE NEW FEDERAL STANDARDS, MENTAL
HEALTH BENEFITS REMAIN LIMITED 5 (2000).
114. See id. at 8 (reporting that twenty-nine states have adopted laws that "are more
comprehensive than the federal parity law by requiring parity not only in dollar limits but also in
service limits or cost-sharing provisions").
115. See GAO, PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE: ACCESS TO INDIVIDUAL MARKET COVERAGE
MAY BE RESTRICTED FOR APPLICANTS WITH MENTAL DISORDERS 8 (2002).
116. See S. REP. No. 107-6 1, at 4 (2001) (explaining that ERISA preemption bars states from
applying coverage mandates to self-insured employer plans); Shannon, supra note 109, at 77
(same).
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typically imposes strict limitations on the specific treatments and other
interventions for which it will pay. Those treatment-specific limitations
formally affect all policyholders-disabled and nondisabled alike. But they
often fall most heavily in practice on individuals with disabilities. Two
aspects of private insurance largely account for this effect: (1) the tilt of
insurance policies toward acute, as opposed to chronic, care;1 17 and (2) the
typical requirement that covered treatments be "medically necessary.""
8
These aspects are intertwined, because insurance policies' definitions of
medical necessity often incorporate an acute-care bias by "requir[ing]
evidence that a service will significantly improve a person's health status"
and not merely "maintain [that person' s] functional capacity."
' 119
The acute-care orientation of private health insurance creates a number
of gaps in coverage that have a significant effect on individuals with
disabilities. Individuals who experience disabling injuries or strokes, for
example, typically find that their insurance does not cover the rehabilitative
117. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., supra note 23, at 227; NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY,
SHARING THE RISK, supra note 101, at "Findings on Barriers to Health Insurance and Health-
Related Services" No. 4; DeJong et al., supra note 102, at 335. For a general critique of the
American health system's acute-care bias, see DANIEL M. Fox, POWER AND ILLNESS: THE
FAILURE AND FUTURE OF AMERICAN HEALTH CARE POLICY (1993).
118. See, e.g., HENRY T. IREYS ET AL., DEFINING MEDICAL NECESSITY: STRATEGIES FOR
PROMOTING ACCESS TO QUALITY CARE FOR PERSONS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES,
MENTAL RETARDATION, AND OTHER SPECIAL HEALTH CARE NEEDS 1-2 (1999); NAT'L
COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, SHARING THE RISK, supra note 101, at "Findings on Barriers to Health
Insurance and Health-Related Services" No. 4. Insurers' imposition and application of "medical
necessity" criteria are frequently discussed in the legal and health policy literature. For
discussions in the legal literature, see Einer Elhauge, The Limited Regulatory Potential of Medical
Technology Assessment, 82 VA. L. REV. 1525 (1996); Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. Anderson,
Health Insurers'Assessment of Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637 (1992); and Timothy
Stoltzfus Jost, The American Difference in Health Care Costs: Is There a Problem? Is Medical
Necessity the Solution?, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1 (1999). For discussions in the health policy
literature, see David M. Eddy, Benefit Language: Criteria That Will Improve Quality While
Reducing Costs, 275 JAMA 650 (1996); Peter D. Jacobson et al., Defining and Implementing
Medical Necessity in Washington State and Oregon, 34 INQUIRY 143 (1997); Sara Rosenbaum et
al., Who Should Determine When Health Care Is Medically Necessary?, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED.
229 (1999); and Linda A. Bergthold, Medical Necessity: Do We Need It?, HEALTH AFF., Winter
1995, at 180. See also Medical Necessity: From Theory to Practice: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 106th Cong. (1999). Although people with
disabilities and those who focus on disability certainly understand the connection between
prevailing definitions of "medical necessity" and the inadequacy of private health insurance for
people with disabilities, the point is largely absent from the general legal or health policy
literature on medical-necessity requirements. Virtually none of that literature focuses on the way
in which the acute-care bias of medical-necessity definitions-and their focus on what one analyst
calls the "truly medical," Eddy, supra, at 652-limits the coverage people with disabilities most
need. For a rare hint at this issue, see Jacobson et al., supra, at 151-52 ("[M]edical necessity is not
well-suited for the severely disabled or the chronic care populations, where problems often deal
with social necessity, such as keeping people independent.").
119. IREYS ET AL., supra note 118, at 2. But cf id. at 17 (noting that definitions "vary
widely").
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therapy they need. 120 Individuals with disabilities who need other forms of
ongoing therapy-such as those with hearing impairments who need speech
therapy-have a similar experience. Private insurers will pay for such
therapy when it is a short-term response to an acute condition, but not when
it is a continuing response to a chronic condition.'21
Similarly, private insurers often do not cover, or do not adequately
cover, durable medical equipment and assistive technologies. 12  The failure
of private insurers to cover the costs of hearing aids is widely
documented. 123 Individuals with limb amputations also frequently have
difficulty obtaining coverage for their prostheses. 124 Insurers often invoke
the "medical necessity" concept to refuse to pay for more advanced (and
more functional) prostheses where less expensive (and less functional)
prostheses are available. 125 The same "medical necessity" issue often arises
120. See, e.g., LISA I. IEZZONI, WHEN WALKING FAILS: MOBILITY PROBLEMS OF ADULTS
WITH CHRONIC CONDITIONS 241 (2003); INST. OF MED., supra note 23, at 255; NAT'L COUNCIL
ON DISABILITY, SHARING THE RISK, supra note 101, at "Findings on Barriers to Health Insurance
and Health-Related Services" No. 5; Batavia, supra note 104, at 43.
121. See, e.g., Micek v. City of Chicago, No. 98-C-6757, 1999 WL 966970, at *6 n.12 (N.D.
I1. Oct. 4, 1999) (stating that plaintiff born with a hearing impairment was denied coverage for
speech therapy "because his condition was chronic and significant improvement could not be
shown within sixty days"); see also Johns Hopkins Hosp. v. Pepper, 697 A.2d 1358, 1370 (Md.
1997) (noting that plaintiffs' insurance did not cover "long-term (i.e., lasting more than sixty
days) physical, speech or occupational therapies").
122. See, e.g., IEZZONI, supra note 120, at 249-50; INST. OF MED., supra note 23, at 227;
NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, SHARING THE RISK, supra note 101, at "Findings on Barriers to
Health Insurance and Health-Related Services" No. 5; SHAPIRO, supra note 33, at 23 1; Batavia,
supra note 104, at 43-44; see also IEZZONI, supra note 120, at 254-55 (noting that even when
insurers pay for mobility aids, they often fail to pay for necessary adjustments and repairs).
123. See, e.g., Tucker, supra note 108, at 1147; Steven B. Adams, Comment, Who Will
Hear? An Examination of the Regulation of Hearing Aids, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
505, 509 (1995); Christine M. Tomko, Note, The Economically Disadvantaged and the ADA: Why
Economic Need Should Factor into the Mitigating Measures Disability Analysis, 52 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 1033, 1035 (2002); see also Ellen A. Rhoades, Hearing Aids for Children: Who
Pays?, VOLTA VOICES, Mar.-Apr. 2002, at 5, 5 ("It is widely known that effective hearing
prostheses are critical to the well-being of these children. And yet, this is the one piece of
equipment that is often the most expensive and the most difficult for parents to secure.").
124. For that reason, the Amputee Coalition of America, in its publication on "adapting to
limb loss," includes articles with titles such as Have You Read Your Insurance Policy Lately?,
When Your Insurance Claim Is Denied, and In Search of Funding. See NAT'L LIMB LOSS INFO.
CTR., FIRST STEP: A GUIDE FOR ADAPTING TO LIMB Loss 46-54 (2003). Such titles are, in fact,
commonplace in publications geared toward parents of children with disabilities. See, e.g., Tricia
Luker & Calvin Luker, "at Do You Mean It's Not Covered?, EXCEPTIONAL PARENT, Aug.
1998, at 42.
125. See, e.g., Cynthia Myers, The Future of Amputee Rehabilitation, REHAB MGMT.,
Oct./Nov. 1998, at 50, 51. For a discussion of the functional benefits of technologically advanced
prostheses, see SHAPIRO, supra note 33, at 222-23. For relevant case law, see EEOC v. Hinsdale
Hospital, No. 98-C-3482, 1999 WL 495480, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 30, 1999) (noting that insurer
refused to pay for myoelectric arm prosthesis that would eliminate neck strain caused by
complainant's existing mechanical prosthesis); Palmer v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 252,
256 (Ct. App. 2002) (nothing that, although plaintiff's prosthetist believed that more expensive
ultralight prostheses would be more functional for his active lifestyle, only the basic prosthesis
satisfied the insurer's "medical necessity" criterion).
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when individuals with mobility impairments seek reimbursements for
wheelchairs.
126
b. Limitations of Public Insurance
The foregoing limitations on private insurance coverage have driven
people with disabilities into the public health care system, primarily
Medicare and Medicaid. But the public health insurance programs
themselves impose serious impediments to the participation of people with
disabilities in the labor force. Most notably, they incorporate restrictive
eligibility criteria that create both psychological and economic disincentives
to working.
To receive Medicare, a working-age individual with a disability
generally must first become eligible for Social Security Disability Insurance
(SSDI) by showing that he or she is unable to do any "substantial gainful
work which exists in the national economy."'' 2 7 SSDI recipients must then
wait two years before receiving Medicare.12 8 Although the administrative
eligibility rules sweep in a large number of people who in fact could
work, 129 the need to prove that one cannot work to obtain SSDI, combined
with the need to remain idle during the two-year waiting period to obtain
health coverage, gives disabled Medicare recipients a significant
psychological investment in the notion that they are unable to work. That
psychological investment makes it hard to leave the SSDI rolls,1 30 as does
the fear of losing Medicare benefits entirely.
SSDI contains a work-incentive provision that allows people with
disabilities who leave the rolls to retain Medicare eligibility for a
substantial length of time (eight-and-a-half years, thanks to the 1999
enactment of the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act
(TWWIIA), discussed infra Part III)."' But benefits recipients who reach
the end of that work-incentive period abruptly lose their Medicare
126. An extensive discussion of this issue appears in IEZZONI, supra note 120, at 223-59.
127. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (2000).
128. See id. § 426(b).
129. For a discussion of this issue, see Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., 526
U.S. 795, 804 (1999) (noting that administrative rules governing SSDI eligibility "inevitably
simplify, eliminating consideration of many differences potentially relevant to an individual's
ability to perform a particular job" and therefore that an individual might qualify for SSDI under
these rules yet still be able to work). See generally Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983)
(describing and upholding the administrative scheme, which relies on categorical rules, for
determining whether individuals are able to work for purposes of SSDI).
130. See DeJong et al., supra note 102, at 334-35; Walter Y. Oi, Employment and Benefits for
People with Diverse Disabilities, in DISABILITY, WORK AND CASH BENEFITS, supra note 6, at
103, 121.
131. See 42 U.S.C. § 426(b).
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eligibility.'32 And SSDI recipients have long feared that if they return to the
workforce for any period, the Social Security Administration will declare
them no longer disabled and thereby eliminate their eligibility for any
benefits.
133
Medicaid contains similar-though not quite identical-work
disincentives. Although the rules governing Medicaid eligibility are
complicated and vary significantly across states, roughly seventy-eight
percent of disabled Medicaid beneficiaries are entitled to coverage because
they receive Supplemental Security Income (SSI).134 (With the exception of
states that have invoked the so-called "209(b) option,"1 35 states are required
to provide Medicaid coverage to all SSI recipients.136) To receive SSI,
applicants must establish both that they have a "disability" and that they
earn and own less than a statutory income and resource threshold.
137
Because the SSI program's definition of disability is the same inability-to-
perform-substantial-gainful-activity definition as the one that applies under
the SSDI program, the same structural work deterrent appears in both: To
establish eligibility, an applicant must make a substantial investment
(psychological and otherwise) in the proposition that he or she is simply
unable to work.
138
SSI (and the accompanying entitlement to Medicaid) does contain a
work-incentive provision: If an SSI recipient with a disability returns to
work, medical benefits will not be cut off until the recipient's monthly
income exceeds the sum of (1) the monthly SSI cash benefit (currently
$552) p!us any supplemental payment provided by the state; (2) the
132. See GAO, SSA DISABILITY: PROGRAM REDESIGN NECESSARY TO ENCOURAGE
RETURN TO WORK 44-47 (1996).
133. See NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, REMOVING BARRIERS TO WORK, supra note 101.
TWWIIA substantially alleviates this fear. See infra Subsection III.A.2.
134. See KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID'S ROLE FOR PEOPLE
WITH DISABILITIES 12 (2003).
135. This option, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(f), was created during the 1972 change from
a cooperative state-federal program of aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled (ABD) to an entirely
federal SSI program. A number of states applied more restrictive eligibility criteria to their ABD
programs than the federal government ultimately applied to SSI. The 209(b) option permits those
states to use their more restrictive pre-1972 ABD eligibility standards, rather than the federal
government's relatively more generous post-1972 SSI eligibility standards, to govern access to
Medicaid. Eleven states-Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Virginia-currently use the 209(b) option. See
KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, supra note 134, at 13.
136. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(II).
137. See id. § 1382.
138. SSI recipients face no waiting period before receiving Medicaid. In this respect, they are
quite unlike SSDI recipients, who must wait two years before receiving Medicare. But even
though SSI-Medicaid recipients do not face the two years of forced idleness that SSDI-Medicare
recipients do, they still must remain idle while their SSI applications are being considered. And
because SSI is not a contributory social-insurance program like SSDI, SSI recipients are far less
likely than SSDI recipients to have had any significant prior workforce attachment.
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recipient's impairment-related work expenses; and (3) the monthly cost of
Medicaid benefits and publicly funded attendant-care services previously
paid to the recipient. 39 Unlike the work-incentive provision under SSDI,
this provision has no time limit, but it still has not moved significant
numbers of people with disabilities into the workforce.140 The initial
investment in idleness that attends the receipt of SSI benefits, the lack of
understanding by SSI recipients of the complex structure of the work-
incentive provision, and the relatively low income levels at which Medicaid
eligibility phases out under that provision are likely explanations.1 4 1
3. Summary
The foregoing discussion should demonstrate that people with
disabilities face an array of deep-rooted structural barriers to work. These
barriers-the lack of access to personal-assistance services, accessible
technology, home modifications, and accessible tiansportation, together
with the structure of our health care system-operate to keep many people
with disabilities out of the workforce well before any individual employer
has an opportunity to discriminate against them. An antidiscrimination
model thus does not appear to be a promising means of attacking those
barriers.
B. The Accommodation-Requirement's Ineffectiveness in Eliminating
Structural Barriers to Employment
The ADA might, at first glance, appear to be a more promising vehicle
for eliminating deep structural barriers to employment than other
antidiscrimination statutes. The ADA's innovation, after all, was that it
placed the requirement of "reasonable accommodation" front and center. 142
Because the existing physical and social environment is structured in a way
139. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382h(b); 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.260-.269 (2004).
140. See, e.g., GAO, MAJOR MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES AND PROGRAM RISKS: SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 10-11 (2003).
141. For a good discussion of some likely reasons the work incentives have been so
ineffective, see GAO, supra note 132, at 39-47. See also Friedland & Evans, supra note 102, at
369 ("Current Medicaid policy addresses some of the employment disincentives for individuals
leaving SSI rolls and returning to work. It does not, however, address the motivation to go on
Medicaid in the first place. This incentive arises because employer-based coverage is unavailable
or inadequate and because Medicaid's income test effectively requires that one stop working to
become eligible.").
142. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (defining "qualified individual with a disability" to mean "an
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires"); id.
§ 12112(b)(5)(A) (requiring employers to "mak[e] reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability").
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that often excludes people with disabilities simply by failing to take them
into account, the ADA's drafters insisted that any disability discrimination
law must include a requirement that employers make changes to (physical
and social) structures that were designed without people with disabilities in
mind. 43 The accommodation requirement might in principle serve as a
means of attacking the deep-rooted structural obstacles to employment for
people with disabilities. 
144
As I show in this Section, however, it has not worked out that way. By
deploying two doctrines-the "job-related" rule, which I discuss in
Subsection 1, and the access/content distinction, which I discuss in
Subsection 2-courts have drained the accommodation requirement of
significant power to eliminate those deep-rooted barriers. These doctrines
categorically exclude certain classes of accommodation from the purview
of the ADA--even if the requested accommodations could be provided
reasonably and without undue hardship. Unfortunately, the types of
accommodation excluded by these doctrines are precisely those that are
necessary to eliminate broad structural barriers to employment for people
with disabilities.
1. The "Job-Related" Rule
One aspect of ADA doctrine quite directly relieves employers of
responsibility for alleviating broad structural barriers to the employment of
people with disabilities. It is well accepted, both by the EEOC and by the
courts, that an ADA accommodation must be "job-related" rather than a
"personal item."1 45 Under this rule, an employer might be required to
provide a disabled individual with an accommodation that "specifically
assists the individual in performing the duties of a particular job" (so long
as the accommodation is reasonable and can be provided without undue
hardship). 46 But the employer will never be required to provide "an
143. See, e.g., Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and
Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 460-
61 (1991); see also SCOTCH, supra note 65, at 70-72 (describing how drafters of the regulations
implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act recognized the need for an accommodation
requirement).
144. Cf Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 94, at 39-41 (suggesting that a race discrimination
regime modeled on the ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement might provide a means for
attacking structural employment problems among racial minorities).
145. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.9 (2004). This doctrine draws directly from a statement
in the House Education and Labor Committee's report on the proposed ADA. See H.R. REP. No.
101-485, pt. 2, at 64 (1990).
146. 29 C.F.R pt. 1630 app. § 1630.9.
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adjustment or modification [that] assists the individual throughout his or her
daily activities, on and off the job."'
147
The "job-related" rule plainly rules out a number of accommodations
that could be provided at reasonable cost and without undue hardship and
that, while necessary to enable many individuals to work, also provide off-
the-job benefits. For example, the rule excuses employers from any
obligation to provide assistive technology that people with disabilities need
to get to work-at least if that technology also helps them outside of the
workplace. 48  Nor need employers provide medical treatment or
rehabilitation that would make an individual with a disability able to
work,149 paid leave to attend training for a new service animal that would
enable an individual with a disability to come to work, 150 or training that
would enable an individual to perform a new job when she has become
unable to perform her old job because of a disability. 151 In all of these cases,
the accommodation might enable an individual with a disability to work,
and it might be provided at "reasonable" cost and without "undue
hardship." But because the accommodation would also provide benefits that
extend beyond the individual's relationship with her particular employer,
the "job-related" rule excludes it from the ADA's requirements.
By similar logic, the statute does not require employers to provide the
home-based personal assistance that many individuals with disabilities need
to get out of bed and ready for work, because such assistance also enhances
those individuals' independence more generally. 152 It bears emphasis that
the problem here is not the expense or burden of personal-assistance
services, which might be relatively cheap. The problem is that such services
help the disabled individual off the job as well as on. When an individual
with a disability needs the assistance of an aide in performing on-the-job
tasks, an employer might well be required to provide it.153 That may be true
147. Id.
148. See EEOC, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS
(TITLE I) OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT § 3.4 (1992) ("Equipment or devices that
assist a person in daily activities on and off the job are considered personal items that an employer
is not required to provide.").
149. See Brookins v. Indianapoiis Power & Light Co., 90 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1003-04 (S.D. Ind.
2000); Burnett v. W. Res., Inc., 929 F. Supp. 1349, 1358 (D. Kan. 1996).
150. See Nelson v. Ryan, 860 F. Supp. 76, 82-83 (W.D.N.Y. 1994).
151. See Williams v. United Ins. Co., 253 F.3d 280, 282-83 (7th Cir. 2001).
152. For discussion of the difficulty with using the ADA as a tool to obtain personal
assistance services, see Simi Litvak, Personal Assistance Services, in IMPLEMENTING THE ADA,
supra note 75, at 365, 370-74.
153. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1211 I(9)(B) (2000) (providing that "reasonable accommodation"
includes "provision of qualified readers or interpreters"); Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63
F.3d 131, 141-42 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J.) (holding that full-time aide to assist plaintiff
teacher in classroom management might be a reasonable accommodation); Nelson v. Thornburgh,
567 F. Supp. 369, 382 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (Pollak, J.) (holding that hiring readers to assist blind
employees with on-the-job tasks is reasonable accommodation).
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even if the cost is substantial.154 But an employer will never be required to
provide aides who offer off-the-job help, no matter how inexpensive.
The EEOC and at least one lower court have gone even further and
concluded that an employer's accommodation obligation does not even
begin until the individual with a disability arrives at the workplace.
Accordingly, the employer need not provide transportation to help the
individual get to the workplace in the first instance. 55 The case law is not
uniform on this issue, however. 156 But whether it affects access to
transportation or not, the "job-related" rule represents a significant
limitation on the accommodation requirement's power to disestablish deep-
rooted structural obstacles to employment for people with disabilities.
2. The Access/Content Distinction
In addition to applying the "job-related" rule, courts have consistently
employed what I will call the access/content distinction in adjudicating
accommodation claims under all three substantive titles of the ADA: Title I,
which prohibits discrimination in private employment; Title I, which
prohibits discrimination by state and local governments; and Title III,
which prohibits discrimination by places of public accommodation. These
courts have held that an accommodation can be required only if it provides
people with disabilities "access" to the same benefit received by
nondisabled individuals; an accommodation that would alter the "content"
of the benefit will not be required, even if it can be provided at reasonable
cost and without undue hardship. In practice, this distinction has largely
drained the statute of effectiveness in attacking what may be the single most
significant employment barrier faced by people with disabilities as a
group-the current structure of our health insurance system.
57
154. See, e.g., Nelson, 567 F. Supp. at 376 (noting that readers would cost approximately half
of plaintiffs' salary, or roughly $6638 per plaintiffper year in 1983 dollars).
155. See Wade v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 97-3378, 1998 WL 639162, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept.
10, 1998) (holding employer not required to provide transportation to and from work); LORI A.
BOWMAN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW YEARBOOK § 9:7.7 (2003) (reporting the EEOC's position
that "barriers outside the workplace, such as a difficulty in getting to work, are not 'workplace
created barriers"' subject to the accommodation obligation).
156. See Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 68 F.3d 1512, 1516-17 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that
employer may be required to provide paid parking space as accommodation for employee whose
disability makes her unable to take public transportation to work); Smallwood v. Witco Corp., No.
94 CIV. 7766 (LMM), 1995 WL 716745, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 1995) ("There is nothing
inherently unreasonable in requiring an employe[r] to furnish an otherwise qualified disabled
employee with assistance related to her ability to get to work.").
157. Professor Melissa Cole argues that the cases that have applied an access/content
distinction in the context of insurance have really applied a status/conduct distinction because they
prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability status but permit discrimination based on the
conduct of using particular medical services. See Melissa Cole, In/Ensuring Disability, 77 TUL. L.
REV. 839, 873 (2003). Without denying the force of Professor Cole's argument, my sense is that
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In the fourteen years the ADA has been on the books, it has proven an
ineffective tool to force structural reforms in our health insurance system.
In particular, courts have consistently read the statute as not reaching the
condition- and treatment-specific coverage limitations that impose severe
burdens on people with disabilities. At first glance, this result may not be
surprising, for the ADA includes a specific safe harbor provision for certain
risk classification and administration decisions by insurers. That provision
states that the statute "shall not be construed to prohibit or restrict":
(1) an insurer, hospital or medical service company, health
maintenance organization, or any agent, or entity that administers
benefit plans, or similar organizations from underwriting risks,
classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or
not inconsistent with State law; or
(2) a person or organization covered by this chapter from
establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering the terms of
a bona fide benefit plan that are based on underwriting risks,
classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or
not inconsistent with State law; or
(3) a person or organization covered by this chapter from
establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering the terms of
a bona fide benefit plan that is not subject to State laws that
regulate insurance. 158
This language seems to authorize insurers to discriminate against
people with disabilities in all acts of risk underwriting, classification, and
administration. But the same provision goes on to say that the foregoing
paragraphs "shall not be used as a subterfuge to evade the purposes of
subchapter[s] I and III of this chapter."' 59 Although the details of this
provision are nearly inscrutable-particularly its "subterfuge" coda 16 0-it
analysis of ADA accommodation doctrine is best advanced by thinking of these cases as applying
what they straightforwardly purport to apply-an access/content distinction.
158. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c).
159. Id. (footnote omitted).
160. Consider the futile efforts of one esteemed judge to make sense of the provision.
Suggesting that insurance companies insisted on the inclusion of the safe harbor provision because
they feared "being sued under [the ADA's public accommodations provisions] for refusing to sell
an insurance policy to a disabled person," then-Chief Judge Posner contended that the provision
might protect such insurers when their refusal to deal rested on sound actuarial principles as
required by state law:
For Mutual of Omaha to take the position that people with AIDS are so unhealthy
that it won't sell them health insurance would be a prima facie violation of [the
ADA's public accommodations provisions]. But the insurance company just might
be able to steer into the safe harbor provided by [42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)], provided it
didn't run afoul of the "subterfuge" limitation, as it would do if, for example, it had
adopted the AIDS caps to deter people who know they are HIV positive from
buying the policies at all.
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"is obviously intended for the benefit of insurance companies."'' 61 One
might therefore expect that it is the insurance-specific safe harbor provision
that made the ADA an ineffective tool for forcing change in private
insurance practices that serve to limit the independence of people with
disabilities.
What is striking, however, is that the cases that have rejected ADA
challenges to condition- and treatment-specific exclusions and caps have
not, for the most part, relied on the safe harbor provision. Judge Posner's
leading decision in Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co.1 62 is exemplary.
The plaintiff, who had HIV, challenged AIDS caps that Mutual of Omaha
had imposed on its health insurance policies. Defending the caps, the
insurer made no effort to claim the protection of the safe harbor provision.
To the contrary, it "conceded itself out of relying on [42 U.S.C.
§ 12201(c)'s] safe harbor by stipulating that it cannot show that its AIDS
caps are based on sound actuarial principles or claims experience or are
consistent with state law."' 63 Despite that concession, the court rejected the
plaintiffs ADA claim on the basis of the access/content distinction.
Because Mutual of Omaha offered people with HIV the same product it
offered everyone else (health insurance with an AIDS cap), the court
concluded that it had not denied the plaintiffs access to the goods or
services it offered and therefore could not be liable under the statute.' 64 In
seeking to lift the AIDS caps, the court held, the plaintiff impermissibly
sought to change the content of the insurance policies Mutual of Omaha
offered. 1
65
Judge Posner made clear that the access/content distinction was not an
insurance-specific doctrine. Rather, it reflected a general limitation on the
ADA's accommodation requirement:
The common sense of the statute is that the content of the goods
or services offered by a place of public accommodation is not
Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 562 (7th Cir. 1999). As Judge Posner describes it,
the "subterfuge" language takes back the entire benefit that insurance companies expected to get
from the safe harbor provision. The whole premise of his argument is that the safe harbor protects
insurers in at least some cases in which they refuse to sell policies to individuals because of their
disabilities. But if an insurer's action is treated as "subterfuge" whenever the insurer aims to keep
a class of people with disabilities from buying its policies, how can the safe harbor ever protect an
insurer who refuses to deal with an individual with a disability? For a good discussion of the
confusing nature of the safe harbor's "subterfuge" provision, see Jeffrey S. Manning, Comment,
Are Insurance Companies Liable Under the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 88 CAL. L. REV.
607, 639-43 (2000).
161. Doe, 179 F.3d at 562. For a discussion of the legislative history of the insurance safe
harbor provision, see Chai R. Feldblum, The Employment Sector, in IMPLEMENTING THE ADA,
supra note 75, at 81, 111-18.
162. 179 F.3d 557.
163. Id. at 562.
164. See id. at 559.
165. See id. at 560.
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regulated. A camera store may not refuse to sell cameras to a
disabled person, but it is not required to stock cameras specially
designed for such persons.1
66
Like Judge Posner, courts adjudicating ADA cases frequently say that
an accommodation may be required only if it provides a disabled individual
access to the same opportunity provided to others (the same job in the
employment context, the same government benefit in the public services
context, or the same good or service in the public accommodations
context). If an accommodation provides nothing more than such access,
then the defendant must provide it to the extent reasonable. But no
accommodation will be required-no matter how reasonable-if it would
alter the content of the opportunity the defendant offers generally. 1
67
Although the insurer does not usually stipulate itself out of the ADA's
safe harbor, Doe's analysis is typical of the case law in this area. The cases
have consistently rejected challenges to disability-related caps or
exclusions, and they have typically done so on access/content grounds: So
long as the insurer offers people with disabilities the opportunity to
purchase policies on the same terms as everyone else, it has not denied
them access to the benefit received by the nondisabled. That is true even if
the policy terms cap or exclude coverage for specific disabling conditions,
or for specific treatments that only people with disabilities can use. Courts
166. Id.
167. See US Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 397 (2002) (employment case) ("The Act
requires preferences in the form of 'reasonable accommodations' that are needed for those with
disabilities to obtain the same workplace opportunities that those without disabilities
automatically enjoy."); PGA Tour v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 683 n.37 (2001) (public
accommodations case) ("'The statute seeks to assure that a disabled person's disability will not
deny him equal access to (among other things) competitive sporting events .... ' (quoting id. at
703 (Scalia, J., dissenting))); Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 597, 603 n.14
(1999) (public services case) (holding that states might be required to create community
placements for individuals with mental disabilities, but rejecting characterization of that holding
as requiring states to provide different services to individuals with disabilities than are provided to
others, while holding that "States must adhere to the ADA's nondiscrimination requirement with
regard to the services they in fact provide"); Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301, 303 (1985)
(public services case) (holding under the Rehabilitation Act-the predecessor to the ADA-tbat
"an otherwise qualified handicapped individual must be provided with meaningful access to the
benefit that the grantee offers," but that the statute "does not require the State to alter [its]
definition of the benefit being offered simply to meet the reality that the handicapped have greater
medical needs"). The ADA's access/content distinction finds an imperfect parallel in
jurisprudence under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and its predecessor
statute, the Education for All Handicapped Children Act. The Supreme Court has held that the
IDEA imposes a non-cost-qualified requirement that school districts provide services necessary
for individuals with disabilities to obtain access to the classroom. See, e.g., Cedar Rapids Cmty.
Sch. Dist. v. Garret F. ex rel. Charlene F., 526 U.S. 66, 77-79 (1999). But it has also held that
school districts have a much more limited obligation under the statute to alter the content of the
instruction provided. See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 198-204 (1982).
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have applied this analysis in cases involving both condition-specific1 68 and
treatment-specific 169 limitations on insurance coverage. With only a few
exceptions, they have not found it necessary to rely on the safe harbor
provision.17 0 In short, the ADA has proven ineffective in challenging the
limits on private health insurance for people with disabilities, and the
access/content distinction has been largely responsible for that result.
168. See, e.g., McNeil v. Time Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 179, 189, 188-89 (5th Cir. 2000) (rejecting
challenge to AIDS cap in health insurance policy and stating that, "[b]ecause Title III does not
reach so far as to regulate the content of goods and services, and because it is undisputed this
limitation for AIDS is part of the content of the good that Time offered, Mr. McNeil's Title III
claim must fail"); Doe, 179 F.3d at 559-60; Moddemo v. King, 82 F.3d 1059, 1062 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (rejecting challenge to insurance plan's $75,000 lifetime cap on mental health benefits-a
cap not paralleled by any similar limitation on benefits for physical conditions-essentially on
access/content grounds). But cf Carparts Distrib. Ctr. v. Auto. Wholesaler's Ass'n, 37 F.3d 12, 19
(1st Cir. 1994) (stating that "a sharp distinction between" access and content may be "illusory").
For a general discussion of the case law, see Mary Crossley, Becoming Visible: The ADA 's Impact
on Health Care for Persons with Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REv. 51, 80 (2000) ("Although some
courts have been willing to scrutinize insurance practices to protect the interests of people with
disabilities, the trend of the case law over the past several years has been for courts to take a fairly
hands-off approach .... ").
169. See, e.g., Bythway v. Principal Health Care of Del., Nos. CIV. A. 97-435-GMS & CIV.
A. 97-600-GMS, 1999 WL 33220042, at *2-3 (D. Del. Sept. 29, 1999) (bone marrow transplant
covered for aplastic anemia and acute leukemia but not Hodgkin's disease); Rome v. MTA/N.Y.
City Transit, No. 97-CV-2945 (JG), 1997 WL 1048908, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1997) (speech
therapy covered for some conditions but not for autism); Hilliard v. BellSouth Med. Assistance
Plan, 918 F. Supp. 1016, 1026-27 (S.D. Miss. 1995) (high-dose chemotherapy covered for some
cancers but not multiple myeloma); Pokomey v. Miami Valley Career Tech. Ctr. Sch. Dist., No.
C-3-94-247, 1995 WL 1671909 (S.D. Ohio July 14, 1995) (Taxol rejected as "experimental"
treatment for lung cancer when it was covered for other cancers). But see Henderson v. Bodine
Aluminum, 70 F.3d 958, 960-61 (8th Cir. 1995) (granting preliminary injunction to woman with
breast cancer who challenged insurance policy's refusal to cover high-dose chemotherapy
treatment (HDCT) for breast cancer when it covered HDCT for some other cancers).
170. Although a number of cases discuss the safe harbor provision, they tend to do so only as
additional support for their decisions or to rebut the contention that the safe harbor provision is
itself evidence of an intent that the statute regulate the content of insurance policies. See Rogers v.
Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 174 F.3d 431, 435-37 (4th Cir. 1999); Ford v. Schering-Plough
Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 610-12 (3d Cir. 1998); Parker v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1012-13
(6th Cir. 1997); Modderno, 82 F.3d at 1063-65. Some courts and judges, to be sure, have relied
primarily on the safe harbor provision in such cases, but they are a distinct minority. See, e.g.,
Ford, 145 F.3d at 614-15 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment); cf Leonard F. v. !sr. Disc. Bank
of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating, in challenge to long-term disability policy that
capped coverage for mental conditions, that "we agree with the district court that, if MetLife's
LTD policy is consistent with state law and was adopted prior to the passage of the ADA, it is
exempt from regulation under the Act pursuant to the safe harbor provision," but vacating
judgment against the plaintiff (footnote omitted)). In Rachel Schneller Ziegler, Note, Safe, but Not
Sound: Limiting Safe Harbor Immunity for Health and Disability Insurers and Self-Insured
Employers Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 101 MICH. L. REv. 840, 856-61 (2002),
many decisions are erroneously attributed to reliance on the safe harbor provision; that attribution
leads the author to conclude that the safe harbor provision has a much greater effect than it
actually does.
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C. Treating Accommodation as Antidiscrimination
As I have shown, courts have read the ADA's accommodation
requirement in a way that rules out of bounds any significant challenge to
the deep-rooted structural barriers to employment for people with
disabilities. In this Section, I explore the possible agenda behind the "job-
related" and access/content doctrines that have achieved that effect. In
Subsection 1, I argue that neither doctrine is especially compelling as an
analytic matter. The "job-related" rule rests on an implicit act/omission
distinction, with all the baseline problems to which such distinctions often
succumb. And the application of the access/content distinction turns
crucially on the level of generality at which the benefit offered by the
defendant is defined-a matter on which the distinction itself provides no
guidance. As I argue in Subsection 2, however, the "job-related" and
access/content rules do serve a discernible agenda. Both operate to
assimilate the accommodation requirement very closely to a classic
antidiscrimination requirement. I hope to show that it is not just
accommodation skeptics and judges engaged in a backlash against the ADA
who have a stake in this agenda; disability rights advocates may see an
ideological interest in it as well.
1. The Analytic Failure of the "Job-Related" and Access/Content
Doctrines
a. The "Job-Related" Rule
Neither the courts nor the EEOC have offered any explicit defense of
the "job-related" rule. But the rule seems to rest on a rough-and-ready
notion of corrective justice. Under this view, an employer can be held
responsible only for the obstacles it erects to the employment of people
with disabilities; if an individual with a disability cannot come to work
because of factors that go beyond any particular employer's workplace or
work rules, no individual employer can rightly be held responsible for those
factors. In essence, the rule imposes a kind of act/omission distinction:
Employers are responsible for their own acts, and they must take
"reasonable" care to assure that those acts "accommodate" employees with
disabilities. But employers are not responsible for simply failing to help
employees with disabilities overcome obstacles that stem from the
government's failure to extend social provision. Indeed, the people who
interjected the "job-related" concept into the congressional deliberations
surrounding the ADA's accommodation requirement-lobbyists for hotel
and small-business employer groups-appear to have had precisely this
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kind of act/omission distinction in mind. Urging that employers not be
required to provide accommodations whose usefulness extended outside of
the workplace, they contended that such accommodations were the
responsibility of the social welfare system rather than individual
employers.
171
Like all act/omission distinctions, the "job-related" rule is subject to
serious critique.172 The mere fact that an accommodation removes an
obstacle that the employer did not impose cannot be determinative, for
ADA-mandated accommodations always require employers to alleviate
disadvantages that are caused by the interaction between conditions the
employer created and conditions the employer played no role in creating.
173
That is true even of core accommodations. When an employer provides a
ramp in a building that formerly had only stairs, for example, it removes an
obstacle that results from the interaction between the design of its facilities
(facilities the employer either created or chose to move in to) and the
inability of people who use wheelchairs to climb stairs (an inability the
employer played no role in creating). If wheelchair users could climb stairs,
the lack of a ramp would not be an obstacle. And when an employer
modifies work schedules for an individual with diabetes, it removes an
obstacle that results from the interaction between its general work schedules
(schedules the employer created) and the need of people with diabetes to
take unusually frequent breaks for self-monitoring and medication (a need
the employer played no role in creating).
There appear to be two principal distinctions between these core
accommodations and accommodations that fail the "job-related" test, but
neither seems to identify any relevant difference. First, under existing
property law arrangements, the employer is the only party that can put a
wheelchair ramp into its facilities or change its work schedules. By
contrast, the state could itself provide a disabled employee with personal
assistance to get out of bed or transportation to get to work. Requiring
employers to provide those non-job-specific accommodations thus seems to
171. See Americans with Disabilities Act: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Small Bus.,
101 st Cong. 96 (1990) (statement of David Pinkus on behalf of National Small Business United)
(giving as example of a proper accommodation requirement a North Carolina statute that relieved
employers of the obligation to "[p]rovide accommodations of a personal nature, including, but not
limited to, eyeglasses, hearing aids, or prostheses, except under the same terms and conditions as
such items are provided to the employer's employees generally"); Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1989: Hearings on H.R. 2273 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary and Subcomm. on
Civil and Constitutional Rights, 10 1st Cong. 128 (1989) (statement of James A. DiLuigi on behalf
of the American Hotel and Motel Association) (stating that "some of the items mentioned earlier
as to employment issues, such as personal attendance and readers" are "sort of ... a social
service").
172. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 21, at 864-65.
173. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 14, at 428-29.
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force employers to bear the costs of the state's broader policy decision not
to provide them itself. But one could make the same point about the core
"job-related" accommodations: The state could pay the costs of installing
wheelchair ramps or modifying work schedules for individuals with
disabilities, but it requires employers to pay. It thus forces employers to
bear the costs of the state's broader policy decision not to pay for those
accommodations itself.
Second, the employer does not realize all of the benefits of an
accommodation that aids an individual with a disability off the job as well
as on. By contrast, a core "job-related" accommodation seems to be
devoted entirely to making the individual with a disability a more
productive worker for the employer. On reflection, however, "job-related"
accommodations do not seem to be any different from non-"job-related"
accommodations in this regard. The principal point of requiring employers
to accommodate individuals with disabilities cannot be that employers will
benefit; we can expect employers to do a fairly good job of pursuing their
own self-interest even without such a requirement. The point of an
accommodation mandate thus must be that individuals with disabilities and
society as a whole will benefit. Even in the core "job-related"
accommodation case, an employer cannot fully appropriate these benefits to
itself, for it cannot lower the wages of newly employed people with
disabilities to compensate for the higher intrinsic value employment has for
them. 
7 4
These points suggest that there is substantial indeterminacy in the "job-
related" rule. For example, I have treated as a core "job-related"
accommodation the modification of an employer's break rules to permit an
employee with diabetes to engage in periodic self-monitoring and self-
medication. In that respect, I have simply followed the case law, which
occasionally finds such additional breaks "unreasonable," but never (to my
knowledge) finds them to be "personal" rather than "job-related."1 75 But
additional breaks for self-monitoring and self-medication seem plainly to fit
the EEOC's definition of an accommodation that is not "job-related": "an
adjustment or modification [that] assists the individual throughout his or her
daily activities, on and off the job." 176 After all, such breaks are designed to
174. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000) (prohibiting discrimination in, inter alia, "employee
compensation"). Employers can appropriate to themselves the societal benefits of
accommodations to some extent by taking advantage of the various tax subsidies that defray
accommodation costs. See GAO, BUSINESS TAX INCENTIVES: INCENTIVES To EMPLOY WORKERS
WITH DISABILITIES RECEIVE LIMITED USE AND HAVE AN UNCERTAIN IMPACT (2002). But those
subsidies are equally available whether the accommodation is "job-related" or not.
175. Cf US Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 398 (2002) (implying that "accommodation of
an individual who needs additional breaks from work, perhaps to permit medical visits" could be a
reasonable accommodation mandated by the ADA).
176. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.9 (2004).
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help the employee keep from falling into insulin shock, a condition that has
both on- and off-the-job effects. That such break-in-work accommodations
are universally treated as "job-related" suggests that the formal statement of
the "job-related" rule is not really doing the important work in these cases.
Rather, what is at work seems to be a set of unarticulated assumptions about
what kinds of accommodations ought to be the responsibility of employers
and what kinds ought to be the responsibilities of individuals with
disabilities or the government. Unless these assumptions are articulated and
defended, it is difficult to justify the "job-related" rule as it has been
formulated and applied.
b. The Access/Content Distinction
The access/content distinction does not appear to stand up to close
analysis either. Application of that distinction depends entirely on the level
of generality at which the "content" of the relevant benefit is described.
And the access/content distinction itself has nothing to say about what level
of generality is appropriate.
Consider Judge Posner's leading opinion in Doe. The court's analysis
in that case depended crucially on a largely undefended decision to define
the "content" of the benefit provided by Mutual of Omaha at a quite low
level of generality-the offer to enter into a contract containing precisely
the same terms as those offered to the nondisabled 7 7 Considered at that
level of generality, the access/content distinction virtually transforms the
accommodation rule into a classic antidiscrimination requirement: Only if
the insurer provides people with disabilities something different than it
provides similarly situated nondisabled persons can the insurer be found
liable.
But it is equally possible to view the issue from a higher level of
generality: Under a policy with an AIDS cap, people without AIDS can
expect to "have all their medically necessary care fully covered" up to the
relatively high general lifetime limits imposed by the policy, while people
with that condition "will have care for their most necessary, life-prolonging
care limited to a fraction of that amount.' 78 If the "content" of the policy is
177. See Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 560 (7th Cir. 1999) ("An insurance
policy is a product, and a policy with a $25,000 limit is a different product from one with a $1
million limit, just as a wheelchair is a different product from an armchair. A furniture store that
does not stock wheelchairs knows that it is making its services less valuable to disabled than to
nondisabled people, but the Americans with Disabilities Act has not been understood to require
furniture stores to stock wheelchairs.").
178. Crossley, supra note 168, at 82; see also Jennifer S. Geetter, Coding for Change: The
Power of the Human Genome To Transform the American Health Insurance System, 28 AM. J.L.
& MED. 1, 38 (2002) (describing the view that "for the 'privilege' of health insurance to be equal
for the disabled and the non-disabled, the insurance coverage must be equally likely to be able to
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described at that level of generality, AIDS caps do deny people with that
condition access to the same benefit that is offered to the nondisabled. But
the access/content distinction cannot tell us whether that perspective or the
perspective adopted by most courts is the correct one.
179
The indeterminacy of the access/content distinction comes into full
view when one examines the Supreme Court's decisions applying that
distinction to demands for disability accommodations. The Court first
endorsed the access/content doctrine in Alexander v. Choate,80 which
applied the Rehabilitation Act, the predecessor statute to the ADA. 8' The
plaintiffs, a class of Tennessee Medicaid recipients with disabilities,
challenged the state's decision to cut back its annual Medicaid coverage of
inpatient hospitalization from twenty to fourteen days. 182 Because the
fourteen-day cap had a disproportionate impact on people with disabilities,
and because the state failed to explore alternatives that would have
achieved the same cost savings as the cap but without such an impact, the
plaintiffs contended that it violated the Rehabilitation Act. 183
In a unanimous opinion by Justice Marshall, the Supreme Court
rejected that contention. And the access/content distinction was the
principal tool the Court employed to reach that result. The essential
requirement of the disability discrimination laws, the Court concluded, is
"that an otherwise qualified handicapped individual must be provided with
meaningful access to the benefit that the grantee offers."' 184 The Court
recognized that "reasonable accommodations... may have to be made" in
order "to assure meaningful access," but it emphasized that access is all that
cover their medical expenses; and an express exclusion for a disability clearly violates this vision
of equality").
179. This point strongly parallels an important critique of the formal notion of equality: We
cannot decide whether two people are treated unequally unless we have a way of determining
whether they are similarly situated. But to decide whether two people are similarly situated
requires a normative theory that the formal notion of equality cannot itself provide (and may in
fact obscure). For a classic statement of this critique, see Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of
Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982). It should not be surprising that the access/content
distinction, which assimilates the accommodation requirement closely to a formal rule of
nondiscrimination, is subject to a similar critique. For a judicial recognition that a formal
nondiscrimination approach can lead one in either direction here, see EEOC v. Staten Island
Savings Bank, 207 F.3d 144, 149 (2d Cir. 2000).
180. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
181. Congress specifically directed courts to look to the Rehabilitation Act in construing the
ADA, though the Rehabilitation Act sets only a floor, not a ceiling, of protection. See 42 U.S.C. §
12201(a) (2000) ("Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall be
construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 790 et seq.) or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such
title.").
182. See Choate, 469 U.S. at 289.
183. See id. at 306.
184. Id. at 301.
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the statute requires. 185 Applying that principle, the Court ruled that "[t]he
14-day limitation will not deny respondents meaningful access to
Tennessee Medicaid services or exclude them from those services." 186 The
Court argued that "[t]he reduction in inpatient coverage will leave both
handicapped and nonhandicapped Medicaid users with identical and
effective hospital services fully available for their use, with both classes of
users subject to the same durational limitation."'
' 87
Just as in the private insurance cases, the Court's conclusion in Choate
turned entirely on the decision to define the relevant opportunity as the
precise package of coverage the defendant offered. If that is the only
opportunity to which the state must provide access, then any package of
health care services-no matter how poorly it serves the needs of people
with disabilities-will comply with disability discrimination law, so long as
that package is offered to everyone. 88 The Choate Court was explicit on
this point. It rejected the notion that the benefit provided by Tennessee's
Medicaid program is "'adequate health care"' or "that level of health care
precisely tailored to [the recipient's] particular needs":
Instead, the benefit provided through Medicaid is a particular
package of health care services, such as 14 days of inpatient
coverage. That package of services has the general aim of
assuring that individuals will receive necessary medical care, but
the benefit provided remains the individual services offered-not
"adequate health care."' 89
The opportunity provided by the Tennessee Medicaid program
obviously need not be described at that level of generality, however, and the
Choate Court provided little reason for doing so. 90 Indeed, it is apparent
that the relevant opportunity could be defined at a higher or lower level of
generality than the one at which the Court defined it. The state does not
provide the package of services that it does because there is anything
magical in that particular bundle of services, but because the package meets
some basic needs of members of the target population at an affordable cost.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 302.
187. Id.
188. For a rare case in which a state formally excluded individuals with disabilities from a
package of health care benefits that were offered to the public more generally, see Burns- Vidlak
ex rel. Burns v. Chandler, 939 F. Supp. 765, 771 (D. Haw. 1996) (holding that excluding aged,
blind, and disabled individuals from an expanded Medicaid managed care plan violated ADA
Title II).
189. Choate, 469 U.S. at 303.
190. The Court noted that the federal Medicaid statute gave the state "substantial discretion to
choose the proper mix of amount, scope, and duration limitations on coverage." Id. But of course
the fact that the Medicaid Act gives states broad power to set the benefits they provide says
nothing about the restrictions the disability discrimination laws place on that power.
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Viewed at that level of generality, people whose basic needs are more
extensive because of disability (such as those who, because of their
disability, need more hospital care than the average person) should have
those basic needs satisfied to the same extent as the average person.
The Court appears to have rejected that higher level of generality out of
a reluctance to second-guess the state's resource allocation decisions. 91 But
that same reluctance could in fact lead us to take the level of generality
even lower. For example, why define the opportunity provided by the
Tennessee Medicaid program as the opportunity to receive fourteen days of
inpatient hospitalization? Why not define it as the opportunity to receive
fourteen days of inpatient hospitalization as provided by the particular
delivery system the state has set up? Medical care under the Tennessee
Medicaid program may be provided in inaccessible buildings, and Medicaid
recipients may be required to file forms that blind people cannot use. 192 But
making those aspects of the delivery system accessible may draw
significant resources away from other state priorities. 1
93
The Court's decision in Choate thus rests on a definition of the relevant
opportunity that, though plausible, is highly contestable. And in the
subsequent decision of Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring,194 the Court took a
broader view of the "content" of the opportunity provided by a state
defendant. In Olmstead, the Court held that states that institutionalize
individuals with disabilities have an obligation to place those individuals in
community settings
when the State's treatment professionals have determined that
community placement is appropriate, the transfer from
institutional care to a less restrictive setting is not opposed by the
affected individual, and the placement can be reasonably
191. See id. at 307 ("[N]othing in the pre- or post-1973 legislative discussion of § 504
suggests that Congress desired to make major inroads on the States' longstanding discretion to
choose the proper mix of amount, scope, and duration limitations on services covered by state
Medicaid .... ").
192. See, e.g., Anderson v. Pa. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 1 F. Supp. 2d 456 (E.D. Pa. 1998)
(finding triable issue regarding whether state Medicaid HMO program violated Title II by using
doctors with physically inaccessible offices and providing handbooks in formats that were not
accessible to people with vision impairments); Tugg v. Towey, 864 F. Supp. 1201 (S.D. Fla.
1994) (granting preliminary injunction to deaf plaintiffs who argued that state violated ADA Title
II by providing mental health counseling services through a sign language interpreter rather than
by providing mental health counselors who themselves speak sign language).
193. See, e.g., Tugg, 864 F. Supp. at 1203-04 (noting that the state planned to cancel its
program of providing sign-language-speaking mental health counselors a month after the federal
grant that supported the program expired); id. at 1210 (noting state's argument that "there is no
way to provide funding for the services sought by the Plaintiffs without undergoing a significant
budget reallocation" but concluding that the burden on the state "is a necessary consequence of
any agency's compliance with the ADA law").
194. 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
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accommodated, taking into account the resources available to the
State and the needs of others with mental disabilities. 1
95
Such an obligation, the Court concluded, flowed from ADA Title II's
proscription of disability-based discrimination, as given content by two
regulations promulgated by the Attorney General: the "integration
regulation," which provides that "[a] public entity shall administer services,
programs, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the
needs of qualified individuals with disabilities"; 96 and the "reasonable
modifications regulation," which provides that "[a] public entity shall make
reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the
modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of
disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program,
or activity."'97
The state had argued, and Justice Thomas's dissent emphasized, that a
requirement to move institutionalized persons into community placements
would overturn the difficult resource allocation decisions the state had
made in setting up its program of care for people with disabilities. By
requiring it to move people with disabilities into community placements
that did not exist, the state argued, the Court's reading of the ADA would
do more than simply provide access to the state's program of care; it would
alter the content of that program. 198 But Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion
dismissed that argument in a footnote:
We do not in this opinion hold that the ADA imposes on the
States a "standard of care" for whatever medical services they
render, or that the ADA requires States to "provide a certain level
of benefits to individuals with disabilities." We do hold, however,
that States must adhere to the ADA's nondiscrimination
requirement with regard to the services they in fact provide. 199
The majority thus argued that its decision was entirely in keeping with
Choate's access/content distinction.
Justice Thomas had a point, however. If the Olmstead Court had
defined the relevant services at the same level of generality as did the
Choate Court, it would have been much harder to defend the ultimate
conclusion that community placement was required. At the time the
Olmstead plaintiffs filed their suit, the "particular package of health care
195. Id. at 587.
196. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2004).
197. Id. § 35.130(b)(7).
198. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 624-25 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 603 n. 14 (majority opinion) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2004]
The Yale Law Journal
services,, 200 offered by the State of Georgia included, in relevant part,
mental health treatment in an available bed in a state hospital or one of the
community treatment settings the state provided. The Olmstead plaintiffs
were not denied access to that package of services, and there was no reason
to believe that they would be "unable to benefit meaningfully" 201 from the
services they did receive. The problem, as in Choate, was simply that the
services the state offered were not "tailored to [the plaintiffs'] particular
needs. 2 °2
My point is not that Choate was right and Olmstead was wrong, or vice
versa. 20 3 My point is that the access/content distinction cannot resolve the
issues in those cases. In each case, it was the Court's largely undefended
choice of the level of generality at which to describe the "content" of the
relevant benefit, and not the access/content distinction itself, that was
determinative.
2. The Agenda of the "Job-Related" and Access/Content Doctrines
Although the "job-related" and access/content doctrines fail as an
analytic matter, they serve a discernible agenda. Each doctrine operates, in
its own way, to confine the reach of the ADA's accommodation
requirement to something very close to that of a classic antidiscrimination
requirement. It should be obvious why such an agenda might appeal to
skeptics of the accommodation requirement-and the burgeoning literature
describing a "backlash" against the ADA suggests that there are many such
skeptics in influential positions.20 4 It is now fairly conventional wisdom that
the Supreme Court has limited the reach of the ADA's protected
"disability" class because of concerns about the broad, redistributive nature
of the statute.2 °5 But the commentators who have articulated this
conventional wisdom have failed to appreciate that accommodation
supporters may themselves feel a stake in limiting the scope of that
requirement. °6
200. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 303 (1985).
201. 1d. at 302.
202. Id. at 303.
203. For what it's worth, I am on record as a fan of the Olmstead majority opinion. See
Bagenstos, supra note 59, at 54-59.
204. See generally BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA, supra note 2.
205. See Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a Difference: Can
Employment Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 79 N.C. L.
REv. 307, 357-58 (2001); Krieger, supra note 6, at 503-20.
206. Indeed, it is notable that people and institutions generally supportive of disability rights
have been central to the development of both the "job-related" rule and the access/content
distinction. It is the EEOC, after all, that has most fully elaborated the "job-related" rule. See 29
C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.9 (2004); EEOC, supra note 148, § 3.4. And Justice Marshall
introduced the access/content distinction into reasonable accommodation law in Choate-an
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
[Vol. 114: 1
2004] The Future of Disability Law 51
It is easy to see why accommodation skeptics might be concerned about
reading the ADA to require employers to undo deep-rooted structural
barriers to employment. In the dominant conception, antidiscrimination
requirements provide a remedy for the defendant's own wrongful conduct
rather than for the defendant's failure to redress a broader societal wrong.20 7
When employers intentionally discriminate on the basis of race, for
example, they have committed an act that is "intrinsically immoral. 20 8
They are held liable for that conduct not because they are convenient
scapegoats for a broader societal problem but because they violated the
moral and legal injunction to treat people equally without regard to race.
Even disparate impact discrimination can be made to fit this account. When
an employer implements a practice that has a disproportionately harmful
impact on groups that have traditionally suffered intentional discrimination,
and that practice lacks a strong business justification, an inference logically
arises that the employer adopted the practice for a discriminatory
purpose.20 9
But the accommodation requirement seems to take us far beyond that
conception of antidiscrimination. It demands that an employer bear a
"reasonable" cost to alter its facilities and routines to promote the
participation of people with disabilities--even if the employer clearly had a
sound business reason for not making those alterations in the first place.210
It may still be easy to see how the employer might have acted wrongfully
when it failed to provide something like a wheelchair ramp that both is
necessary to permit many people with disabilities to work at the employer's
facilities and is something that only the employer is in a position to provide.
But if an employer is required to provide personal-assistance services or
transportation to enable an employee with a disability to get to work, or
health insurance coverage that meets the employee's particular needs, the
accommodation requirement seems much more like a requirement that the
employer do something to "make up for" the disadvantage that people with
disabilities experience because of broader societal decisions about the
allocation of social services.211
opinion issued in the same year that he vigorously defended disability rights in his separate
opinion in City ofCleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 461-64 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
207. I describe and critique that conception in Bagenstos, supra note 21, at 839-59.
208. Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences,
Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 192 (1992).
209. See George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of
Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1309-11 (1987).
210. This is the core of Professor Mark Kelman's critique of the accommodation
requirement. See Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833
(2001). I tried to challenge that critique in Bagenstos, supra note 21, at 870-98.
211. US Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 413 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Accommodation skeptics could readily see such a broad reading as
presenting in particularly dramatic terms two of the basic challenges they
have leveled against the requirement in general. First, such a reading
requires an employer to bear a financial burden not because of any
particular fault on its part, but simply because of the fortuity that this
particular worker with a disability applied for one of its positions.
12
Second, such a reading threatens to turn the accommodation requirement
into an essentially standardless vehicle for ad hoc wealth redistribution to
individuals with disabilities. 13
Perhaps counterintuitively, disability rights advocates might feel
pressure to reject the broader reading of the accommodation requirement as
well. As I discussed in Part I, disability rights activists in the 1970s and
1980s explicitly and emphatically rejected charity and welfare as responses
to disability. They argued that it was only a denial of civil rights, and not
the lack of charitable largesse, that kept people with disabilities out of the
workforce. 2 1 But the more that individual employers are required to
counteract broad structural obstacles that they did not themselves create, the
more it looks like they are being required to provide charity 1 5 Even
disability rights activists, then, might have an ideological interest in reading
the accommodation requirement to mandate that an individual employer
take steps to remove only those barriers that the employer itself played a
part in creating.
212. See Issacharoff& Nelson, supra note 205, at 344-45.
213. Justice Scalia has particularly emphasized this point in dissents that accuse the Court of
disregarding the limitations that he believes properly apply to the accommodation requirement.
See US Airways, 535 U.S. at 413-14 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("When one departs from this
understanding [of accommodation as removing a 'disability-related obstacle' to the specific
opportunities offered by the defendant], the ADA's accommodation provision becomes a
standardless grab bag-leaving it to the courts to decide which workplace preferences (higher
salary, longer vacations, reassignment to positions to which others are entitled) can be deemed
'reasonable' to 'make up for' the particular employee's disability."); PGA Tour v. Martin, 532
U.S. 661, 691 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's interpretation of the
reasonable accommodation requirement for "exercis[ing] a benevolent compassion that the law
does not place it within our power to impose"). As I argue in this Subsection, it is not just Justice
Scalia who seeks to limit the scope of the accommodation requirement-support for limitations
seems to be widespread.
214. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
215. Deans Stewart Schwab and Steven Willborn make a similar point in explaining the
general rule under the ADA that employers need not accommodate the lesser productivity of a
worker with a disability. Although accommodations that remove obstacles to disabled workers
who are as productive as nondisabled workers seem "consistent with our meritocratic ideal that
jobs should go to the most qualified applicant," they contend, disability advocates may recognize
that "[t]he argument that less productive workers with lesser costs are functionally equivalent to
more productive, greater cost workers may fail to persuade politically." Stewart J. Schwab &
Steven L. Willborn, Reasonable Accommodation of Workplace Disabilities, 44 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1197, 1233 (2003).
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Both the "job-related" rule and the access/content distinction appear to
respond to these concerns by limiting the reach of the accommodation
requirement to circumstances in which the traditional justifications for
antidiscrimination rules apply. As I argued in the previous Subsection, the
"job-related" rule rests on an implicit act/omission distinction in which
employers can be held responsible for their "own" choices but cannot be
required to make up for broader failures of social provision. Although that
act/omission distinction is not especially convincing analytically, it is
precisely the same kind of distinction that seems to underlie the
requirement of intentional discrimination in equal protection cases.
2 16
The access/content distinction seems to serve a similar function. As the
Court made clear in Choate, the distinction serves to "keep [the
accommodation requirement] within manageable bounds."'2 17 It limits
required accommodations to those cases in which the defendant has
imposed an obstacle that prevents people with disabilities from availing
themselves of the same opportunities open to the nondisabled. Like the
"job-related" rule, it assimilates the accommodation requirement very
closely to an antidiscrimination requirement.
The ADA's accommodation requirement has been regarded as a
"profound" innovation 218 that represents an effort to shift the baseline
against which we measure "discrimination., 219 But the doctrines I have
discussed show that the differences are ones of degree and not of kind. The
accommodation requirement does shift the baseline of analysis somewhat,
for it does not limit its scrutiny to those acts taken with an intent to
discriminate; taking a wider view, the requirement asks whether an
employer has reasonably accounted in its actions for potential employees
with disabilities. But the "job-related" and access/content doctrines make
the accommodation requirement similar to an antidiscrimination
requirement in two key respects: The "job-related" rule, like the intentional
discrimination requirement, focuses attention on the responsibility of the
individual defendant as opposed to that of society as a whole, and the
access/content distinction, like a formal nondiscrimination rule, asks
whether people with disabilities have been denied access to the same
opportunities as similarly situated nondisabled persons.
216. See, e.g., Louis MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF:
CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 110-15 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 897-98 (1987).
217. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 299 (1985) (employing the access/content
distinction in interpreting the reasonable accommodation requirement imposed by section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
218. Karlan & Ruthergien, supra note 94, at 41.
219. See Bagenstos, supra note 14, at 435.
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As I argued in Subsection 1, the "job-related" and access/content
doctrines are formally indeterminate in substantial respects. Courts and
advocates committed to broader social welfare provision for people with
disabilities could easily read those doctrines in a way that would require
employers to dismantle structural barriers to employment for people with
disabilities. But the courts' current applications of these doctrines suggest
that efforts to achieve social welfare redistribution through the ADA-a
statute that bills itself as an antidiscrimination measure-will meet with
substantial resistance. The accommodation requirement has the potential to
serve as an open-ended tool of redistribution to people with disabilities, and
courts naturally look for some principle to constrain and guide their
application of that requirement. The current case law shows that courts
have, equally naturally, looked to settled tools of antidiscrimination law-
including notions of employer fault and disparate treatment-for such a
principle. So long as courts interpreting the accommodation requirement
feel compelled to focus on the fault of individual employers, as opposed to
that of society as a whole, that requirement will lack significant power to
undo the deep-rooted structural barriers to employment for people with
disabilities. 2 0 And so long as courts interpreting the accommodation
requirement feel compelled to limit the statute's redistributive potential by
employing the access/content distinction, the same desire to limit the
ADA's sweep will likely lead them to continue to define the "content" of
the relevant opportunity at a low level of generality. If they do, the ADA
will remain virtually useless as a means of attacking the private insurance
limitations that impose the greatest practical burden on many people with
disabilities.
III. THE FUTURE OF DISABILITY LAW:
FROM ANTIDISCRIMINATION TO SOCIAL WELFARE LAW
In the previous Parts, I have argued that the antidiscrimination model
faces significant limitations in its power to enhance employment and
integration for people with disabilities. People with disabilities will not
move into the workforce in more significant numbers unless the law
addresses deep-rooted barriers to employment such as the unavailability of
personal-assistance services, assistive technology, and accessible
transportation, as well as the current structure of our health care system. But
an antidiscrimination approach cannot effectively attack those barriers, and
220. Cf MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 279-80 (1987) (arguing that
our legal culture's focus on individual duties makes it hard to envision rights to societal
provision).
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the ADA's requirement of reasonable accommodation is (in practice) little
different from a classic antidiscrimination rule in that respect. Solving the
problem requires a social welfare approach-that is, sustained and direct
government intervention through such means as public funding and
provision of services.
In this Part, I argue that disability rights advocates "on the ground"
have begun to recognize the importance of social welfare interventions to
address the deep-rooted barriers to employment of people with disabilities.
Thus, as I show in Section A, both the litigation dockets and legislative
priorities of disability rights organizations have increasingly focused on
social welfare rather than antidiscrimination laws. Disability rights
advocates now frequently bring cases under social welfare laws like the
Medicaid Act as well as under antidiscrimination laws like the ADA, and
they lobby for changes in public health-insurance programs that would
enhance the integration and employability of people with disabilities. To a
far greater extent than commentators have appreciated, the disability rights
movement has turned (back) to a social welfare approach to disability law.
But in returning to social welfare strategies to enhance employment
opportunities and integration of people with disabilities, advocates should
not forget their own earlier critique of a social welfare response to
disability. In some ways, the new social welfare initiatives promise to avoid
the pitfalls the disability rights movement identified in an earlier generation
of welfare programs. In other respects, however, the new initiatives seem to
be subject to the same challenges as the earlier programs. As social welfare
strategies return to the forefront of disability policy, the important task for
disability rights advocates will be to identify ways of reconstructing the
disability welfare system so that it avoids the paternalism, arbitrariness, and
oppression that those advocates so cogently described in earlier programs.
In Section B, I discuss some key dilemmas disability rights advocates must
confront in this regard.
And there is yet a broader issue-the coherence and viability of the
disability rights movement as a movement. Opposition to social welfare law
reflected more than a simple policy preference for disability rights activists
in the 1970s and 1980s; it also had the important instrumental function of
bringing together disparate people with disparate impairments into a more
or less unified disability rights movement. As disability rights advocates
begin cautiously to embrace social welfare strategies again, they must find
some way to avoid the tendency of such strategies to fragment the
movement. In Section C, I offer some initial thoughts about this problem.
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A. The Move (Back) to Social Welfare
In this Section, I describe a number of areas in which disability rights
activists have endorsed social-welfare-law means of achieving the goals of
employment and community integration for people with disabilities. I first
discuss litigation to enforce the Medicaid Act, which is an increasingly
important part of the docket of disability rights organizations. I then discuss
activists' efforts, through legislative advocacy, to expand public health-
insurance programs. Those efforts fall into two categories: efforts to
provide coverage to working people with disabilities and efforts to provide
reimbursement for services such as personal assistance that make it possible
for people with disabilities to participate in community life, including in
employment. In each of these areas, disability rights advocates have begun
to achieve some success.
1. Litigation To Enforce the Medicaid Act
Even if disability rights advocates have increasingly turned toward
efforts to enact social welfare legislation, one might expect that disability
rights litigation would continue to be dominated by the ADA. To a large
extent, that is true--especially in the individual-plaintiff lawsuits that make
up the vast majority of disability rights cases. 221 But in the systemic-reform
dockets of disability rights organizations, there is a notable trend toward a
social welfare approach. In dozens of recent cases, those organizations have
filed suits to enforce provisions of the Medicaid Act (Title XIX of the
Social Security Act).222 Rather than merely demanding an end to
221. The diversity of disabilities embraced by the ADA's protected-class definition,
combined with the individualized nature of the "reasonable accommodation" determination,
makes it difficult to bring class action suits under the ADA. See Ruth Colker, ADA Title III: A
Fragile Compromise, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 377, 379 n.19 (2000) (noting that "it is
difficult to file class action remedies" under the ADA's public accommodations title because "the
community of individuals with disabilities is quite diverse"); Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 94,
at 19 (noting that "[flew of the cases brought under the ADA are class actions" because
"[flitigation under the ADA . . . responds to the complexities in the inherently unique
circumstances of many disabled individuals"). The point holds particularly true for cases under
the employment discrimination title of the ADA, which has been the primary engine of litigation
under the statute. Of course, the overwhelming preponderance of individual over class action
litigation is not unique to the ADA; to the contrary, as Professors John Donohue and Peter
Siegelman showed in their influential article, employment discrimination litigation generally
follows a similar pattern. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of
Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1019-21 (1991).
222. GARY A. SMITH, HUMAN SERVS. RESEARCH INST., STATUS REPORT: LITIGATION
CONCERNING HOME AND COMMUNITY SERVICES FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 5-31 (2004),
available at http://www.hsri.org/docs/litigation041804.pdf, lists Medicaid cases brought by
disability rights organizations such as People First, various state chapters of the ARC (formerly
the Association of Retarded Citizens), and various state protection and advocacy agencies.
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discrimination or seeking an accommodation under the ADA or the
Rehabilitation Act, these suits demand specific benefits to which the
plaintiffs claim entitlement under the federal Medicaid statute.
Disability rights organizations have not been indiscriminate in the
benefits they have sought through litigation. Rather, they have focused on
those Medicaid benefits-like community placements and personal-
assistance services-that enhance opportunities for people with disabilities
to participate in community life (and particularly in employment). They
have tended to bring Medicaid suits that address one of two kinds of
problems. First, many people with disabilities have been forced to remain
on waiting lists for community-based services to which they are entitled
under their states' Medicaid plans because the states have refused to
provide those services in a timely manner to all who are eligible.
223
Disability rights organizations have frequently brought class action suits
that contend, inter alia, that such waiting lists violate various requirements
of the Medicaid Act.22 4 Plaintiffs in these cases have obtained a number of
favorable rulings from courts, and they have received significant relief in
settlements.225
223. See JANE PERKINS & MANJU KULKARNI, ADDRESSING HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED
WAIVER WAITING LISTS THROUGH THE MEDICAID PROGRAM 1 (2000), available at
http://www.healthlaw.org/docs/200005FactSheet-hcbw.pdf, SMITH, supra note 222. For a
comprehensive overview of state waiting lists for services for people with mental retardation and
developmental disabilities, see RESEARCH & TRAINING CTR. ON CMTY. LIVING, POLICIES AND
RESOURCES RELATING TO WAITING LISTS OF PERSONS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION AND
RELATED DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES (2002), available at
http://rtc.umn.edu/pdf/waitlist2002.pdf.
224. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 222, at 5 ("As of February 2004, lawsuits seeking
community services for people with developmental disabilities had been filed in twenty-five
states."). These lawsuits contend that the waiting lists violate such statutory directives as the
statute's "reasonable promptness" provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) (2000) (requiring that a
state's Medicaid plan "provide that all individuals wishing to make application for medical
assistance under the plan shall have opportunity to do so, and that such assistance shall be
furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals"); the statute's "comparability"
provision, id. § 1396a(a)(10)(B) (requiring that medical assistance provided to any eligible
individual "shall not be less in amount, duration, or scope than the medical assistance made
available to any other such individual"); the statute's "best interests" provision, id. § 1396a(a)(19)
(requiring that services be provided "in a manner consistent with simplicity of administration and
the best interests of the recipients"); and the statute's "free choice" provision, id. § 1396n(c)(2)(C)
(requiring, under the statute's home- and community-based waiver provision, that beneficiaries be
"informed of the feasible alternatives, if available under the waiver, at the choice of such
individuals, to the provision of inpatient hospital services, nursing facility services, or services in
an intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded").
225. See Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79, 88 (1st Cir. 2002) (stating that failure to fill
available home- and community-based waiver slots can violate "reasonable promptness"
provision but remanding for a determination whether the defendants had in fact violated that
provision); Lewis v. N.M. Dep't of Health, 275 F. Supp. 2d 1319, 1345 (D.N.M. 2003) (stating
that failure to provide home- and community-based services to individuals eligible for open home
and community-based waiver slots violates "reasonable promptness" provision); Boulet v.
Cellucci, 107 F. Supp. 2d 61, 76-80 (D. Mass. 2000) (holding that waiting list for residential
placements for individuals receiving services under state's home- and community-based waiver
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Second, some state Medicaid policies, such as low reimbursement rates
for personal assistance and other services, can make it impossible in
practice for individuals with disabilities to obtain adequate community-
based services even if the state does not place those individuals on a
waiting list.22 6 Disability rights organizations have challenged these policies
under the adequate-payment provision of the Medicaid Act. That provision
requires states to "assure that payments are consistent with efficiency,
economy, and quality of care and are sufficient to enlist enough providers
so that care and services are available under the plan at least to the extent
that such care and services are available to the general population in the
geographic area.''227 These suits have been less successful than the waiting-
list suits. No court has yet granted final relief to plaintiffs with disabilities
who challenge inadequate reimbursement rates for community services
providers, and some courts have ruled against these plaintiffs, though a
number of cases are still pending.228
Litigation to enforce the Medicaid Act plainly has serious limitations as
a tool to achieve community integration for people with disabilities. Such
litigation can be only as effective in achieving those goals as the Medicaid
statute itself.229 To be sure, Medicaid covers an array of services that are
important to people with disabilities-potentially including, at each
individual state's option, services such as durable medical equipment and
program violates "reasonable promptness" and "freedom of choice" provisions); Benjamin H. v.
Ohl, No. 3:99-0338, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22469, at *39-43, *44-45 (S.D. W. Va. July 15, 1999)
(granting preliminary injunction on basis of claim that waiting lists violate "reasonable
promptness" and "freedom of choice" requirements). For examples of settlements, see Rancourt v.
Concannon, No. 01-CV-159 (D. Me. July 9, 2003), available at http://wwxv.drcme.org/
rancourt.html (agreement settling litigation challenging Maine's denial of timely Medicaid
services to adults with mental retardation); Makin v. Hawaii, No. CV 98-00997 DAE, slip op. at 2
(D. Haw. Apr. 25, 2000) (agreement settling litigation challenging waiting list for home- and
community-based services in Hawaii); and Hawaii Disability Rights Center v. Hawaii, No. 03-
00524 HG-KSC (D. Haw. filed Oct. 21, 2003), available at http://www.hawaiidisabilityrights.org/
Forms/SMComplaintl0.01.03(web).doc (complaint alleging lack of compliance with the Makin
settlement and renewing challenge to Hawaii waiting list).
226. See, e.g., Sandra L. Yue, A Return to Institutionalization Despite Olmstead v. L.C.? The
Inadequacy of Medicaid Provider Reimbursement in Minnesota and the Failure To Deliver
Home- and Community-Based Waiver Services, 19 LAW & INEQ. 307, 330-37 (2001).
227. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A).
228. See Sanchez v. Johnson, 301 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1062-65 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (dismissing
challenge to low rates of payment for community services providers on the ground that, per
Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 279-90 (2002), the adequate-payment provision does
not create judicially enforceable rights); Mandy R. v. Owens, No. 00-M-1609 (BNB) (D. Colo.
filed Aug. 14, 2000) (marking the intervention of Colorado Association of Community Centered
Boards as plaintiff challenging adequacy of state's payments for community services); Ball v.
Biedess, No. CIV 00-67 TUC ACM (D. Ariz. filed Jan. 27, 2000) (challenging Arizona Medicaid
program's reimbursement rates for home-care workers).
229. Even when the Medicaid statute contains sufficient substantive requirements, moreover,
many of those requirements may be held not to be judicially enforceable under the § 1983
doctrine most recently articulated in Gonzaga. See, e.g., Sanchez, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 1062-65.
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prosthetics. 230 Also at state option, Medicaid may provide home- and
community-based services, including personal assistance, for many people
with disabilities.231 But in two significant respects, Medicaid is a flawed
tool.
First, the wide discretion accorded to states in the structuring of
Medicaid benefits 232 makes the program a less than sure means of
promoting the interests of people with disabilities. Although Medicaid
currently provides a great deal to people with disabilities, in most cases
(accounting for two-thirds of overall program spending on people with
disabilities) it does so because states have chosen to cover optional
populations and to provide optional services. 233 Roughly twenty-two
percent of disabled Medicaid recipients qualify because their states have
chosen to participate in an optional eligibility pathway authorized by the
Medicaid statute. 234 The most important of these pathways is the so-called
"medically needy" option. That option permits states to extend coverage to
people with disabilities whose incomes and assets are too high to satisfy the
requirements for SSI eligibility but who "spend down" to a "medically
needy income limit" set by the state. 235 Thirty-five states participate in the
"medically needy" option, with a median income limit of fifty-five percent
of the federal poverty line. 236 And even when individuals with disabilities
are part of a mandatorily covered population-as when they receive SSI-
the decision to provide services that promote integration and employment
230. For durable medical equipment, see 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(7) (authorizing states to cover
home health services); and 42 C.F.R. § 440.70(b)(3) (2003) (defining home health services to
include the provision of medical equipment). For prosthetics, see 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(12)
(authorizing states to cover "prosthetic devices"). See KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE
UNINSURED, supra note 134, at 2 ("Medicaid is unique among public and private insurance
programs, in that it provides a comprehensive set of acute and long-term care benefits to meet the
needs of people with disabilities."); Jane Perkins, Medicaid: Past Successes and Future
Challenges, 12 HEALTH MATRIX 7, 24 (2002) ("Medicaid has provided essential services for
people with disabilities that are not generally available through private health insurance coverage.
... [T]he benefits package offered by Medicaid includes coverage of long-term care services and
services which help maximize functioning, such as home health services, durable medical
equipment, prosthetic devices, and personal care attendant services."); Sandra Tanenbaum,
Medicaid and Disability: The Unlikely Entitlement, 67 MILBANK Q. 288, 295-96 (1989).
23 1. See Letter from Timothy Westmoreland, Dir., Ctr. for Medicaid & State Operations,
Health Care Fin. Admin., to State Medicaid Directors attachment 3-g (July 25, 2000), available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/states/letters/smd725aO.asp.
232. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444 (1977) (concluding that the Medicaid statute
"confers broad discretion on the States to adopt standards for determining the extent of medical
assistance").
233. See KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, supra note 134, at 36.
234. See id. at 12-16.
235. See KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID MEDICALLY NEEDY
PROGRAMS: AN IMPORTANT SOURCE OF MEDICAID COVERAGE (2003); KAISER COMM'N ON
MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, supra note 134, at 15.
236. See KAISER COMM'NON MEDICAID& THE UNINSURED, supra note 134, at 15.
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opportunities (such as durable medical equipment and personal care) is one
that rests almost entirely with the state.237
With states facing severe budget crises, optional Medicaid benefits for
people with disabilities are prime targets for cuts. "Forty-nine states and the
District of Columbia implemented Medicaid cuts in FY 2003 and 32 states
that enacted Medicaid reductions earlier in the year[] revisited the Medicaid
budget and made cuts a second time in the year., 238 And states are
considering even deeper reductions, including elimination of their
"medically needy" programs and restrictions on long-term-care spending.239
Even with fiscal pressures easing as the economy improves, a number of
states are continuing to implement new Medicaid cost containment
strategies.240 The Bush Administration's Health Insurance Flexibility and
Accountability Initiative (HIFA) 241 only adds to these budgetary pressures.
HIFA encourages states to finance expansions of coverage of the uninsured
population through cuts in the optional services they currently provide.
242
And the Administration has proposed to go farther and move Medicaid to a
block-grant model more generally.243 Medicaid recipients with disabilities,
who incur a disproportionate share of the program's costs, are likely to be
particularly vulnerable to the service-cutting incentives created by these
initiatives.244
237. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (2000) (mandating only that states cover inpatient and
outpatient hospital and health center services; laboratory services; nursing facility services for
adults; early and periodic screening, diagnosis, and treatment for children; family planning
services for individuals of childbearing age; medical services provided by physicians and dentists;
nurse-midwife services; and services of a pediatric nurse practitioner).
238. KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, supra note 134, at 35. For
additional discussion of the budgetary pressures on state Medicaid programs, see Perkins, supra
note 230, at 27. For a recent example of how these cuts affect people with disabilities, see Bob
Herbert, Op-Ed, Punishing the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2004, at A27 (describing recent
Mississippi cuts that "will end Medicaid eligibility for some 65,000 low-income senior citizens
and people with severe disabilities").
239. See KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, supra note 134, at 35.
240. See KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, STATES RESPOND TO FISCAL
PRESSURE: A 50-STATE UPDATE OF STATE MEDICAID SPENDING GROWTH AND COST
CONTAINMENT ACTIONS 3 (2004) (noting that eighteen states had initiated new mid-year
Medicaid cost-containment strategies in fiscal year 2004).
241. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., GUIDELINES FOR STATES INTERESTED
IN APPLYING FOR A HIFA DEMONSTRATION, http://www.crs.hhs.gov/hifa/hifagde.asp (last
modified Sept. 16, 2004).
242. See KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, supra note 134, at 34; Jennifer
Mathis, Community Integration of Individuals with Disabilities: An Update on Olmstead
Implementation, 35 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 395, 409-10 (2001); Perkins, supra note 230, at 29-30.
243. For a discussion of recent jousting between the Bush Administration and state
governments over Medicaid financing, see Robert Pear, U.S. Nears Clash with Governors on
Medicaid Cost, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2004, at Al.
244. See KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, supra note 134, at 21 (noting
that people with disabilities account for sixteen percent of the Medicaid population but forty-three
percent of Medicaid expenditures).
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Second, the structure of the Medicaid program itself imposes
significant obstacles to the ability of people with disabilities to live and
work in the community. Foremost among these is Medicaid's strong
institutional bias.245 Nursing-home care is a mandatory service under the
Medicaid program,246 but home-based services are not.2 47 Although thirty-
one states have invoked the statute's personal-care option to provide
benefits for individuals in the community, "[i]n most states, the personal
care benefit is less comprehensive than nursing home care and is targeted to
beneficiaries who are less disabled than nursing home residents. 4 8 And
although forty-nine states have received waivers from the Secretary of
Health and Human Services to provide home- and community-based
services to a subset of Medicaid recipients with disabilities, 249 the statutory
provision that authorizes such waivers permits states to limit the number of
beneficiaries eligible for community placements 25 0 -limitations that states
are forbidden to impose for institutional placements. States have
aggressively taken advantage of their authority to limit the number of
waiver slots; waiting lists for home- and community-based Medicaid
services can be caused by these permissible limitations, rather than any
violation of the Medicaid Act. 25 1 And the statutory waiver provision also
requires states to provide assurance to the Secretary that the average cost of
serving an individual under the waiver program will not exceed the cost of
serving that individual in an institution.252 When states seek to provide
institutional placements, the statute requires no comparable assurance that
245. See id. at 31; NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, SHARING THE RISK, supra note 101, at
"Findings on Barriers to Health Insurance and Health-Related Services" No. 2 ("Medicaid has an
inherent institutional bias whereby certain services are covered only in inpatient hospital or
institutional settings.").
246. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(10)(A) (2000); id. § 1396d(a)(4)(A).
247. See id. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (mandatory services); id. § 1396d(a)(8) (optional private duty
nursing services); id. § 1396d(a)(19) (optional case-management services); id. § 1396d(a)(22)
(optional home and community care for disabled elderly individuals); id. § 1396d(a)(23) (optional
community-supported living-arrangement services); id. § 1396d(a)(24) (optional home- and
community-based personal care services). The Medicaid statute does, however, require that states
provide "for the inclusion of home health services for any individual who, under the State plan, is
entitled to nursing facility services." Id. § 1396a(10)(D). But "home health services" do not
include the important community services described in this footnote.
248. Loretta Williams, Note, Long Term Care After Olmstead v. L.C.: Will the Potential of
the ADA's Integration Mandate Be Achieved?, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 205, 212
(2000).
249. KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, supra note 134, at 31.
250. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(3).
251. See, e.g., Jane Perkins & Randolph T. Boyle, Addressing Long Waits for Home and
Community-Based Care Through Medicaid and the ADA, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 117, 120-21, 130
(2001); Sara Rosenbaum et al., Olmstead v. L.C.: Implications for Medicaid and Other Publicly
Funded Health Services, 12 HEALTH MATRIX 93, 129-30 (2002).
252. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(2)(D); KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED,
supra note 134, at 31-32.
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community placements are at least as expensive. As a result of all of these
provisions that skew Medicaid coverage toward institutionalization,
"persons with disabilities are often institutionalized, rather than kept in the
community, in order to receive necessary health care services.
' 253
Other limitations include significant restrictions on Medicaid coverage
of durable medical equipment. Because Medicaid covers such equipment
only as a form of "home health services, ' 25 4 it will be reimbursed only if it
is "suitable for use in the home. 255 As a result, Medicaid recipients are
denied reimbursement for multiple-terrain wheelchairs "that would enable
them to get out of their house, and travel independently" but that are not
necessary for use in the home. 6 And "Medicaid often denies mobility aids,
describing them as 'non-essential,' or pays only for obsolete equipment. 257
As the National Council on Disability reported, "the refusal of Medicaid to
cover appropriate wheelchairs for people with physical disabilities borders
on the legendary.'258
At best, then, Medicaid litigation can force states to comply with their
own earlier decisions to provide optional services. If states respond to that
litigation by amending their Medicaid plans to cut back on the services they
promise to provide, there is nothing in the statute to stop them.259 Successes
in Medicaid litigation thus may become Pyrrhic victories for disability
rights advocates.
But the rise in Medicaid litigation by disability rights advocates is
important nonetheless. Despite its limitations, it represents a recognition
that antidiscrimination strategies alone cannot achieve employment and
community integration for people with disabilities. These goals can be
achieved only through state-provided services-core social-welfare-law
interventions. As I discuss in the next two Subsections, disability rights
advocates are increasingly focusing their legislative advocacy on efforts to
alter the aspects of existing Medicaid law that limit the program's power to
achieve these goals.
253. NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, SHARING THE RISK, supra note 101, at "Findings on
Barriers to Health Insurance and Health-Related Services" No. 2.
254. See 42 C.F.R. § 440.70(b)(3) (2003); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(7) (permitting
states, at their option, to provide Medicaid coverage for home health services).
255. 42 C.F.R. § 440.70(b)(3).
256. KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, supra note 134, at 28-29.
257. IEZZONI, supra note 120, at 249.
258. NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 106, at 4.
259. This may be an area where the ADA's accommodation approach can do a great deal of
good. The statute's integration mandate, as interpreted in Olmstead, might well prevent a state
from cutting back on integration-enhancing services that are optional under the Medicaid law. As
I noted in Part II, however, the access/content distinction significantly limits the usefulness of the
ADA in this respect.
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2. Expanding Eligibility for Public Health Insurance
As I discussed above, the most significant aspects of our current health
insurance system that limit work opportunities for people with disabilities
are the powerful work disincentives built into the major public health-
insurance programs, Medicare and Medicaid. To obtain coverage under
these programs, people with disabilities must generally show that they are
unable to work. In the past, recipients who returned to work often lost their
Medicare and Medicaid eligibility as a result. Because private health
insurance will not provide the services many people with disabilities need,
these eligibility rules effectively lock them out of the workforce. 260 Any
effort to move substantial numbers of people with disabilities into jobs must
address disincentives like these. In particular, such an effort must sever the
link between cash benefits and public health insurance and thereby make
work no longer a disqualifying factor for the receipt of Medicare and
Medicaid.
Recognizing this point, disability rights advocates in recent years have
devoted substantial energy to lobbying for legislation that would extend
eligibility for Medicare and Medicaid to a larger number of working people
with disabilities. Disability rights advocates were among those who
successfully pushed for the passage of the Ticket to Work and Work
Incentives Improvement Act (TWWIIA) of 1999.261 Among other things,
TWWIIA extends Medicare coverage for a full eight-and-a-half years to
individuals with disabilities who leave the SSDI rolls to return to work.262
The statute provides for expedited reinstatement to the SSDI-Medicare or
SSI-Medicaid rolls for former recipients who, after a period of time back in
the labor force, become unable to work once again.263 It also limits the
degree to which work activity can be used as evidence that a former
260. See supra notes 127-141 and accompanying text.
261. Pub. L. No. 106-170, 113 Stat. 1860 (codified in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
For discussion of the role of disability rights advocates in drafting and lobbying for TWWIIA, see
145 CONG. REC. S14,981 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1999) (statement of Sen. Jeffords) ("In addition to
staff, we received countless hours of assistance and advice from the Work Incentives Task Force
of the Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities. These individuals worked tirelessly to educate
Members of Congress about the need for and the effects of this legislation."); 145 CONG. REC.
S7060-61 (daily ed. June 16, 1999) (statement of Sen. Dodd) ("In support of this important
legislation are the Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities, the ARC, Easter Seals, the National
Alliance for the Mentally Ill, the Paralyzed Veterans of America, the United Cerebral Palsy
Association, and the National Education Association."); Susan Page, Clinton Aims To Help
Disabled Workers, USA TODAY, Jan. 13, 1999, at 12A (noting Justin Dart's support of the statute
that became TWWIIA); and Joshua Harris Prager, Back to Work: Loss of Health Benefits No
Longer Threatens Disabled Job-Seekers, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 1999, at AI ("In December 1996,
several advocacy groups for the disabled convened in Washington, D.C., and Oakland, Calif., to
push the idea of Medicaid buy-in programs.").
262. See § 202(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 426(b) (2000)).
263. See id. § 112 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(i), 1383(p) (2000)).
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recipient no longer has a disability.264 These provisions address a significant
fear held by many SSDI recipients: If they leave the benefits rolls to return
to work, they will lose their SSDI eligibility-and hence their entitlement to
Medicare-once and for all, even if they later cannot find adequate work or
private health insurance.
But TWWIIA's extension of Medicare coverage to individuals who
leave the SSDI rolls has a number of significant limitations. Although the
statute extends Medicare coverage to individuals for a longer period of time
after they leave the SSDI rolls, it does not make Medicare available to those
who have not yet joined those rolls. To become eligible for Medicare in the
first place, individuals with disabilities must still establish that they are
unable to work, and they must remain unemployed through the lengthy
disability-determination process. As a result, Medicare recipients with
disabilities continue to develop a significant psychological investment in
the proposition that they cannot work, and they continue to experience long
periods of separation from the workforce that make them less
employable.265 A truly effective effort to improve the employment rate of
people with disabilities must also focus on individuals who are currently
employed but whose attachment to the workforce is shaky.266
Moreover, an extension of Medicare benefits may not be sufficient to
eliminate disincentives to work. Medicare was designed for a nonworking
elderly population and does not well serve the interest of people with
disabilities in community integration and access to the labor market.267 For
one thing, the program uses a "medical necessity" standard similar to that
employed by private insurers.268 As the Institute of Medicine has pointed
264. See id. § 111 (a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 421(m) (2000)).
265. See GAO, supra note 140, at 10-11; GAO, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION:
STATUS OF ACHIEVING KEY OUTCOMES AND ADDRESSING MAJOR MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES
19-20 (2001).
266. See GAO, DISABILITY PROGRAMS LAG IN PROMOTING RETURN TO WORK 19 (1997);
Richard V. Burkhauser & Mary C. Daly, Employment and Economic Well-Being Following the
Onset of a Disability, in DISABILITY, WORK AND CASH BENEFITS, supra note 6, at 59, 77-85;
O'Day & Berkowitz, supra note 75, at 636-38.
267. See MARMOR, supra note 29, at 153 ("[Tlhe structure of the benefits themselves,
providing acute hospital care and intermittent physician treatment, was not tightly linked to the
special circumstances of the elderly as a group. Left out were provisions that addressed the
particular problems of the chronically sick elderly: medical conditions that would not dramatically
improve and the need to maintain independent function rather than triumph over discrete illness
and injury.").
268. See INST. OF MED., supra note 23, at 227; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A) (2000)
(limiting reimbursement to items or services that are "reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis
or treatment of illness or injury or to improve the functioning of a malformed body member"); id.
§ 1395y(a)(6) (barring reimbursement for "personal comfort items"). For critical discussion of the
Medicare medical necessity determination process, see Timothy P. Blanchard, "Medical
Necessity " Denials as a Medicare Part B Cost-Containment Strategy: Two Wrongs Don't Make It
Right or Rational, 34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 939 (1990); and Timothy P. Blanchard, Medicare Medical
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out, under that standard, "assistive technologies are likely to be dismissed
as 'not primarily medical in nature' or as 'convenience items.' 269 And
Medicare denies reimbursement for mobility aids and power wheelchairs to
recipients who can move around in their homes without them; if a recipient
needs such equipment for purposes of traveling outside the home only, the
equipment is deemed to be an uncovered "convenience item.' '270 In the
guise of preventing fraud, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) recently promised to enforce the "medical necessity" requirement
particularly stringently when individuals seek Medicare reimbursement for
power wheelchairs; although CMS ultimately withdrew the "guidance"
document containing that promise, the agency insists that its policy remains
unchanged.271 Services essential to participation in community life, such as
augmentative communication or personal assistance, often fail to satisfy
Medicare's medical necessity criteria as well.272
When Medicare does provide services that could be used to promote
integration of people with disabilities in the life of the community, it
frequently imposes a restriction that defeats a major purpose of those
services: Recipients must become, in effect, "prisoners in their own
homes. 2 73 Under Medicare's "homebound rule," a person who receives
"home health services" (a term that includes such important services as
personal assistance, physical and occupational therapy, and speech and
language pathology274) must be "confined to his home., 275 The statute
elaborates that "[w]hile an individual does not have to be bedridden to be
considered 'confined to his home', the condition of the individual should be
such that there exists a normal inability to leave home and that leaving
Necessity Determinations Revisited: Abuse of Discretion and Abuse of Process in the War Against
Medicare Fraud andAbuse, 43 ST. Louis U. L.J. 91, 100-04 (1999).
269. INST. OF MED., supra note 23, at 227; see also IEZZONI, supra note 120, at 232 ("The
prohibition against 'convenience' items, in particular, compromises efforts to obtain assistive
technologies and other devices."); Bruce C. Vladeck et al., Confronting the Ambivalence of
Disability Policy: Has Push Come to Shove?, in DISABILITY: CHALLENGES, supra note 6, at 83,
95 ("Assistive technology addresses a range of needs that go well beyond the scope of Medicare's
currently stated purposes and benefits.").
270. See IEZZONI, supra note 120, at 250; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(n) (providing coverage
for durable medical equipment only when it is "used in the patient's home").
271. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
PUB. 100-02, CMS MANUAL SYSTEM: BENEFIT POLICY (2003), available at
www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/pmtrans/R2BP.pdf; Michael Janofsky, Costs and Savings in
Medicare Change on Wheelchairs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2004, at A13; Payment for Power
Wheelchairs: CMS Rescinds Latest Policy Change, but Confusion Is Likely To Remain, 27 REP.
ON DISABILITY PROGRAMS (Bus. Publishers. Inc., Silver Spring, Md.), Apr. 1, 2004, at 49, 49-50.
272. See INST. OF MED., supra note 23, at 257.
273. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DELIVERING ON THE PROMISE: U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES SELF-EVALUATION To PROMOTE COMMUNITY
LIVING FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES app. A at 58 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
274. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(m).
275. Id. § 1395f(a)(2)(C); accord id. § 1395n(a)(2)(A).
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home requires a considerable and taxing effort by the individual. 276 This
provision was recently amended to clarify that absences from the home to
receive health care treatment or adult day care do not compromise a
recipient's homebound status, nor do other absences "of infrequent or of
relatively short duration., 277 But because the permitted trips must still be
infrequent and require "considerable and taxing effort," the changes in the
homebound definition do not alter the fundamental problem: As soon as an
individual with a disability becomes able to leave the house and participate
in the community, the individual will lose Medicare home health services.
In a classic Catch-22, an individual will lose home services even if those
very services remain essential to the individual's continued ability to leave
the house.278
Other provisions of TWWIIA attempt to address these limitations of the
Medicare extension. Section 201 of the statute authorizes states, at their
option, to create Medicaid buy-in programs for working people with
disabilities. 279 Even if individuals with disabilities earn too much to qualify
for Medicaid under the statute's general work-incentive provisions,28° states
may permit them to obtain Medicaid by "pay[ing] premiums or other cost-
sharing charges set on a sliding scale based on income.",28' States have
broad flexibility in setting those premiums, as well as in setting income and
asset limits for eligibility.282 But enrollees whose income does not exceed
450% of the federal poverty line may not be charged a premium that
amounts to more than 7.5% of their income.283 And section 204 authorizes a
"demonstration project" in which states may provide Medicaid coverage for
state-identified classes of individuals with impairments who currently work
but whose conditions are "reasonably expected" to become work-
276. Id. § 1395f(a); accord id. § 1395n(a).
277. Id. § 1395f(a), amended by Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and
Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 507, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763 app. F 2763A-532 to
-533. The amended statute provides that "any absence for the purpose of attending a religious
service" shall be conclusively presumed to be infrequent or of relatively short duration.
278. See IEZZONI, supra note 120, at 239-40.
279. Section 201 is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(XV). Disability rights
activists have also been major supporters of the proposed Family Opportunity Act of 2003, S. 622,
108th Cong. (2003), which would authorize states to allow parents of children with disabilities to
buy into the Medicaid program, see S. REP. NO. 108-157, at 5-7 (2003).
280. See supra Section II.A (discussing the operation of those provisions).
281. 42 U.S.C. § 1396o(g)(1)(A) (added by TWWIIA, Pub. L. No. 106-170, § 201(a)(3), 113
Stat. 1860, 1893 (1999)).
282. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(XV), (XVI), 1396o(g)(1)(A).
283. See id. § 1396o(g)(1)(B). This provision builds on an earlier statute, the Balanced
Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4733, 111 Stat. 251, 522, which authorized states to
establish Medicaid buy-in programs for people with disabilities who earn up to 250% of the
federal poverty level. TWWlIA eliminates the 250% income cap on eligibility, though it permits
states to impose income caps of their own.
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prohibiting disabilities if those individuals do not receive Medicaid
284services.
These efforts to expand Medicaid eligibility are themselves quite
limited. Neither the general buy-in authority under section 201 nor the
targeted demonstration-project authority under section 204 is mandatory for
states. Given the substantial budgetary pressures on states to limit optional
categories of Medicaid spending,285 it is unlikely that TWWIIA's eligibility
expansions will ever be fully implemented. Indeed, only twenty-eight states
have chosen to implement Medicaid buy-in programs for workers with
disabilities.286  As of September 2003, these programs covered
approximately 56,000 people.287 And nearly all of them limit eligibility to
workers whose income is less than three times the federal poverty line.288
Moreover, the TWWIIA provision for workers at risk of falling out of the
workforce is a mere demonstration, which is expected to reach selected
populations in no more than eight states and the District of Columbia by the
end of fiscal year 2004.289
Despite these limitations, TWWIIA marks a major step forward in
promoting independence and work for people with disabilities. And the
involvement of disability rights activists in lobbying for the statute marked
a major advance as well, for it reflected a recognition that social welfare
interventions can be crucial in empowering people with disabilities.
3. Expanding the Services Covered by Public Health Insurance
Even if disability rights activists succeed in expanding eligibility for
public health insurance, significant structural barriers to employment will
284. TWWIIA, Pub. L. No. 106-170, § 204(b)(1)(B), 113 Stat. 1860, 1898 (1999).
285. See supra Subsection III.A. 1.
286. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
CURRENT ENROLLMENTS IN THE MEDICAID BUY-IN AS OF MARCH 31, 2003,
http://cms.hhs.gov/twwiia/enrollmentperstate.pdf. For discussions of the implementation of the
buy-in program, see DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE MEDICAID BUY-IN PROGRAM:
LESSONS LEARNED FROM NINE "EARLY IMPLEMENTER" STATES (2002), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/Eilesson.htm; GAO, supra note 103; and HENRY T. IREYS ET
AL., THE MEDICAID BUY-IN PROGRAM: QUANTITATIVE MEASURES OF ENROLLMENT TRENDS
AND PARTICIPANT CHARACTERISTICS IN 2002, PRELIMINARY REPORT (2003), available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/twwiia/mathrpt 003.pdf.
287. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 286.
288. The GAO reported that only three of the twenty-four states that had Medicaid buy-in
programs in December 2002 extended eligibility to those who earned more than three times the
poverty line. Minnesota has no income eligibility limit, New Hampshire limits eligibility to those
who earn less than 450% of the federal poverty level, and Indiana limits eligibility to those who
earn less than 350% of the federal poverty level. See GAO, supra note 103, at 17.
289. See General Services Administration, Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, available
at http://12.46.245.173/pls/portal30/SYSTEM.PROGRAM TEXTRPT.SHOW?p.argjnames
=prognbr&p.arg-values=93.769 (last visited Sept. 24, 2004).
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remain. As I discussed above, the coverage formulas for both Medicare and
(to a lesser but still important extent) Medicaid give short shrift to those
services that would enable people with disabilities to live and work in the
community. Under Medicare, the homebound rule limits home health
services to those who are "confined to [their] home[s]. ' 29° If home services
enable an individual to leave his or her home routinely, the individual will
lose coverage for those services. 291 And Medicaid's "institutional bias"
means that home-based personal-assistance services-perhaps the most
important tool for people with disabilities to achieve integration in the
community-are often not covered.292
Disability rights activists have increasingly turned their attention to
attacking these limitations on Medicare and Medicaid benefits. Indeed,
passage of the so-called MiCASSA law-the Medicaid Community-Based
Attendant Services and Supports Act293 -is probably the most significant
legislative priority for disability rights activists.9 MiCASSA would
eliminate Medicaid's institutional bias by mandating that states cover
personal-assistance services for recipients with disabilities. 295 The bill
would give eligible individuals the choice between receiving community-
based attendant services and receiving services in an institutional setting,
and it would guarantee persons with disabilities the power personally to
hire, fire, and manage their assistants.296
290. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395f(a)(2)(C), 1395n(a)(2)(A) (2000).
291. See supra Subsection III.A.2.
292. See supra Subsection III.A. 1.
293. H.R. 2032, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 971, 108th Cong. (2003).
294. See Harriet McBryde Johnson & Lesly Bowers, Civil Rights and Long-Term Care:
Advocacy in the Wake ofOlmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 10 ELDER L.J. 453, 457-58 (2002)
("Passing MiCassa is now the single national goal for American Disabled for Attendant Programs
Today (ADAPT), the grassroots organization that effectively applied direct action, including civil
disobedience, in its successful, twenty-year fight for accessible public transportation."); ADAPT,
A Community-Based Alternative to Nursing Homes and Institutions for People with Disabilities,
http://www.adapt.org/casaintr.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2004) (describing ADAPT's support for
MiCASSA); ADAPT, List of Supporters, http://www.adapt.org/casa/supporters.htm (last updated
Jan. 13, 2004) (listing organizations that have endorsed MiCASSA, including disability rights
groups such as ADA Watch, the American Association of People with Disabilities, the Bazelon
Center for Mental Health Law, the Disability Rights Center, the Disability Rights Education and
Defense Fund, and Justice for All). In September 2003, ADAPT led a fourteen-day march from
the Liberty Bell in Philadelphia to the Capitol in Washington, D.C., to draw attention to
MiCASSA. For the website devoted to that "Free Our People March," see ADAPT, Free Our
People!, http://www.adapt.org/freeourpeople (last visited Sept. 24, 2004). At a congressional
hearing in March 1998, both ADAPT leader Michael Auberger and Justin Dart, one of the key
disability rights advocates in the effort to obtain passage of the ADA, offered strong testimony in
support of MiCASSA. See Community-Based Care for Americans with Disabilities: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Env't of the House Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong.
21-24, 78-87 (1998) [hereinafter Community-Based Care Hearing].
295. In particular, the bill would require that states cover "community-based attendant
services and supports" for any Medicaid-eligible individual who meets the criteria for institutional
care. H.R. 2032 § 101.
296. See id.
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The disability rights community has also begun to mobilize against
Medicare's homebound rule. Disability rights organizations have supported
legislation that would eliminate the homebound restriction.297 In response to
these efforts, a provision in the 2003 Medicare reform law established a
pilot project, limited to three states and 15,000 participants, that effectively
eliminates the homebound requirement for certain individuals with
permanent and severe disabilities.
298
The homebound demonstration aside, disability rights activists' efforts
to expand the services covered by public health insurance have not yet
borne significant fruit. MiCASSA has now been introduced in five
successive Congresses without ever making it out of committee. 299 The
nursing-home lobby, which carries a great deal of clout on Capitol Hill,
300
understandably is strenuously opposed to the bill.3 °1 If passed, after all,
MiCASSA would likely result in large numbers of people moving from
nursing homes to home- and community-based settings. Some groups of
parents of people with disabilities, such as Voice of the Retarded, also
oppose the bill. The parents in these groups fear that their (now-grown)
children will not receive appropriate care in community settings.3 °2
Even if MiCASSA can navigate these legislative shoals, it will not be a
panacea for people with disabilities. As I discuss below, the bill could
easily leave people with disabilities at the mercy of private home-health-
care agencies, which may subordinate the independence of their clients to
their own profit-maximizing objectives. And MiCASSA is limited to
personal-assistance services; it does nothing to assure access to such
important services as assistive technology or home modifications for people
with disabilities. Nonetheless, the fact that disability rights activists have
placed such a high priority on the enactment of legislation expanding the
297. See H.R. 1874, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 598, 108th Cong. (2003). For the list of
supporters-including disability rights groups American Association of People with Disabilities
(AAPD) and Justice for All-see Nat'l Coalition To Amend the Medicare Homebound Restriction
for Ams. with Significant Illness, Endorsements,
http://www.amendhomeboundpolicy.homestead.com/endorse.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2004).
298. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, § 702, 117 Stat. 2066, 2335-36.
299. See H.R. 2032; S. 971, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 3612, 107th Cong. (2002); S. 1298,
107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 4416, 106th Cong. (2000); S. 1935, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 2020,
105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 4250, 104th Cong. (1996).
300. On the power of the nursing home lobby, see BRUCE C. VLADECK, UNLOVING CARE:
THE NURSING HOME TRAGEDY 192-201 (1980). See generally Batavia et al., supra note 98, at
531-32 (discussing opposition to personal assistance policies from entrenched interests).
301. See, for example, the MiCASSA issue paper on the website of the American Health
Care Association, probably the leading nursing home trade association; that paper "strongly calls
upon Congress to oppose MiCASSA legislation." AM. HEALTH CARE ASS'N, ISSUE BRIEF:
MICASSA LEGISLATION 2 (2004), available at http://www.ahca.org/brief/ib-micassa.pdf.
302. See, e.g., Community-Based Care Hearing, supra note 294, at 13 (statement of Rep.
Brown); id. at 52-57 (statement of Polly Spare).
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Medicaid program is itself telling. It reflects a recognition by disability
rights activists that the ADA alone is not sufficient to achieve community
integration for people with disabilities. Social welfare law remains
important as well.
B. Emerging Dilemmas
As the previous Section demonstrates, disability rights activists have
increasingly recognized the limitations of the antidiscrimination approach
of the ADA. But as those activists turn toward social welfare strategies,
new dilemmas will arise-or rather, old dilemmas will reassert themselves.
Although social welfare strategies are essential to achieving the goals of
disability rights activists, the disability rights movement's 1970s-era
critique of the social welfare system remains powerful. But a number of the
new social welfare initiatives potentially raise the same sorts of concerns
that disability rights activists voiced in the 1970s. Any return to social
welfare law must seek to address those concerns.
In this Section, I discuss two broad questions disability rights advocates
will face as they embrace social welfare strategies for achieving their goals.
First, they must choose whether to advocate universal social insurance
benefits or targeted disability-specific interventions. The choice between
universalism and targeting is one that appears throughout social welfare
law, but, as I show in Subsection 1, the disability rights movement's
critique of welfare gives the choice an unusual character in the disability
context. Second, disability rights advocates' critique of professional
domination of people with disabilities makes it particularly important that
renewed social welfare interventions reduce the medicalization of disability
benefits and guarantee consumer control. At the same time, these
interventions must do so without placing people with disabilities at risk of
receiving inferior services. I discuss these matters in Subsection 2. These
two examples hardly .exhaust the issues that disability rights advocates will
face in relying on social welfare strategies, but they illustrate the kinds of
dilemmas with which those advocates must grapple.
1. Universal Versus Targeted Approaches
In social welfare policy generally, policymakers are often said to face a
tradeoff between targeted and universal interventions.303 Targeted
303. See, e.g., NEIL GILBERT, TRANSFORMATION OF THE WELFARE STATE: THE SILENT
SURRENDER OF PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY 135 (2002) ("Since the birth of the welfare state,
policymakers have debated the defining principles that guide the allocation of social benefits. The
classic line of this debate draws the distinction between universalism and selectivity.").
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programs-those that focus benefits on a particular needy group-may
more efficiently achieve the goal of alleviating suffering. But universal
programs-social insurance programs that provide benefits to broad classes
such as all workers or all citizens-are generally thought to be more
politically stable. "Programs for the poor are poor programs," the clich6
goes.3 °4
Looking at the history of the American welfare state in general, there
seems to be a great deal of evidence to support the notion that broad social
insurance programs fare better politically than do more targeted
interventions.3 °5 In this regard, one need only compare the history of the
Social Security program with that of the major means-tested welfare
program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) (which became
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) after passage of the 1996
welfare law). Social Security's universal coverage has largely masked the
program's redistributive character, and political support for the program has
remained sufficiently strong to scare off-at least so far-any effort to
change it fundamentally. 30 6 Welfare, by contrast, has long been a political
target, and efforts to limit and condition the benefits it provides have not
stopped with the passage of the 1996 reform law, which eliminated the
federal entitlement to welfare.30 7 When the issue is viewed in a comparative
perspective across industrial democracies, the evidence remains strong that
304. The saying is variously credited to Richard Titmuss and to Wilbur Cohen, one of the
founding fathers of Social Security. For examples of commentators noting the political advantages
to framing social welfare programs as universal social-insurance entitlements, see GRAETZ &
MASHAW, supra note 6, at 288-89; THEDA SKOCPOL, SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES:
FUTURE POSSIBILITIES IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 250-72 (1995); and WILLIAM JULIUS
WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 118 (1987). See also JACOB S. HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE: THE BATTLE
OVER PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SOCIAL BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES 40 (2002) (calling this
claim "ubiquitous"). There also may be efficiency advantages to universalism, which can
circumvent adverse selection and moral hazard problems. See, e.g., GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra
note 6, at 38-39.
305. For a contrary view, see PAUL PIERSON, DISMANTLING THE WELFARE STATE? REAGAN,
THATCHER, AND THE POLITICS OF RETRENCHMENT 103, 101-03, 128 (1994) (explaining that "the
biggest programmatic losers in the 1980s were often universal programs" and "the biggest
winners were in fact targeted ones").
306. See, e.g., GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 6, at 285-86; SKOCPOL, supra note 304, at
263-66.
307. Professor Theda Skocpol explicitly draws the comparison between Social Security and
welfare in Theda Skocpol, The Limits of the New Deal System and the Roots of Contemporary
Welfare Dilemmas, in THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 293, 295-98
(Margaret Weir et al. eds., 1988). See also SKOCPOL, supra note 304, at 255-59. For good pre-
welfare-reform discussions of the American politics of welfare, see THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL &
MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE IMPACT OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN
POLITICS (1991); and HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 49, at 82-13 1. For good post-1996
treatments, see generally R. KENT WEAVER, ENDING WELFARE AS WE KNOW IT (2000); HAROLD
L. WILENSKY, RICH DEMOCRACIES: POLITICAL ECONOMY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND PERFORMANCE
323-24 (2002); and Hugh Heclo, The Politics of Welfare Reform, in THE NEW WORLD OF
WELFARE 169 (Rebecca M. Blank & Ron Haskins eds., 2001).
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welfare programs based on broad universal entitlements have a political
advantage over more targeted interventions.
30 8
In the disability context, however, it might appear that there is no such
tradeoff between universal and targeted approaches. People with
disabilities, after all, have long been considered to be the "deserving
poor.',309 A social welfare program targeted to poor people in general might
well be politically vulnerable, but a social welfare program targeted to
people with disabilities-toward whom the general public has a charitable
disposition-will likely be much stronger politically.310 As they turn back
to social welfare strategies, disability rights activists might well be tempted
to seek enactment of targeted programs that will provide enhanced benefits
for people with disabilities only. Indeed, all of the legislative proposals
discussed in Section A were disability-specific initiatives. 311 At a time when
significant retrenchment in domestic spending seems all but inevitable, the
successful passage of the TWWIIA statute and the relatively favorable
reception the other disability-specific initiatives have received may suggest
that such targeted proposals are politically viable in a way that broader
social insurance proposals are not.
308. See WILENSKY, supra note 307, at 363-97; Bo Rothstein, The Universal Welfare State
as a Social Dilemma, in RESTRUCTURING THE WELFARE STATE: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND
POLICY CHANGE 206 (Bo Rothstein & Sven Steinmo eds.., 2002); Duane Swank, Political
Institutions and Welfare State Restructuring: The Impact of Institutions on Social Policy Change
in Developed Democracies, in THE NEW POLITICS OF THE WELFARE STATE 197, 213-14, 232-33
(Paul Pierson ed., 2001).
309. See supra text accompanying note 58.
310. See, e.g., Jonathan Zasloff, Children, Families, and Bureaucrats: A Prehistory of
Welfare Reform, 14 J.L. & POL. 225, 308 n.259 (1998) (arguing that the means-tested SSI
program has fared well politically, notwithstanding its targeted nature, because the program's
beneficiaries-including, inter alia, people with disabilities-have "substantial political support
among the general public"). Indeed, Professor Jerry Mashaw suggests that public attitudes toward
disability are sufficiently positive to make politically possible a regime in which private
employers would be required to satisfy employment quotas for people with disabilities. See Jerry
L. Mashaw, Against First Principles, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 211, 233 (1994) ("Quotas simply do
not have the same ideological loading in this context that they have in others."). I am dubious
about that political judgment and find it striking that disability-employment quotas have not been
seriously proposed in any political forum in the United States in at least two decades. See
STEPHEN L. PERCY, DISABILITY, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND PUBLIC POLICY: THE POLITICS OF
IMPLEMENTATION 207 (1989) (describing the Carter Administration's decision not to impose
numerical goals for disability employment on federal contractors under section 503 of the
Rehabilitation Act, even though the government had imposed numerical goals for race and gender
on federal contractors under Executive Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (Sept. 24, 1965),
the model for section 503).
311. Another disability-specific program frequently discussed in the literature is a "Disabled
Worker Tax Credit," which would be modeled on the Earned Income Tax Credit and provide a
refundable tax credit to working individuals with disabilities. See, e.g., Burkhauser & Daly, supra
note 266, at 87; Hilary Williamson Hoynes & Robert Moffitt, The Effectiveness of Financial Work
Incentives in Social Security Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income, in
DISABILITY, WORK AND CASH BENEFITS, supra note 6, at 189, 214; Weber, Disability and the
Law of Welfare, supra note 6, at 947-50.
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But targeted disability-specific social welfare programs have a
downside as well. As disability rights activists made clear in the 1970s, one
reason disability welfare programs have broad political support is that much
of the public holds attitudes that are inconsistent with recognizing people
with disabilities as full citizens.312  Many believe that people with
disabilities are especially deserving of charity and public largesse precisely
because they believe that people with disabilities are not capable of
providing for themselves. If disability rights activists rely on and cater to
those attitudes to gain support for disability-specific social welfare
initiatives, they may end up reinforcing those attitudes in a way that is
extremely damaging to the movement's broader goals.31 3
This point suggests that disability rights activists should, whenever
possible, seek to achieve their social welfare goals through "universal
policies that recognize that the entire population is 'at risk' for the
concomitants of chronic illness and disability. ' '3 14 For this reason, I think
that job set-asides for people with disabilities, an approach favored by a
number of commentators,3 15 ought properly to be a nonstarter. Indeed, it is
notable that European countries that have historically maintained quota
systems are now moving-largely at the insistence of politically activated
people with disabilities-to abolish them.31 6 There is good reason to doubt
that such systems have been especially effective in promoting employment
and integration for people with disabilities in any event.3 17
312. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
313. This is a classic example of what Professor Martha Minow has labeled the "dilemma of
difference," in which "[t]he stigma of difference may be recreated both by ignoring and by
focusing on it." MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW 20 (1990).
314. Irving Kenneth Zola, Toward the Necessary Universalizing of a Disability Policy, 67
MILBANK Q. 401,401 (1989).
315. See, e.g., Issacharoff& Nelson, supra note 205, at 355-57; Mashaw, supra note 310, at
231-37; Weber, Beyond the ADA, supra note 6, at 159-74.
316. See Lisa Waddington, Reassessing the Employment of People with Disabilities in
Europe: From Quotas to Anti-Discrimination Laws, 18 COMp. LAB. L.J. 62, 81-99 (1996).
317. As Professor Lisa Waddington concludes,
[M]ore than fifty years' experience with the quota system has revealed that systems
which are not effectively enforced have little or no effect in terms of generating
employment, while those which are based on the levy-grant system are incapable of
meeting the set targets in this period of high unemployment, at least where the levy
is set at a low level. The political will does not exist to enforce quota systems, or to
set a high levy, and it cannot be expected that the performance records of quotas
will improve.
Id. at 100; see also Katharina C. Heyer, The ADA on the Road: Disability Rights in Germany, 27
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 723, 729 (2002) (stating that the German quota system "remains highly
segregated and continues to isolate people with severe, learning, or developmental disabilities,"
and that it has not improved the employment position of people with disabilities); Katharina
Heyer, From Special Needs to Equal Rights: Japanese Disability Law, I ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y
J. 7:1, :8 (2000), http://www.hawaii.edu/aplpj/pdfs/07-heyer.pdf (stating that Japan has never met
its 1.8% employment quota for people with disabilities, and that the quota system has resulted in
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Health policy seems an extremely promising area in which to take a
universalist approach. Until the 1990s, American disability rights activists
were quite averse to urging a broadening of guaranteed health coverage.
The movement had "worked so hard for so long to separate the issues of
health and disability" that demands for broader health coverage would seem
to "resurrect[] harmful stereotypes. 318 Three events led disability rights
activists to recognize their important stake in health reform debates: the
Oregon Health Plan controversy of 1992,319 the flurry of activity
surrounding President Clinton's proposed Health Security Act in 1993 and
1994,320 and the rise of managed care in the mid- to late 1990s.3f1 But if
disability rights activists restrict their goals to disability-specific expansions
of health insurance such as those embodied in TWWIIA and MiCASSA,
their actions risk "reviving the stereotype that all people with disabilities
are sick and should be viewed as patients. 322
If disability rights advocates place a greater focus on urging enactment
of a universal health care system, though, they may help to blunt that
stereotype. For many of the reasons discussed in Part II, people with
disabilities would disproportionately benefit from a universal guarantee of
health insurance.323 Most notably, such a guarantee would eliminate the fear
of the loss of coverage that is the most significant barrier to employment for
people with disabilities. But a universal health care system would likely not
be seen as a disability-oriented program, because it would provide benefits
to everyone. Advocacy for and enactment of such a system would not send
the message that people with disabilities are uniquely in need of caretaking;
it would send the message that we all need insurance against contingencies
in life.
324
"de facto re-segregation into separate workplaces" as companies have "compl[ied] with the quota
by establishing special 'barrier-free' subsidiary companies").
318. Sara D. Watson, An Alliance at Risk: The Disability Movement and Health Care
Reform, AM. PROSPECT, Winter 1993, at 60, 63, available at http://www.prospect.org/
printlV4/12/watson-s.html; see also DeJong & Basnett, supra note 102, at 614 (discussing
American disability rights activists' reticence to participate in health policy debates until the
1990s).
319. See DeJong & Basnett, supra note 102, at 614-15; Watson, supra note 318. For a
general discussion of the Oregon Health Plan controversy, see Bagenstos, supra note 38, at 1507-
09.
320. See DeJong & Basnett, supra note 102, at 615. For good discussions of the failure of the
Clinton health proposal, see HAYNES JOHNSON & DAVID S. BRODER, THE SYSTEM: THE
AMERICAN WAY OF POLITICS AT THE BREAKING POINT (1996); and THEDA SKOCPOL,
BOOMERANG: CLINTON'S HEALTH SECURITY EFFORT AND THE TURN AGAINST GOVERNMENT IN
U.S. POLITICS (1996).
321. See DeJong & Basnett, supra note 102, at 615-16.
322. Watson, supra note 318, at 63.
323. See Weber, Disability and the Law of Welfare, supra note 6, at 953-54.
324. The health policy area thus presents fertile ground for disability rights activists to pursue
the strategy Professor Skocpol has labeled "targeting within universalism," in which universal
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To be sure, universal health insurance is at best a long-run goal given
today's climate of domestic-policy retrenchment. But disability rights
activists can engage in (relatively) universalist social welfare advocacy
even today. One of the greatest current threats to people with disabilities is
the persistent proposal to transform Medicaid into a block-grant program.
As I discussed in Part II, that proposal would likely place people with
disabilities-who represent a disproportionate percentage of Medicaid
costs-at the greatest risk of having their benefits cut. Yet in defending the
program's current entitlement structure, activists need not rely on the
unique harm block grants pose to people with disabilities. Rather, they can
focus on the need for health care more generally.
To some extent, of course, disability rights advocates will necessarily
be called upon to defend disability-specific interventions. Even in the
context of universal health insurance, activists will want to assure that the
benefits formula provides adequate coverage for those services that are
particularly important to people with disabilities. And even when they
defend the Medicaid entitlement generally, disability activists will, by their
very participation, trigger the feelings of charity and pity many nondisabled
people have toward people with disabilities. The attitudes toward disability
that remain prevalent in society are too strong to enable activists to fully
escape them by urging universal interventions. But by casting demands for
social welfare provision in universal terms as frequently as possible, the
disability rights movement can help to erode the notion that people with
disabilities are fundamentally separate from the community of citizens.
2. Consumer Control
A second issue disability rights advocates must confront as they
embrace social welfare programs is the issue of consumer control. To date,
disability rights advocates have focused their newfound social welfare
advocacy on the implementation and expansion of public health insurance
programs. As I described in Section A, those activists have sought to
compel states to provide the services mandated by the Medicaid Act, and
they have sought to expand the eligibility criteria for and the services
provided under both Medicare and Medicaid.325 That medical focus should
hardly be a surprise. Many of the services people with disabilities need to
enhance opportunities to live and participate in the community are typically
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regarded as medical services that should appropriately be provided through
the health care and health insurance systems.326
But the medical focus of this new social welfare advocacy carries risks
as well. When participants in the disability rights movement urged a move
away from a social welfare approach in the 1970s and 1980s, they argued
that social welfare programs gave members of the "helping professions" too
much power to control the lives of people with disabilities.327 The medical
profession was probably the most frequent target of that critique. Activists
contended that medical professionals view disability as a sickness--one for
which the individual with a disability must submit to the treatment dictated
by a doctor or nurse. The result of this "medical model" is to deny
independent agency to people with disabilities and to reinforce the notion
that disability is an individual rather than a societal problem.32 8 In pursuing
medicalized social welfare strategies to achieve the goals of the disability
rights movement, activists risk further entrenching the salience of the
medical model of disability.
And the risk is not merely the abstract and ineffable one that the law
will send the wrong message. The risk is far more concrete. Social welfare
interventions financed by the health insurance system tend to be delivered
through the infrastructure of the health insurance system. That
infrastructure is controlled by medical professionals and is arranged in a
way that can itself deny agency and autonomy to people with disabilities. 9
For that reason, disability rights activists in the 1970s and 1980s urged that
there is nothing inherently medical in such services as personal assistance
or assistive technology and that those services should be provided through a
demedicalized process in which individuals with disabilities, rather than
medical professionals, have control.330 Yet by seeking those services
through health insurance programs like Medicare and Medicaid, today's
disability activists may be undermining their own goals.
326. See supra text accompanying note 102.
327. See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
328. See, e.g., SIMI LINTON, CLAIMING DISABILITY: KNOWLEDGE AND IDENTITY 11 (1998);
OLIVER, supra note 69, at 36-37; see also Carol J. Gill, Health Professionals, Disability, and
Assisted Suicide: An Examination of Relevant Empirical Evidence and Reply to Batavia, 6
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 526, 530-32 (2000) (arguing that physicians hold negative attitudes
about the quality of life of people with disabilities).
329. See, e.g., DeJong & Wenker, supra note 98, at 161-62; Mary Johnson, The Choice That
Nobody's Heard Of RAGGED EDGE, Jan./Feb. 1998, at 22, available at http://www.ragged-edge-
mag.com/jan98/choice.htm.
330. See, e.g., BERKOWITZ, supra note 24, at 201-04; Batavia et al., supra note 98, at 529-30;
DeJong, supra note 60, at 14-20; see also PAMELA J. DAUTEL & LEX FRIEDEN, CONSUMER
CHOICE AND CONTROL: PERSONAL ATTENDANT SERVICES AND SUPPORTS IN AMERICA (1999)
(urging change in Medicaid personal-assistance rules to recognize nonmedical nature of that
assistance in recommendation number five of blue-ribbon panel on personal-attendant services).
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The proposed MiCASSA statute provides an excellent example. The
bill would require states to provide "community-based attendant services
and supports" as a mandatory Medicaid benefit. 3  Mandated services
would include an array of personal-assistance services that would enhance
the opportunities for people with disabilities to participate in community
life.332 And the bill takes a number of significant steps in the direction of
assuring disabled individuals control of the services provided to them. It
would require that individuals with disabilities have the power to "select[],
manage[], and dismiss[]" their own assistants.333 It would also guarantee
individuals with disabilities "maximum control of the community-based
attendant services and supports, regardless of who acts as the employer of
record.,334 These requirements would significantly advance the goals of
independence and integration for people with disabilities.
But MiCASSA would leave intact a significant expression of the
medical model of personal-assistance services-the requirement, in many
states' Nurse Practice Acts, that "virtually any hands-on services provided
for pay to a disabled or elderly person" be treated "as the practice of
nursing, requiring licensure. ' '335 (MiCASSA would not alter the general rule
that the states retain the power to regulate the proper practice of
medicine.) 336 This requirement often "makes effective in-home services
unavailable," particularly for "those who live in a rural area beyond the
reach of a nursing agency, or need an attendant for short shifts throughout
331. S. 971, 108th Cong. § 101 (2003).
332. See, e.g., id.
333. Id. (amending, if enacted, 42 U.S.C. § 1935(g)(1)(A)(iv) (2000)).
334. Id. (amending, if enacted, 42 U.S.C. § 1935(g)(2)(B) (2000)).
335. Johnson & Bowers, supra note 294, at 458. Toby Olson, then the head of the
Washington State Governor's Committee on Disability Issues and Employment, gave a powerful
example of the restrictions Nurse Practice Acts place on the services unlicensed attendants can
perform:
Under Washington state's current nurse practice law, "it's illegal to use your own
judgment and rent a pair of hands," as Olson put it.
"If you can tell someone, 'pick up that blue pill-not that light blue one, but the
long blue capsule-and put it in my mouth'-if you're competent to do that, but
you can't put the pill in your mouth by yourself, then you're not allowed to have
just anyone working for you do it." It has to be a nurse.
Mary Johnson, in Thrall to the Medical Model, RAGGED EDGE, Jan./Feb. 1999, at 12, available at
http://www.ragged-edge-mag.com/0199/al99ftI.htm. For a relatively recent, comprehensive
overview of the restrictions that the states' Nurse Practice Acts might place on consumer-directed
personal assistance, and the move in a number of states to loosen those restrictions, see SUSAN C.
REINHARD, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CONSUMER DIRECTED CARE AND NURSE
PRACTICE ACTS (2001), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/nursprac.htm.
336. Medicaid once required that home services be provided or supervised by nurses;
although that requirement has been eliminated from federal law, states still retain the power to
impose similar requirements on Medicaid services through their Nurse Practice Acts. See GARY
SMITH ET AL., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., UNDERSTANDING MEDICAID HOME AND
COMMUNITY SERVICES: A PRIMER 12, 41, 56, 60-62 (2000), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/primer.htm.
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the day. 337 And when nursing agencies are available to provide personal
assistance, they often impose severe restrictions on the use of their services.
Some of these restrictions may result from home health agencies'
bureaucratic imperatives of coordinating services to a large number of
dispersed individuals.338 Others may reflect an effort to limit attendant
services to those that are "truly medical"-even if more custodial services
would be most effective in promoting independence. 339 Disability rights
activists in a number of states are currently urging relaxation of the
restrictions in their Nurse Practice Acts-and they have won some
important victories. 340 But until those efforts fully succeed, a statute like
MiCASSA will have only limited power to enhance the opportunity for
people with disabilities to participate in community life.
To be sure, the crafting of consumer-controlled structures for
implementing personal-assistance services raises complex political and
policy questions. For the reasons I have discussed, relying on home health
agencies to deliver personal-assistance services limits the agency and
autonomy of people with disabilities. It may therefore seem attractive from
a policy perspective to establish a voucher scheme in which individuals
with disabilities serve as employers of their own attendants and receive a
fixed amount of money to pay their attendants' wages. Medicaid's recent
"cash and counseling" demonstration employed a model like this in three
states, and it is set to expand. 4 Other countries have begun to move toward
voucherized consumer-controlled personal-assistance services as well.342
337. Johnson & Bowers, supra note 294, at 458.
338. See Johnson, supra note 329 ("'My attendant was not allowed to make lunch or
breakfast for my 3-year-old son, only me,' says Vini Portlizine of Pennsylvania, who became
disabled when her child was still a toddler and found herself on the receiving end of an aide from
a 'home health agency."'); id. (reporting a response to a survey of those who receive attendant
services that "[h]ome health agencies refused to send aides before 8 a.m. or after 6 p.m. (aides put
clients in bed at 6 p.m.-the end of their shift)").
339. See id. (reporting survey responses, which revealed that "[a]gency rules forbade aides
helping a client outside their home, forbade them to put away groceries, forbade them to feed
pets"); see also Batavia et al., supra note 98, at 535 ("In determining the appropriate scope of
personal assistance services, there is an ever-present tendency in this country to segregate the
medical from the nonmedical domains of home care and to segregate in-home forms of assistance
from out-of-home forms. Many disabled persons find these distinctions to be artificial and a
source of frustration in their daily lives.").
340. See, e.g., Valerie J. Bogart, Consumer Directed Assistance Program Offers Greater
Autonomy to Recipients of Home Care, N.Y. ST. BAR ASS'N J., Jan. 2003, at 8, 8-9 (describing
amendments to New York's statute); Johnson & Bowers, supra note 294, at 458 n.25 (describing
recent amendment to South Carolina's statute). See generally Johnson, supra note 335 (discussing
efforts to reform Nurse Practice Acts).
341. See Consumer Directed Services: Improving Medicaid Beneficiaries' Access to Quality
Care: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
108th Cong. 1-30 (2003) (discussing experience under the cash-and-counseling demonstration);
'Consumer Direction' Goes Off in a Completely New Direction, 27 REP. ON DISABILITY
PROGRAMS (Bus. Publishers, Inc., Silver Spring, Md.), Feb. 19, 2004, at 25, 25-26 (discussing
plans for expansion of cash and counseling demonstration); Leslie Foster et al., Improving the
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In addition to the policy benefits of a consumer-controlled voucher
scheme, such a scheme may seem attractive from a political perspective:
Using vouchers to implement a Medicaid-funded personal-assistance
benefit would fit in well with the broader conservative agenda to privatize
and impose choice principles on social welfare services.343 It is therefore
possible to envision an across-the-aisle compromise in which people with
disabilities receive new personal-assistance services (which plays to
liberals' interest in expanding social welfare programs) but must use
vouchers to do so (which plays to conservatives' interest in privatized,
choice-based social services).34 4 The disability rights movement's rhetoric
of independence and consumer control might in this context lend a liberal
patina to the generally conservative policy tool of vouchers.
But there are substantial drawbacks to the cash-and-counseling model
of personal-assistance services. For one thing, only a fraction of individuals
with disabilities have the time, inclination, and skills to search for, hire, and
train their own personal assistants.345 In this respect, people with disabilities
are no different from anyone else. Many people, disabled and nondisabled,
who want to hire household assistance-babysitting, housecleaning, or
personal assistance-find that the burdens of becoming an employer are
great; they seek help from specialized employment agencies that screen,
train, and refer candidates for these jobs. If it is to serve the needs of people
Quality of Medicaid Personal Assistance Through Consumer Direction, HEALTH AFF.,
Mar. 26, 2003, at W3-162, W3-163 to W3-164, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/
hlthaff.w3.162vl .pdf (discussing results of cash-and-counseling demonstration in Arkansas); see
also KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, AN OVERVIEW OF THE INDEPENDENCE
PLUS INITIATIVE To PROMOTE CONSUMER-DIRECTION OF SERVICES IN MEDICAID (2003)
(discussing the Bush Administration's Independence Plus Initiative, which will allow states to
adopt a cash-and-counseling approach to, inter alia, personal-assistance services through a
Medicaid waiver).
342. See Sharon M. Keigher, Austria's New Attendance Allowance: A Consumer-Choice
Model of Care for the Frail and Disabled, 27 INT'L J. HEALTH SERVICES 753, 755-57 (1997)
(describing an Austrian program, established in 1992, that provides fixed cash payments to
individuals with disabilities to enable them to purchase attendant services); Joshua M. Wiener et
al., Consumer-Directed Home Care in the Netherlands, England, and Germany (Oct. 2003)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://research.aarp.org/health/2003_12 eu_cd.pdf
(discussing voucher- and cash-grant programs in the Netherlands, England, and Germany).
343. On the rise of privatization and choice, see, for example, MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS,
NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 22-28 (2002); Matthew Diller, Form and
Substance in the Privatization of Poverty Programs, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1739 (2002); Jody
Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1291-95
(2003); and Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1367, 1376-94
(2003).
344. See Keigher, supra note 342, at 761-62 (describing how such a political compromise
resulted in passage of Austria's attendance allowance).
345. See Bob Kafka, Empowering Service Delivery, RAGGED EDGE, Sept./Oct. 1998, at 28,
available at http://www.ragged-edge-mag.com/0998/b998ft6.htm ("This traditional independent-
living movement approach to how personal attendant services should be delivered may work for
some individuals who have the desire and skills to run things on their own. But for the vast
numbers of people who have disabilities, it's just not working.").
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with disabilities, a comprehensive personal-assistance policy must leave
room for such agencies.
Moreover, disability rights activists should regard the conservative
agenda behind the cash-and-counseling program as a threatening one. Such
a program would likely reduce the wages paid to personal assistants, as they
would move from working for (frequently unionized) home health agencies
to working for hard-to-unionize individual household employers.346
Although one result would be the lowering of costs for personal-assistance
services,347 the lower costs can be double edged. If voucher amounts are
pegged to lower wage projections, they may be insufficient to attract a
stable, qualified workforce of personal assistants.348 As the Kaiser
Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured recently reported, low wages
have already led to a "shortage of direct care workers who are trained and
willing to provide community-based personal assistance and other long-
term services. '349 There is thus reason to fear that a cash-and-counseling
approach to attendant services would serve as yet another means of using
deinstitutionalization to cut costs rather than serve the interests of people
with disabilities.35 °
346. In Canada, the implementation of a voucher-type scheme known as "individualized
funding" led in many provinces to significant erosion in personal attendants' pay and working
conditions. See LEN BUSH, NAT'L UNION OF PUB. & GEN. EMPLOYEES, SELF-MANAGED CARE
AND INDIVIDUALIZED FUNDING: NOT THE SAME THING! 12-13 (Nov. 17-20, 2000), available at
http://action.web.ca/home/clcdisab/attach/disabconfnov2000_bush.pdf, see also Wiener et al.,
supra note 342, at 17 (describing argument by "some stakeholders" that "being an individual
worker under Direct Payments [England's voucher scheme] has disadvantages compared to being
employed by a local social service authority with union protection").
347. See, e.g., Wiener et al., supra note 342, at 22 ("[W]hile much of the policy interest in
consumer-directed home care derives from a desire to empower people with disabilities and give
them more control over their lives, this approach is also attractive to governments because of its
lower per person costs.").
348. See BUSH, supra note 346, at 12-13 (describing this problem under the Canadian
individualized funding system). Wiener and his colleagues report a shortage of workers available
under the Dutch, English, and German voucher policies, though that shortage in part reflects
broader trends in the home-care workforce-whether they work in consumer or agency models.
See Wiener et al., supra note 342, at 16-17.
349. KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, OLMSTEAD V. L.C.: THE
INTERACTION OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND MEDICAID 5 (2004).
350. This country certainly has a history of attempting to implement deinstitutionalization
"on the cheap," Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 610 (1999) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment), with devastating results for deinstitutionalized populations. See, e.g.,
Michael L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization, and Homelessness: A Story of
Marginalization, 28 Hous. L. REV. 63, 89-90 (1991) (discussing budget-cutting and privatizing
motives for deinstitutionalization). More generally, privatization of social welfare programs in this
country has recently served an agenda of "reducing the welfare rolls in a manner that spares
public officials from the political consequences of appearing harsh and uncaring about the poor."
Diller, supra note 343, at 1757. There is nothing inherently conservative about privatization. See,
e.g., Freeman, supra note 343, at 1314 (arguing that "perhaps privatization can enhance public
law norms by extending them to realms where they typically do not play a significant role");
Metzger, supra note 343, at 1377 ("[H]istory demonstrates that increased privatization often goes
hand in hand with expansion rather than contraction in public responsibilities."). But privatization
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A more promising approach would retain an agency-provider model of
service delivery but give people with disabilities a greater voice in the
operations of the provider agencies. A handful of independent living
centers-self-help organizations run by people with disabilities 35 '-have
operated attendant-services programs for a number of years.3 52 Longtime
disability rights activist Bob Kafka has proposed that independent living
centers across the country take over the personal-assistance business more
generally, by setting up home- and community-based support service
agencies that would be controlled by people with disabilities and would
deliver attendant services according to the "independent living principles"
of consumer control and demedicalization.3 53 Although much of this new
model of "empowering service delivery" remains to be fleshed out-and
although community-controlled service provision has a checkered history in
American social welfare policy354 -- disability rights activists might
fruitfully focus their energies on elaborating and testing that model.3 55
C. The Coherence of the Disability Rights Movement
in addition to these policy dilemmas, a turn to social welfare strategies
potentially raises a deeper problem for disability rights advocates: It might
endanger the coherence and viability of the disability rights movement as a
movement. Although activists in the 1970s and 1980s were sincere in their
belief that existing welfare programs harmed people with disabilities, their
opposition to welfare served a separate function. Opposition to welfare, and
the concomitant embrace of the broad notion of "independence," helped to
unify previously unaffiliated groups of disparate people with diverse
disabilities. People with different disabilities had very different needs, but
people with nearly all types of disabilities could sign onto an
in this country has, as Professor Diller describes, often been used as a covert means of reducing
public investment in social welfare. See HARVEY FEIGENBAUM ET AL., SHRINKING THE STATE:
THE POLITICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF PRIVATIZATION 131-39 (1998); Metzger, supra note 343, at
1377-78.
351. For a discussion of the independent living movement, see Bagenstos, supra note 4, at
987-99.
352. See Kafka, supra note 345.
353. Id.; see also Batavia et al., supra note 98, at 536-37 ("Whether the funding for a national
personal assistance services program derives from federal, state, or private coffers, we believe that
the program ideally should be based on an entirely new legislative authority that does not suffer
the drawbacks of health care or social service funding. Such statutory authority should be entirely
consistent with the precepts of the independent living model.").
354. See, e.g., DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, MAXIMUM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING:
COMMUNITY ACTION IN THE WAR ON POVERTY (1969).
355. Some of the types of institutional and programmatic structures developed by the
emerging community-development movement might well provide a model here. See, e.g.,
WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT: LAW, BUSINESS,
AND THE NEW SOCIAL POLICY (2001).
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"independence" agenda. 356 And, in unity, the disability rights movement
found strength. The ability of disability rights leaders to hold the movement
together contributed significantly to the passage of the ADA.
3 57
A renewed embrace of social welfare law might threaten to disunify the
disability rights movement in at least two ways. First, individuals with
disabilities who do not need social welfare interventions to get and keep
jobs-those for whom antidiscrimination law is sufficient-may perceive
no interest in advocating for those interventions. Second, the design and
funding of social welfare programs may pit people with different
impairments against one another in internecine struggles for limited
domestic-policy resources.
358
These are significant concerns, and they deserve more discussion than I
can give them here. The stress that social welfare strategies will place on
the unity of the disability rights movement probably cannot be avoided
entirely. But there are at least some tools for managing the tension. In this
regard, universalism in the design of social welfare programs has particular
appeal. Not only does universalism help to avoid the stigmatizing nature of
programs that identify people with disabilities as uniquely incapable of
performing the usual functions of citizenship, it also helps to avoid fights
between people with different disabilities for a scarce pool of resources
devoted to people with disabilities in general.
As I acknowledged above, a general presumption in favor of
universalism does not eliminate zero-sum questions of distribution. Even a
universal benefit will necessarily be crafted according to rules that help
some people more than others. And resources are and will remain limited.
But disability rights advocates should make no mistake: The failure to
embrace social welfare interventions has distributive consequences as well.
As a number of commentators have noted, the rights-focused, welfare-
opposing approach of those who advocated the ADA disproportionately
benefits a relatively advantaged class of people with disabilities-precisely
the sort of people who crafted that approach in the first place. 359 Disability
rights advocates will do best to bring these distributive choices out in the
open and to recognize the limitations of the ADA for many classes of
people with disabilities.
356. For further support for the argument in this paragraph, see Bagenstos, supra note 4, at
1008-13.
357. See SHAPIRO, supra note 33, at 126-27.
358. There is a long history of such internecine battles among impairment-specific disability
organizations. See Bagenstos, supra note 4, at 1009.
359. See, e.g., id. at 1013-14 & n.383.
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CONCLUSION
Disability rights activists will face a number of political and policy
dilemmas as they rely increasingly on social welfare law. I do not pretend
even to have begun to resolve those dilemmas. But it is important that
activists recognize the important choices that lie ahead. The
antidiscrimination approach exemplified by the ADA has not come close to
achieving full employment and community integration for people with
disabilities, and there is no reason to expect that it ever will. Although the
ADA remains exceptionally important, social welfare interventions will
also be necessary to achieve those goals. The important tasks for the
disability rights movement in the twenty-first century will be, first, to
confront honestly the promise and limitations of an antidiscrimination
approach and, second, to craft social welfare laws and policies that address
the movement's own critique of social welfare responses to disability.
These will not be easy tasks, but they will be exceptionally important for
the lives of tens of millions of people with disabilities.
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